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ABSTRACT
THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE APPREHENSION OF BEING:
THE ROLE OF JUDGMENT IN LIGHT OF
THIRTEENTH-CENTURY
SEMANTICS

Rosa E. Vargas Della Casa, M.A.
Marquette University, 2013

Aquinas’ famous comments in his early Scriptum on the Sentences (In I Sent., d.
38, q. 1, a. 3) regarding the intellect’s apprehension of essence and esse have traditionally
been interpreted as grounding Aquinas’ doctrine on the judgment of esse. For Aquinas, it
appears, what the intellect apprehends in a simple concept is essence. Since esse, for him,
is not an essence, it cannot, on the received view, be the object of conceptualization.
Therefore, esse is grasped by the intellect only in judgment. The claim that no genuine
concept of esse is possible, however, is inconsistent with Aquinas’ theory of
signification. A term’s signification is constituted, at least in part, in its “signing relation”
with some “concept” in the mind. If, as on the traditional reading, there is no concept of
esse, the term ‘esse’ is left without signification. To respond that the term ‘esse’ signs,
not a concept, but the judgment in which esse is apprehended is in direct conflict with
Aquinas’ claim elsewhere that no term, including ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, signifies a judgment. I
propose an alternative interpretation to In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, one that allows for the
possibility of a conceptual apprehension of esse. The alternative reading explains
Aquinas’ remarks there in light of the theoretical context of the discussion, in particular
the theory of propositions and their objects. I show how and why Aquinas develops a
distinctive theory of the object of the proposition, that it is concerned with “the esse of a
thing” as a complex. Although this complex includes the simple act of being, as for the
traditional position (contrary to its major critics), it cannot be reduced to anything simple.
Despite the Sentences’ affirmation of a real distinction between a thing’s esse and
essence, to which correspond two different operations of the intellect, it does not follow
that the human intellect cannot conceive esse, just as it conceives essences, in a simple
conception.
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INTRODUCTION
The most famous and distinctive doctrine in Aquinas’ metaphysics is his account
of esse as the act of a thing by which it exists, an act ontologically distinct from a thing’s
essence. As a result, there is great interest in how Aquinas establishes the doctrine, and
how esse in this sense is known. In three well-known passages in the commentaries on
the Sentences and on Boethius’ De trinitate, both early works, Aquinas maintains that the
second operation of the intellect regards the esse of a thing, whereas the first operation
regards a thing’s essence. Ever since the work of Étienne Gilson and Joseph Owens such
remarks have been interpreted as outlining Aquinas’ doctrine on the judgment of esse.
According to this doctrine, esse is grasped originally and solely in ‘judgment’. There is
no authentic ‘concept’ of esse, for only essence is grasped in ‘simple apprehension’.
Since esse is not an essence, it cannot be the object of conceptualization.
Among the earliest criticisms of this interpretation of Aquinas’ words is that of
Louis-Marie Régis who, in a review of Gilson’s Being and Some Philosophers in 1951,
challenges the assertion that for Aquinas no concept of esse is possible from the point of
view of Aquinas’ logic. Régis points to various passages from Aquinas’ commentary on
Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias where Aquinas speaks of a concept of esse signified by the
verb ‘est’. Régis’ critique was echoed by Jean Isaac who, in a similar review and
referring also to the commentary on the Peri hermeneias, argues that for Aquinas the
noun ‘ens’ and the verb ‘est’ signify a concept of esse in different ways. Some years later,
in 1959, Ralph McInerny argues against the claim that the verb ‘est’ is not a predicate
(for, predicates are concepts, and ‘est’ is not a concept since no concept of esse is
possible) on the basis of an study of Aquinas’ account of the signification of the verb
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‘est’, which shows that, for Aquinas, ‘est’ is not only a concept but a predicate as well.
Régis’ line of criticism for the denial of a concept of esse in Aquinas has otherwise
generated very little attention among mainstream Aquinas scholars. A contributing factor
may be the fact that prior to 1970 not much was known about the nature of thirteenthcentury logic and its place in Latin scholasticism. Only since the work of L. M. De Rijk
in his Logica Modernorum, a two-volume study terminist logic completed in 1967, has it
been widely recognized how central a role was played within subsequent thirteenthcentury education and thought by a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s logic, which
originates in the twelfth century. As regards to Aquinas, in the last twenty years, serious
research on Aquinas’ logic has begun to show the extent to which Aquinas’ doctrine of
esse is embedded in his theory of signification.
The present study defends Régis’ approach to the issue of the possibility of a
concept or simple conception of esse in Aquinas. Régis’ position has failed to be
compelling because (i) it offers no convincing alternative account of the early texts on
judgment of esse; (ii) whatever account of these texts is offered seems to focus on a
proposition as predicating form of a subject, which either ignores non-quidditative esse as
act or reduces it to esse in the sense of the truth of a proposition, or ‘propositional esse’.
By contrast, I establish three different claims. First, as part of his semantic theory,
Aquinas recognizes a simple conception of esse. Second, the traditional reading of
Aquinas’ remarks in the commentaries on the Sentences and on De trinitate on the
intellect’s apprehension of the esse of a thing as ruling out the possibility of a simple
conception of esse cannot be made consistent with the text. And, third, Aquinas’
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association of the intellect’s second operation with a thing’s esse is a consequence of his
rather novel view on the object of propositions.
The discussion is divided into four chapters. In chapter I, I discuss in detail
Gilson’s and Owens’ claim of the impossibility of a ‘concept’ of esse in Aquinas. I also
review Régis’ and Isaac’s critique of this claim from the point of view of Aquinas’ logic.
Last, I consider Gilson’s answer to the difficulties introduced by Régis and Isaac.
Following on McInerny, I argue that Gilson’s response begs the question in ruling out of
court Aquinas’ remarks in the commentary on the Peri hermeneias concerning a concept
of esse as signified by the noun ‘ens’ and the verb ‘est’. I submit that the question of
whether or not Aquinas’ remarks in the Peri hermeneias are representative of the sort of
logic to which Aquinas’ subscribes must be answered on the basis of an independent
study of Aquinas’ logic, and in particular of his theory of signification.
In chapters II and III, then, I review Aquinas’ account of the signification of
terms, including the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’, in order to ascertain the nature of the logical
theory to which Aquinas subscribes. In the process, I present evidence that as part of his
semantic theory Aquinas recognizes a simple or non-composed conception of esse (i.e. a
‘concept’ of esse). I begin chapter II by presenting the main elements of the standard
semantic theory of terminist logic, according to which the signification of terms, nouns
and verbs alike, is constituted primarily by their “signing relation” with a simple or noncomposed conception of some res. Aquinas subscribes to a version of this theory that is
distinctive of mid-thirteenth century Latin Europe, a version sometimes called ‘premodism’, in which is highlighted a correspondence within the semantic triangle between
the modi significandi of terms, the modi intelligendi of our intellect, and the modi essendi
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of extra-mental reality. We shall see significant overlap between the major witnesses of
this logic, Peter of Spain, William of Sherwood, and Lambert of Auxerre, and the
semantics of Aquinas. At different places throughout his works Aquinas characterizes the
conception signified by terms as simple (incomplexa), and in more than one occasion he
specifically links the kind of conception that nouns and verbs signify to the first operation
of the intellect. Under the ‘pre-modist’ semantic framework, the noun ‘ens’ and the verb
‘est’, which have esse as their res significata, must signify a simple conception of esse.
Indeed, in chapter three, I show that in his commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias,
Aquinas argues that, despite appearances to the contrary, the conception the terms ‘ens’
and ‘est’ signify is not the sort of conception produced by the second operation of the
intellect, a complex conception, but rather the sort of conception that belongs to the first
operation, a simple conception. Aquinas’ remarks in the commentary on the Peri
hermeneias on the signification of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ are thus very much consistent
with the semantic theory to which Aquinas subscribes, pace Gilson. If, as on the
traditional reading of the Sentences and De Trinitate, there is no concept of esse, we are
faced with two conflicting sets of texts on the subject of the human intellect apprehension
of esse. Should Aquinas’ early texts on the judgment of esse, then, be dismissed as
inconsistent with his finished semantics?
In the last chapter (chapter IV), I dissolve the apparent inconsistency between the
texts by presenting an alternative reading of Aquinas’ association of the second operation
of the intellect with a thing’s esse. My reading leaves open the possibility of a simple
conception of esse. I begin by addressing a question of development, which suggests that
Aquinas’ doctrine of the impossibility of a simple conception of esse belongs exclusively
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to his early writings. In response, I show that even while (presumably) still maintaining
the view that esse is apprehended only in judgment, Aquinas recognizes a simple
conception esse. Next, I give an exegesis of the key text, In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, where
Aquinas refers twice to the intellect’s apprehension of a thing’s esse in its second
operation. Aquinas’ affirmations cannot be understood independently of the medieval
problem of divine knowledge of enuntiabilia: can God with his simple understanding
know propositions and their objects, which are complex, and if so, how? After presenting
the theoretical background of Aquinas’ discussion, I show that, contrary to the traditional
reading of the passage, Aquinas’s remarks on the second operation of the intellect and
‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ are not directed at the intellect’s apprehension of esse as
a simple. What Aquinas has in mind is rather the intellect’s apprehension of the
composed unit that is ‘the esse of a subject’. Further, evidence for this interpretation
emerges when one examines Aquinas’ ‘inherence theory’ of the proposition. Standard
characterizations of Aquinas’ theory fail to see how the very notion of the proposition as
predicating form of matter or a subject allows it also to be seen as predicating the being
of a form of the subject. Existential propositions such as ‘Socrates exists’ can be taken as
predicating a form. But Aquinas moves in the opposite direction: all propositions can be
related to existential propositions as the primary instance, so that all propositions can be
seen as predicating the act of being of a thing or esse rei. It appears that it is precisely in
the context of explaining divine simple knowledge of complexes that Aquinas develops
this propositional theory. Aquinas’ aim at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 is to contrast a
propositional and hence complex apprehension of esse as the act of a subject (esse rei) in
humans with knowledge in God that is not really distinct from his simple apprehension of
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his esse, which is his essence. Apparently for Thomas the account of how God knows
essences is by itself inadequate to explaining how God knows propositional complexes.
The same association of the second operation of the intellect with the apprehension of a
complex esse rei can be found in Aquinas’ other early texts, and he refers to the same
solution to the problem of God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia in the mature Summa
theologiae.

CHAPTER I

A PROBLEM REGARDING THE HUMAN INTELLECT’S
APPREHENSION OF ESSE

1.1

The Problem: A Concept of Esse
In his early Scriptum on the Sentences (c. 1251-52)1 Aquinas makes the following

remarks regarding the intellect’s apprehension of a thing’s essence and esse:
Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse
ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio
intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis
formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates
rerum, quae etiam dicitur indivisibilium
intelligentia. Alia autem comprehendit esse
rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam
esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a
qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in
quadam compositione formae ad materiam,
vel accidentis ad subjectum.2

Since there are two [components] in a
thing, the quiddity of the thing and its esse,
a twofold operation of the intellect
corresponds to these two. One is called
“formation” by philosophers, by which the
intellect apprehends the quiddities of
things, which is also called the
“understanding of indivisibles.” But the
other comprehends the esse of a thing by
composing an affirmation, because also the
esse of a thing composed of matter and
form, from which the intellect receives
cognition, consists in a certain composition
of form with matter or of accident with
subject.

Later in the same article, contrasting God’s and the human intellect’s apprehension of a
thing’s esse and non esse, Aquinas adds, in the response to the second objection:
Sed intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a
rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent,
non apprehendit illud esse nisi componendo
et dividendo.3

But our intellect, whose cognition arises
from things that have composite esse,
apprehends this esse only by composing
and dividing.

Since the work of Étienne Gilson and Joseph Owens, these remarks have been interpreted
as ruling out the possibility of a “conceptual” apprehension of esse and thus as grounding
1

For the dating of Aquinas’ works see Jean-Pierre Torrell, Initiation à saint Thomas d’Aquin:
Sa personne et son œuvre, 2nd ed. (Paris: Cerf, 2002).
2
In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903.
3
In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 904.
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Aquinas’ distinctive doctrine on the judgment of esse. According to the mainstream
reading of this doctrine, esse is originally and solely apprehended by the human intellect
in judgment. For Aquinas, it appears, what the intellect apprehends in simple abstract
conceptualization is essence. Since esse, for him, is not an essence, it cannot be the object
of conceptualization. Therefore, no concept of esse is possible.
The absence, indeed, the apparent impossibility, of a concept of esse, however,
makes it difficult to explain the evident fact that esse is often the subject of thought and
discourse. In response, Aquinas scholars generally concede that what is originally
apprehended in judgment is in some way later also conceptualized. I say “in some way”
because the resulting concept of esse is not regarded as a concept in the strict sense. In
the second edition of Being and Some Philosophers, for example, Étienne Gilson
recognizes a “logical concept” of esse. This logical concept, he says, mistakenly turns
esse into an essence and needs to be distinguished from the proper “metaphysical
conception” of esse in judgment. Gilson reminds his readers of a distinction he made
earlier in his book between “conception,” which covers both judgment and
conceptualization, and “concept” which is the simple apprehension of an essence.4
Similarly, in An Interpretation of Existence, Joseph Owens observes that when we think
and write about esse, the term ‘esse’ refers to a concept whose borrowed content can do
no more than to “draw attention to and focus attention upon what is originally known
through a judgment.”5 If esse cannot be apprehended through conceptualization, there is
in fact no concept of esse. Owens writes:

4

Étienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies, 1952), 221-27.
5
Joseph Owens, An Interpretation of Existence (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1968), 65.
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We have no authentic concept of existence. What we do is use concepts of other
objects to indicate actual existence and to keep attention concentrated upon it. But
no concept taken just in itself expresses what is characteristic of the fact that
something exists.6
In a later article Gilson takes a similar position. He accepts a conceptual “representation”
of esse; we use quidditative concepts to represent what is “implicitly conceived” in
judgment.7 In the end, there really is no concept of esse. There cannot possibly be one if
conceptualization, properly speaking, is limited to essences. The doctrine of the judgment
of esse is seen by both Gilson and Owens as a distinctive feature of Aquinas’
metaphysics as compared to that of Aristotle. No doubt what is apprehended in judgment
needs to be somehow conceptualized, but this can never be an authentic
conceptualization. As Owens notes:
Aquinas of course does more than judge that things exist. He thinks about and
writes about existence as a topic. He is thereby conceptualizing what was
originally known in judgment . . . He speaks of the existence of God, the
existence of man, the existence of a stone, regarding existence as a single notion
undiversified in itself . . . Yet he shows no interest in calling it a concept.8
Though largely accepted among scholars, the claim that esse is originally and
solely apprehended by the human intellect in judgment has seen some criticism as not
properly representing the doctrine of Aquinas. Cornelio Fabro, for instance, rejects the
stand entirely. Fabro interprets Aquinas’ remarks at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 as dealing
with “the characteristic function of the two operations of the mind which divide the twofold content of the notion of ens, essence and the actus essendi. Therefore, the notio entis

6

Ibid., 70.
Étienne Gilson, “Propos sur l’être et sa notion,” in San Tommaso e il pensiero moderno, ed.
Pontificia Accademia di S. Tommaso (Roma: Città Nuova Editrice, 1974), 16.
8
Joseph Owens, “Aquinas on Knowing Existence,” in St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of
God: Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, ed. John R. Catan (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1980), 29.
7
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precedes them both.”9 The notion of esse or actus essendi is thus for Fabro consequent
upon the notion of ens. Jacques Maritain, in contrast, concedes an original intellectual
apprehension of esse in judgment, but he denies that esse is solely apprehended in
judgment. He recognizes three concepts of esse. One is a reflexive concept, subsequent
upon what is originally known in judgment; the other two concepts are attained through
abstraction and precede the apprehension of esse in judgment.10
As intriguing as these alternative interpretations are they appear to be guided
more by their respective proponent’s general understanding of Aquinas’ metaphysics than
by a primarily logical inquiry guided by Aquinas’ texts. Another line of criticism, which
stems from Louis-Marie Régis in his review of the first edition of Being and Some
Philosophers, appears promising in this regard.11 Régis challenges Gilson’s assertion that
for Aquinas no concept of esse is possible from the point of view of Aquinas’ logic,
specifically his theory of signification.
Before addressing Régis’ account of the problem, let us first briefly review some
of the main components of Aquinas’ theory of signification. Aquinas’ semantic theory is
not different from the standard semantic theory of the mid-thirteenth century Latin west,
terminist logic, the culmination of a dominant century-old tradition.12 The term
Cornelio Fabro, “The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse and the Grounds of Metaphysics,”
International Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1966): 426.
10
Jacques Maritain, “Réflexions sur la nature blessée et sur l’intuition de l’être,” Revue thomiste
68 (1968): 17-32.
11
Louis-Marie Régis, review of Being and Some Philosophers, by Étienne Gilson, Modern
Schoolman 28 (1951).
12
The most comprehensive work on terminist logic is that of L. M. De Rijk, Logica
Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic, 2 vols. (Assen: Van
Gorcum, 1962-7). Other relevant works include: Elizabeth Ashworth, “Signification and Modes
of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,” Medieval
Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991); Paul Spade, “The Semantics of Terms,” in The Cambridge
History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Umberto Eco, “Denotation,” in On the
9
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‘terminist’ results from the theory’s focus on the properties of terms. Among those
properties, logicians count that of signification or significatio. Generally speaking, a term
(terminus) can be any word in a given language. Strictly speaking, however, a term is
defined as any part of speech which may be “subjected to the predicate or predicated of
the subject in an ordinary categorical proposition.”13 Thus, whole phrases may be terms,
but only words of a certain type are terms in their own right. According to terminist
logicians, only ‘categorematic’ words (nouns, adjectives, and verbs) may be placed in the
subject or the predicate position. What is characteristic of categorematic words is that
they have signification on their own, that is, they have signification outside a
propositional content. In other words, categorematic words have signification before they
enter into a proposition.
There are two things worth emphasizing in the terminist notion of signification. In
the first place, signification is associated with “signing” rather than, as we might suppose,
meaning.14 The question about the signification of terms is a question about what it is that
terms sign. For any term, to signify is ‘to sign’. Signification is the property that a term
has to sign something, that is, to represent or make something known beyond itself. Thus,
another common formula for signification is “to establish an understanding” (intellectum
constituere).15 Second, we must note that a term’s signification is twofold. A term
immediately signifies a ‘conception’ in the mind (conceptio, ratio, or verbum mentale),
but ultimately it signifies the ‘thing’ (res) that is the object of that conception. Thus, the

Medieval Theory of Signs, eds. Umberto Eco and Constantino Marmo (Amsterdan: Benjamins,
1989).
13
Paul Spade, “The Semantics of Terms,” 188.
14
On signification as signing, see Ashworth, “Signification and Modes,” 43-45; Eco,
“Denotation,” 47-55; Spade, “Semantics of Terms,” 188-90.
15
Ashworth, “Signification and Modes,” 44.
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signification of the res is mediated by the conceptio signified by the term.16 At the same
time, the conceptio signified by the term is the conception of the res signified by the
term. In the words of Aquinas: “the ratio signified by a name is the intellect’s conceptio
of the thing signified by the name.”17 Now, there are many other distinctions that
terminists will add to the signification of a term: consignifications, modi significandi, and
possible secondary significations. At this point, however, what we need to remember is
that a term’s signification consists in the signing of a ‘conception’ in the mind and of a
‘thing’, generally outside the mind, which is the object of the conception signified.
Signification is generally defined as a property of terms, but propositions too were
said to have signification. Propositions have signification inasmuch as they make
something known to the mind. The semantic or logical distinction between terms and
propositions rests on the nature of the conception they signify. Propositions signify the
composition or division of the intellect, that is, they signify a “mental proposition” or
complex conception. Terms, on the other hand, signify a simple or non-composite
conception.18

For this doctrine in Aquinas see ST I, q. 13, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 139: “Respondeo
dicendum quod, secundum Philosophum, voces sunt signa intellectuum, et intellectus sunt rerum
similitudines. Et sic patet quod voces referuntur ad res significandas, mediante conceptione
intellectus;” ST I, q. 13, a. 4, ad 1, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 145: “[N]omen non significat rem, nisi
mediante conceptione intellectus;” also In I Periher., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 11, lines
109-12: “[I]deo necesse fuit Aristotili dicere quod uoces significant intellectus conceptiones
inmediate, et eis mediatibus res.” As we shall see, this mediated “signing” of the res is crucial to
Aquinas’ account of modes of signification.
For a discussion of the role of Boethius’ translation of Aristotle as affecting the medieval
signification theory, see John O’Callaghan, Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a
More Perfect Form of Existence (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 41-77.
17
ST I, q. 13, a. 4, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 144: “Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio
intellectus de re significata per nomen.”
18
On the signification of propositions see Gabriel Nuchelmans, “The Semantics of Propositions,”
in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg, Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy.
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Let us now return to Régis’s review. Régis begins by pointing out that the
assertion that no concept of esse is possible is inconsistent with Aquinas’ remarks in his
commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias (c. 1270-71) regarding the signification of
verbs. Régis refers us to the following passages:
[S]ignificatio orationis differt a
significatione nominis uel uerbi, quia
nomen uel uerbum significat simplicem
intellectum, oratio autem significat
intellectum compositum.19

The signification of a proposition differs
from the signification of a noun or verb,
because a noun or a verb signifies a simple
understanding, a proposition signifies a
composite understanding.

Set dicendum est quod duplex est operatio
intellectus, ut supra habitum est; ille qui
dicit nomen uel uerbum secundum se,
constituit intellectum quantum ad primam
operationem, que est conceptio alicuius . . .
non autem constituit intellectum quantum
ad secundam operationem, que est
intellectus componentis et diuidentis.20

It should be said that the operation of the
intellect is twofold, as was said above; and
he who speaks a noun or a verb by itself
brings about an understanding with respect
to the first operation, which is the
conception of something . . . but [the verb
or the noun said by itself] does not bring
about an understanding with respect to the
second operation, which belongs to the
intellect composing and dividing.

In the first text, verbs are said to signify a simple understanding as opposed to a
composite understanding; that is, verbs signify a “concept” rather than a judgment.
Furthermore, in the second text, the conception signified by verbs is linked to the first
operation of the intellect, not the second. If the verb forms of esse signify a simple
conception, then clearly a “concept” of esse is possible.
Next, Régis addresses Gilson’ claim of the “impredicability” of the verb ‘is’ or
‘est’. As we are about to see, Gilson’s denial that ‘is’ is a predicate is closely linked to his
denial that a “concept” of esse is possible. Before examining Régis’ objections on the
matter, let us look at Gilson’s argument for the ‘impredicability’ of the verb ‘is’.

19
20

In I Periher., lect. 6, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 32, lines 20-23.
In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 29, lines 277-86.
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“Propositions,” Gilson writes, “are usually defined as enunciations which affirm
or deny one concept of another.”21 A proposition consists in the union of two concepts (or
of the disunion of two concepts, in the case of a negation). It follows from there that
predicates are concepts. Gilson distinguishes two types of propositions: “one-term” and
“two-term” propositions. An example of a two-term proposition is ‘Man is rational’,
where ‘man’ and ‘rational’ are terms but ‘is’ is not. The reason ‘is’ is not a term, Gilson
explains, is that “it designates, not a concept, but the determinate relation which obtains
between two terms.”22 An example of a one-term proposition is ‘Peter is’, where there is
only one term, ‘Peter’. Gilson asks, then: “if all propositions entail either a composition
or division of concepts, how can there be a proposition in which there is only one
concept?”23 One could answer that in the proposition ‘Peter is’, ‘is’ is the predicate, just
as in the proposition ‘Peter runs’, ‘runs’ is the predicate. Gilson observes, though, that
while ‘John runs’ may be turned into the two-term proposition ‘John is running’, the
transformation is not possible for a proposition such as ‘Peter is’. Gilson explicates the
matter as follows:
Now, in such cases, as I am or God is the transformation is not even possible,
because in I am being or God is being, the predicate is but a blind window which
is put there for mere verbal symmetry. There is no predicate even in the thusdeveloped proposition, because, while running did not mean the same thing as is,
being does. In other words, is-running does not mean is, and this is why, in the
first case, the verb is a copula, which it is not in the second case. The
metaphysical truth that existence is not a predicate is here finding its logical
verification.24
Gilson explains that ‘is’ cannot be a predicate because esse or existence falls
outside the scope of conceptual or abstract representation. Esse or existence is rather
21

Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 190.
Ibid.
23
Ibid., 191.
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Ibid., 193.
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attained in judgment or, more precisely, in the judgment of existence. In Gilson’ analysis,
a judgment of existence has no predicate. A judgment of the form ‘x is’, or merely ‘is’,
does not predicate existence of its subject; rather, it “posits” the existence of the subject.
If the proposition, “Peter is,” means anything, it means that a certain man, Peter
by name, actually is, or exists. Is does not predicate anything, not even existence;
it posits it.25
In the judgment of existence Gilson finds a distinct and superior type of cognition than
abstract conceptualization because in judgment essence is restored to its act of existing.
Let us rather say that such a judgment intellectually reiterates an actual act of
existing. If I say that x is, the essence of x exercises through my judgment the
same act of existing which it exercises in x.”26
The act of judging thus reflects the structure of reality where essence is composed with
esse. Gilson finds confirmation of this doctrine in Aquinas’ Commentary on Boethius’
De trinitate, q. 5, a. 3. The reference is significant because this is a parallel text to In I
Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 on the subject of the apprehension of esse.27
Let us now review Régis’ objections to the “impredicability” of the verb ‘is’.
Régis points out that in the commentary on the Peri hermeneias Aquinas speaks of the
verb ‘is’ as a predicate. He refers us to the following passage:
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ quandoque in
enunciatione predicatur secundum se, ut
cum dicitur: «Sortes est», per quod nichil
aliud intendimus significare quam quod
Sortes sit in rerum natura; quandoque uero
non predicatur per se, quasi principale
predicatum, set quasi coniunctum principali
25

[T]his verb ‘is’ is sometimes predicated in
a proposition in itself, as when one says
‘Socrates is’, by which we do not intend to
signify anything other than that Socrates
exists in reality. But sometimes the verb
‘is’ is not predicated in itself, as if [it were]
the principal predicate, but, as it were,

Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 201.
Ibid., 203.
27
See De trin., q. 5, a. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 147, lines 96-101: “Prima quidem operatio
respicit ipsam natua rei . . . . Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei.” For the passage
Gilson’s has in mind, see ibid., lines 105-18. The Sentences and De trinitate are the only texts
where the correlation between the two operations of the intellect and the principles of reality,
essence and esse, is mentioned. In later texts, the correlation has disappeared.
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predicato ad connectendum ipsum subiecto,
sicut cum dicitur : «Sortes est albus» : non
enim est intentio loquentis ut asserat
Sortem esse in rerum natura, set ut attribuat
ei albedinem mediante hoc uerbo ‘est’; et
ideo in talibus ‘est’ predicatur ut adiacens
principali predicato, et dicitur esse tercium
non quia sit tercium predicatum, set quia
est tercia dictio posita in enunciatione, que
simul cum nomine predicato facit unum
predicatum, ut sic enunciatio diuidatur in
duas partes, non in tres.28

conjoined to the principal predicate in order
to connect it to the subject, as when one
says ‘Socrates is white’. For, it is not the
intention of the speaker to assert that
Socrates exists in reality, but to attribute to
him whiteness by means of the verb ‘is’;
and for this reason ‘is’ in such cases is
predicated as ‘adjacent to’ the principal
predicate, and it is said to be ‘third’, not
because it is a third predicate, but because
it is a third term in the proposition, which
together with the noun predicated make one
predicate, and thus the proposition has two
parts, not three.

In light of this passage, Régis observes that Gilson’s distinction between “one-term” and
“two-term” propositions finds no support in Aquinas. For Aquinas, every proposition
contains two terms: a subject and a predicate term. The difference between the
propositions ‘Socrates is’ and ‘Socrates is white’ is that in the proposition ‘Socrates is
white’, the predicate is composed of the verb ‘is’ and the term ‘white’; whereas in the
proposition ‘Socrates is’, the verb ‘is’ alone constitutes the predicate.
Régis further observes that the metaphysical reason for the function of the verb
‘is’ as copula comes directly from its object, which, for Régis, is not existence in general
but the actual and present ‘to be’ or ‘to exist’. He cites the following passage from
Aquinas’ commentary on the Peri hermeneias:
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ . . . significat enim id
quod primo cadit in intellectu per modum
actualitatis absolute; nam ‘est’ simpliciter
dictum significat esse actu, et ideo
significat per modum uerbi. Quia uero
actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc
uerbum ‘est’, est communiter actualitas
omnis forme uel actus, substancialis uel
accidentalis, inde est quod, cum uolumus
significare quamcumque formam uel actum
28

[T]his verb ‘is’ . . . signifies that which first
falls into the intellect in the mode of
actuality absolutely; for, ‘is’ simply said
signifies being in act, and thus it signifies
in the mode of a verb. But because the
actuality that is principally signified by the
verb ‘is’ is, in common, the actuality of
every form or act, whether substantial or
accidental, it follows that when we wish to
signify that some form or act is actually in

In II Periher., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 88, lines 36-52.
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actualiter inesse alicui subiecto,
significamus illud per hoc uerbum ‘est’,
simpliciter quidem secundum presens
tempus, secundum quid autem secundum
alia tempora.29

some subject, we signify this by means of
the verb ‘is’, either simply or according to
some qualification; simply, in the present
tense; according to some qualification, in
the other tenses.

For Aquinas, Régis concludes, esse is grasped through and in a concept. Régis
thus rejects Gilson’s claim that concepts are only of essences: “there are concepts in
Thomism which neither are nor can be quidditative, because the reality which they
signify is not quiddity but being.”30 Such is the case of the noun ‘ens’ and the verb ‘esse’
or ‘est’; the concept each of these terms signifies is by no means quidditative.
Régis’ critique of the assertion that for Aquinas no concept of esse is possible, a
critique made in light of Aquinas’ logic, was echoed by Jean Isaac in his review of Being
and Some Philosophers.31 Isaac’s contribution to the discussion consists in the
introduction of the idea that the noun ‘ens’ and the verb ‘esse’ signify the same abstract
concept in the mind, only grasped in different ways: in the first case (‘ens’), as a subject;
in the second case (‘esse’ or ‘est’), as the act of a subject. The latter, Isaac adds, is only
possible in judgment.32 To this extent Isaac considers Gilson to be right. Indeed, esse as
the act of a subject is grasped by the intellect only in judgment, for the act of a subject
cannot be understood without its subject. However, Isaac notes, there is an abstract
concept of esse that precedes the grasping of esse in judgment.
29

In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 391-403,. See also ST I, q. 3, a. 4,
Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 42: “Secundo, quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae: non enim
bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam esse;” De pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad
9, Pession ed., p. 192: “Qualibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod
esse ponitur . . . Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc
est perfectio omnium perfectionum.”
30
Régis, review of Being and Some Philosophers, 125.
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Jean Isaac, review of Being and Some Philosophers, by Étienne Gilson, Bulletin Thomiste 8,
no. 1 (1951).
32
Ibid., 56-57.
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Gilson must have considered Régis’ and Isaac’s objections to the doctrine of the
impossibility of a simple conception of esse sufficiently serious, for in the second edition
of Being and Some Philosophers, he devotes an appendix to them. In the following
section, we review Gilson’s response to Régis and Isaac.

1.2

A Concept of Esse: Aristotelian or Thomistic Logic?

In reference to the apparent inconsistency referred to by Régis between the
doctrine of the judgment of esse and Aquinas’ commentary on the Peri hermeneias,
Gilson asks:
In his commentaries on Aristotle does Saint Thomas always express his deepest
personal thought on a given question? Unless we admit that logic is a strictly
formal science wholly unrelated to metaphysics, it is hard to imagine that the true
Thomistic interpretation of a logic applicable to habens esse can be identically the
same as that of a logic applicable to a metaphysics of ousia.33
Gilson insinuates that Aquinas’ metaphysics requires a different sort of logic from that of
Aristotle. For Aquinas, Gilson insists, there can be no “concept” of esse because
“concepts” are only of essences and esse is not an essence. One may speak of a “concept”
of esse only when esse is mistaken for essence. There is, however, a “conception” of esse
in judgment. Gilson often goes back to his distinction between “concept” and
“conception,” insisting that he has not denied a “conception” of esse. How this
distinction serves to dissolve the difficulty remains unclear. At some point, however,
Gilson seems to recognize that the difficulties regarding the cognition of esse cannot be
reduced to the level of names:
Whether or not our conceptions of verbs should be called ‘concepts’ is, outside of
history, of secondary importance. What does matter is to know if nouns and verbs
Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 224 (Gilson’s appendix is not found in the
corresponding French work).
33
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express cognitions of the same nature and if they point out the same constitutive
element in the metaphysical structure of being.34
Gilson’s assessment of what Régis’ observations amount to is on target. If nouns and
verbs signify “cognitions of the same nature,” then concepts are not restricted to being
about one metaphysical constituent alone, essence, and thus a concept of esse may be
possible. Furthermore, if a simple conception of esse, expressed by a verb, is possible,
then we have reason to question the traditional reading of In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 as
ruling out the possibility of a conceptual apprehension of esse.
Of course, Gilson’ answer to the question of whether or not the cognitions
signified by verbs and nouns are of the same nature is in the negative. Gilson remains
firm in his interpretation of In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 as ruling out the possibility of a
conceptual apprehension of esse. Based on the idea that esse cannot be the object of
conceptualization because esse is not an essence, Gilson concludes that nouns and verbs
cannot express the same kind of cognition. Having limited conceptualization to essences,
Gilson has no difficulty inferring that since verbs do not point out essences, verbs cannot
possibly signify a concept and must therefore signify a judgment. For Gilson, Aquinas’
distinction between essence and esse entails the distinction between conceptualization
and judgment as well as the distinction between nouns and verbs:
[T]he same metaphysical distinction between esse and essentia . . . entails the
logical distinction between simple apprehensions and judgments, as well as the
grammatical distinction between nouns and verb.35
According to the logic Gilson attributes to Aquinas, nouns signify essences and their
concepts, whereas verbs signify esse and the judgment of esse.

34
35
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Regarding the relation between the linguistic expressions ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, Gilson
observes that ‘ens’ is not properly a noun since it signifies not essence but esse; ‘ens’ is a
“verbal” noun. Here Gilson presents us with the following texts where ‘ens’ is said to
signify esse not essence: “Ens autem non dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi” (In
I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2); and “nomen autem rei a quidditate imponitur, sicut nomen
entis ab esse” (SCG I, c. 25). From the observation that ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ signify esse, not
essence, Gilson concludes, contrary to what Isaac suggests, that there is no “concept” of
esse common to ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ that is grasped in different ways; for, only essence may
be an object of conceptualization. Once again, there is no concept of esse. There is only
esse or the act of existence which is signified in abstracto by ‘ens’ and in concreto by
‘esse’: “Ens signifies in abstracto the act concretely signified by is.”36 In support of his
analysis of ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, Gilson refers us to the following passage in Aquinas:
[V]ita non hoc modo se habet ad vivere,
sicut essentia ad esse; sed sicut cursus ad
currere; quorum unum significant actum in
abstracto, aliud in concreto.37

The relation between ‘vita’ and ‘vivere’ is
not the same as that between ‘essence’ and
‘esse’; it is rather the same as ‘cursus’ and
‘currere’, one of which signifies the act in
the abstract, the other in the concrete.

According to Gilson, the correct parallel to ‘cursus’ and ‘currere’, and to ‘vita’ and
‘vivere’, would be ‘ens’ and ‘esse’. The verb ‘est’ signifies the act of existing in the
concrete, for ‘est’ signifies ‘something is’. The verbal noun ‘ens’ signifies the same act
but in the abstract, for ‘ens’ signifies ‘habens esse’, that is, ‘an existing being’. Earlier in
the text, Gilson has observed that the apprehension of ‘ens’ (i.e., of ‘habens esse’)

36
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ST I, q. 54, a. 1, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 5, p. 39.
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implies the apprehension of its esse, for it is because ‘it has esse’ that a thing is an ens.
Hence ‘ens’ expresses the same object as the verb ‘est’.38
At the outset, there is a serious problem with Gilson’s response to the objections
raised by Régis and Isaac: his argument begs the question.

1.3

The Problem of a Concept of Esse: Begging the Question

In his Being and Predication, Ralph McInerny has pointed out that, in answering
Régis and Isaac, Gilson begs the question when he uses the equation between concept
and essence as a reason to dismiss the texts referred to by Régis and echoed by Issac
where Aquinas speaks of a concept of esse. For, the equation between concept and
essence is precisely what those texts bring into question.39 McInerny, it seems to me, is
correct. According to Gilson, a logic applicable to the metaphysical doctrine of the real
distinction between essence and esse cannot admit a “concept” of esse because concepts
are only of essences and, for Aquinas, esse is not an essence. In Gilson’s estimation, the
texts where Aquinas speaks of a concept of esse must represent the logic, not of Aquinas,
but of Aristotle, at least as viewed by Aquinas.40 But, here is the problem: whether or not
Aquinas’ remarks in the commentary on the Peri hermeneias regarding a concept of esse
are representative of the logic to which Aquinas subscribes is an issue that can only be
resolved on the basis of an independent examination of Aquinas’ logic.

38
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Gilson provides us with a series of statements on the signification of nouns and
verbs, as well as of ‘ens’ and ‘est’, that he claims represent the logic of Aquinas as
contrasted with the logic of Aristotle:
(i)

Nouns and verbs signify objects and cognitions of a diverse nature.
Whereas nouns signify essences and their concepts, verbs signify esse and
the judgment of esse.

(ii)

The verbal expressions ‘ens’ and ‘est’ signify, not a concept of esse, but
the judgment of esse.

(iii)

Esse or the act of existence is signified in abstracto by ‘ens’ and in
concreto by ‘est’.

(iv)

The verb ‘est’ is not a predicate. For, predicates are concepts, and ‘est’ is
not a concept.

(v)

A judgment of existence (i.e., a judgment of the form ‘x is’) contains not
two terms but one.

Although Gilson introduces the aforementioned statements as representing a ‘Thomistic
Logic’ as contrasted with an ‘Aristotelian Logic’, he presents no direct evidence that
Aquinas indeed subscribes to them. In fact, they downright contradict Aquinas’
affirmations on the matter in his commentary on the Peri hermeneias. Gilson is right in
his assessment of the logic that would follow from the denial of a concept of esse. But
whether or not Aquinas subscribes to such logic is yet to be seen.
There is, however, one observation made by Gilson on the problem of a concept
of esse which is very much on target. Gilson observes that the answer to the question of
whether there is a concept of esse requires first an answer to the question of whether
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nouns and verbs “express cognitions of the same nature.”41 I agree, and I submit that the
answer to the question is to be found by examining Aquinas’ account of the signification
of nouns and verbs in general. If Aquinas’ theory of signification reveals that nouns and
verbs signify cognitions of the same nature, then, there would be no reason to suppose
that, when in the commentary on the Peri hermeneias Aquinas writes that the verb ‘is’ or
‘est’ signifies a simple conception produced by the first operation of the intellect, he is
not expressing, as Gilson terms it, “his deepest personal thought.”42

1.4

An Alternative Approach to the Problem

Before we consider my proposal for an alternative approach to the problem, let
me offer a short recount of the problem itself. We have two conflicting sets of texts. In
the first place we have In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 where Aquinas establishes a correlation
between the two operations of the intellect and the two metaphysical principles in a thing,
essence and esse. The essence of a thing is apprehended by the first operation, the esse of
a thing by the second operation. The traditional reading of this passage understands it as
ruling out the possibility of a conceptual apprehension of esse, that is, as denying the
possibility of a “concept” of esse. On the other hand, we have Aquinas’ Commentary on
Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias where he specifically links the kind of conception that nouns
and verbs signify to the first operation of the intellect alone. Nouns and verbs signify a
simple conception rather than a composite conception, that is, they signify a “concept”
rather than a judgment. Hence, a concept of esse is possible. Here is then the problem:
The denial of the possibility of a genuine conceptual apprehension of esse is inconsistent
41
42
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with the semantic theory of the Commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias. According
to the latter, the signification of nouns and verbs is constituted, at least in part, by their
“signing relation” with some concept in the mind. If, as on the traditional reading of In I
Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, there is no concept of esse, the term ‘esse’ is left without
signification.
In order to address the problem and dissolve the inconsistency between texts, we
have two possible paths to follow. In the first, we take as our starting point the claim that
In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 rules out the possibility of conceptual apprehension of esse.
From here, our best explanation of the apparent inconsistency of texts is to agree with
Gilson’s assessment of Aquinas’ commentaries on Aristotle. The inconsistency
disappears since the conflicting semantic remarks do not represent Aquinas’ own theory
of signification, but that of Aristotle, at least as viewed by Aquinas. We have seen the
problems with such an approach. The other possible path is to take Aquinas’ semantic
theory as our starting point. One first task would then be to show that Aquinas’ remarks
in his commentary on the Peri hermeneias regarding the signification of nouns and verbs
and of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ are consistent with the general semantic theory Aquinas
subscribes to. Recent research, unknown or little used by mainstream Aquinas scholars
prior to 1970, greatly simplifies this project by having already established the nature of
twelfth-thirteenth century “terminist” logic, and the fact that Aquinas was conversant in
and an active contributor to this tradition. The real challenge we face, however, by taking
Aquinas’ semantic theory as our starting point is to offer an alternative interpretation of
In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, one that allows for the possibility of a conceptual apprehension
of esse, thus solving the apparent inconsistency.
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The second path is the one I pursue. There is much to be gained by approaching
the issue of the human intellect’s apprehension of esse from the point of view of
Aquinas’ semantic theory. Moreover, the same holds true regarding other issues
pertaining to Aquinas’ doctrine of esse. As any reader of Aquinas can tell, Aquinas’
metaphysical claims regarding esse are very often accompanied by a series of semantic
remarks regarding the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ which are apparently intended to illuminate
the corresponding metaphysical claims. Yet to the contemporary reader these semantic
remarks are anything but illuminating. As a result, scholars tend for the most part either
to ignore them or to take them as dispensable accessories to the comparatively
substantive claims. However, Aquinas’ semantic remarks function as more than outdated
explanatory tools. In fact, as Gyula Klima has noted, the very form of discourse within
which Aquinas’ metaphysical claims are formulated presupposes a distinct semantic
theory which sets the stage for the language game in which Aquinas and his
contemporaries participate.43 Therefore, if we are not only to make sense of but also to
join in the discussion with some degree of competence, we need to be proficient in the
rules governing the game and thus the semantic theory in which it is framed. In short, our
understanding of Aquinas’ metaphysical doctrine of esse is enriched if we take seriously
his semantic remarks.

See Gyula Klima, “The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics
of Being,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5 (1996): 87.
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CHAPTER II

AQUINAS AND THE TRADITION OF TERMINIST LOGIC

This chapter serves two purposes at once. It provides the conceptual tools
necessary for the next chapter’s discussion of Aquinas on the terms that signify esse,
namely, of the noun ‘ens’ and the verb ‘esse’. In the process, the chapter also shows that
Aquinas’ theory of signification is no different from the standard semantic theory of the
mid-thirteenth century, ‘terminist logic’, which has its origins in an original interpretation
of the logical works of Aristotle that emerged in the twelfth century.
The chapter is divided into two parts, the first of which is devoted to terminist
logic, focusing especially on the authors whose semantics parallels Aquinas’ and who
may have influenced Aquinas, directly or indirectly. After reviewing the historical
background leading to the development of terminist logic in the Latin west, I examine the
terminist theory of signification as found in logical treatises of the mid-thirteenth
century.1 Naturally, the focus will be on the notion of signification (significatio), but I
will also consider three other related notions: consignification (consignificatio), modes of
signification (modi significandi), and analogy (analogia) or signification per prius et
posterius. In addition, I briefly review the notion of supposition (suppositio), given that
Aquinas occasionally uses supposition theory to explain some features of a term’s
signification. In the second part of the chapter, I review Aquinas’ theory of signification.
1

The most comprehensive work on terminist logic is that of L. M. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum:
A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic, 2 vols. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1962-7).
Other relevant literature can be found in Elizabeth Ashworth, The Tradition of Medieval Logic
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Aquinas’ understanding of the notion of modi significandi will be of particular interest to
us in view of the next chapter’s discussion on Aquinas’ account of the signification of the
terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, which discussion largely centers on the modes of signification
Aquinas assigns to these terms. As we shall see, following on the logicians’ use of the
notion, Aquinas relates the notion of modi significandi with that of modi intelligendi. For
Aquinas, the modes of signification of terms follow from the modes of understanding of
the intellect; thus, an examination of the mode of signification of ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ will
help us ascertain the sort of conception these terms signify.

2.1

Thirteen Century Logic: The Tradition of Terminist Semantics

Throughout the Middle Ages the area of study which today is identified as
“semantics” was traditionally placed under the province of logic.2 For the greater part of
the thirteenth century (up until around 1275) terminist logic was the prevailing logical
theory. Terminist logic, also known as ‘modern logic’ (logica moderna) as opposed to the
‘ancient logic’ (logica antiqua) of Aristotle, was the culmination of a century-old
tradition which begins with the rediscovery of Aristotle’s logical works in the twelfth
century. The name ‘terminist’ results from the theory’s focus on the properties of terms.
Generally speaking, a term (terminus) can be any word in a given language. Strictly
speaking, however, a term is defined as any part of speech which may be “subjected to
the predicate or predicated of the subject in an ordinary categorical proposition.”3

2

On the scope of grammar and logic in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, see Michael
Covington, Syntactic Theory in the High Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984), 8-12.
3
Paul Spade, “The Semantics of Terms,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval
Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), 188.
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According to this definition, whole phrases may be terms, but only a certain kind of
words may be terms in a proposition. Medieval logicians classified words into two kinds:
categorematic words (categoremata) and syncategorematic words (syncategoremata).
Only categorematic words are terms in their own right since they can function by
themselves as subjects and predicates of propositions; thus, nouns, adjectives, and verbs
are the only kind of words included within this category. Terminist logicians recognize
two main properties of terms: signification (significatio), which is the property a term has
of ‘signing’ a concept in the mind and an object in the real world; and supposition
(suppositio), which is the property a term has of ‘standing for’ a particular object or
individual.
In the following pages, I consider, first, the notion of suppositio, and next, the
notion of significatio, together with the subordinate notions of consignificatio, modi
significandi, and signification per prius et posterius, as found in treatises of logic of the
mid-thirteenth century. Before analyzing the notions of supposition and signification,
though, it is helpful to locate them against their background. I begin, then, with a review
of the historical background leading to the standard semantic theory of the mid-thirteenth
century.

2.1.1

Historical Background

At the turn of the twelfth century, the only logical works of Aristotle that were
available in the Latin west were the Categories and De interpretatione. The rest of
Boethius’s translations (the Prior Analytics, the Topics, and the Sophistical Refutations)
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were lost and not rediscovered until the 1120s.4 During the first haft of the twelfth
century, Latin translations of other previously unknown works of Aristotle (including the
Posterior Analytics) were made and disseminated throughout the Latin west. By 1150 the
complete Aristotelian logical corpus was available to scholars in Latin translation.5 The
influx into the Latin west of new translations of original texts as well as of commentaries
on those texts by Arabic and other Greek authors continued over the second half of the
twelfth century and into the thirteenth century. The wealth of new material circulating in
Western Europe at this time inspired the development of original new work by medieval
scholars. During this period the logica moderna took form and with it the theory of the
properties of terms.
It was previously thought that the development of the logica moderna, or
terminist logic as it was later known, was primarily the result of the assimilation of
Byzantine and Arabic logic. It is true that some Arabic treatises on logic were available to
scholars in Latin translation since the second half of the twelfth century,6 but they appear
to have to have had little influence on the development of the logica moderna. In his
Logica Modernorum De Rijk has effectively shown that the logica moderna developed
authentically in Latin Europe. It was the result of the creative minds of medieval

Bernard G. Dod, “Aristoteles latinus,” in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg (eds), Cambridge
History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 46.
5
James of Venice completed a Latin translation of the Posterior Analytics between 1125 and
1150. He also produced a new translation of the Sophistical Refutations. See Dod, “Aristoteles
latinus,” 74-79.
6
Early in the second half of the twelfth century Al-Ghazali’s Intentions of the Philosophers was
translated in full into Latin. Parts of Avicenna’s Book of Healing, namely the part on Porphyry’s
Isagoge and some fragments of the part on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, were also available to
twelfth century scholars. In addition, small fragments of Al-Farabi’s logic works were also
circulating. Henrik Lagerlund, “The Assimilation of Aristotelian and Arabic Logic up to the Later
Thirteenth Century,” in Logic Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 2, Medieval and
Renaissance, ed. Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008), 284-85.
4
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logicians who, having appropriated the logica nova of the recently rediscovered
Aristotelian texts on logic, expanded the range and application of logic to previously
unconsidered problems. According to De Rijk, it was in part the rediscovery of the
Sophistical Refutations, which deals primarily with fallacies, that set in motion the
development of the theory of the properties of terms and, in particular, the notion of
supposition.7 Although the theory of the properties of terms comprises both signification
and supposition, it developed primarily as a theory of supposition. Early terminist
logicians had a contextual approach to semantics; the discussion was centered on the
properties of terms in a proposition. Supposition theory is “a theory describing how the
structure of a sentence indicates what kind of items its terms ‘stand for’ (stant pro) or
‘suppose for’ (supponunt pro).”8 Terminist logicians were certainly not unaware of the
new departures of the logica moderna, but at the same time they did not see themselves
as truly going beyond Aristotle, whom they regarded as the pre-eminent logician whose
theory is virtually complete.9 Supposition theory, however, is genuinely a European
invention. Unlike the notion of signification, which has its roots in the Peripatetic
tradition, the notion of supposition has no counterpart in Greek scholasticism.10
By the turn of the thirteenth century, logic had firmly reestablished itself as a
major discipline of study, and terminist logic was widely acknowledged as a common

7

In addition to the discussion of fallacies in the early Latin commentaries on the Sophistical
Refutation, the development of grammar in the twelfth century also played an important role in
the formulation of the theory of supposition; De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, 2:95-125.
8
Sten Ebbesen, “The Dead Man is Alive,” Synthese 40, no. 1 (1979): 45.
9
Sten Ebbesen, “What Counted as Logic in the Thirteenth Century?” in Methods and
Methodologies. Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500-1500, ed. Margaret Cameron and John
Marenbon (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 99-101.
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Sten Ebbesen, “Dead Man is Alive,” 45-46.
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frame of reference for logical and semantic analysis.11 At the newly established
universities of Paris and Oxford, logical studies quickly became the main feature of the
arts curriculum.12 As noted by Ashworth, “Logic was at the heart of the arts curriculum,
for it provided the techniques of analysis and much of the vocabulary found in
philosophical, scientific, and theological writing. Moreover, it trained students for
participation in the disputations that were the central feature of medieval instruction.”13
Aristotle’s Organon, Porphyry’s Isagoge, and Boethius’ logical treatises were the core of
the logic curriculum of the trivium.14 The central place of logic in medieval instruction is
further evidenced by the fact that Aristotle’s logical works remained largely unaffected
by the prohibitions on Aristotle of the 1210-1230s. Logic was never very controversial. It
was the Metaphysics, Physics and other Aristotelian works on natural philosophy that the
authorities of the time found objectionable.15 During the first half of the thirteenth
century, the most influential treatises of logic written within the tradition of terminist

Alain De Libera, “The Oxford and Paris Traditions in Logic,” in Kretzmann, Kenny, and
Pinborg (eds), Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 174.
12
Richard Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953),
182; Ashworth, “Terminist Logic,” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Robert
Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1:146. The medieval universities were
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studied the trivium (grammar, rhetoric, and logic), provided a basis for the terminal degree at any
of the other three faculties. On the structure and history of the universities of Paris and Oxford,
see, e.g., Hastings Rasdhall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, ed. A. B. Emden and
F. M. Powicke, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1936); Gordon Leff, Paris and Oxford
Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Intellectual History
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968).
13
Ashworth, “Terminist Logic,” 146.
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thirteenth century, see C. H. Lohr, “The Medieval Interpretation of Aristotle,” in Kretzmann,
Kenny, and Pinborg (eds), Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 84-86.
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and the Physics, as well as books I-V of the Meteorologics. Dod, “Aristoteles latinus,” 47.
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logic were composed: Peter of Spain’s Tractatus; William of Sherwood’s Introductiones
in logicam; and Lambert of Auxerre’s Logica, also known as Summa Lamberti.
Of all the logical treatises produced in the thirteenth century, Peter’s of Spain’s
Tractatus (written between 1230 and 1245) was by far the most influential. It was used
throughout European universities as a standard logic textbook well into the seventeenth
century.16 There is some uncertainty as to the true identity of Peter of Spain, but recent
evidence suggests that, unlike what was previously thought, the author of the Tractatus is
not Pope John XXI, but rather a Spanish Dominican.17 Although not as influential in
subsequent centuries as Peter’s Tractatus, Sherwood’s Introductiones in logicam (written
in the late 1230s or early 1240s) was highly regarded among his contemporaries. The
Franciscan Roger Bacon acknowledges his influence in his Opus tertium (written in
1267).18 It is likely that Sherwood lectured at both Oxford and Paris; he is believed to
have been a master in the Arts Faculty at Paris between 1240 and 1248.19 Regarding
Lambert’s Logica, it was likely written in the mid 1250s. The author of the Logica is
generally identified with the Dominican Lambert of Auxerre, but recent studies have
showed that the author could very well be his contemporary Lambert of Lagny.20 There
are strong similarities in composition, organization, and doctrine among the aboveOn the diffusion of Peter’s Tractatus, see L. M. De Rijk, introduction to Tractatus, by Peter of
Spain (Assen: Van Gordum, 1972), xcv-cx. As De Rijk notes, Peter’s Tractatus was repeatedly
copied and commented upon; the earliest commentaries date to the second half of the thirteenth
century. There exist today no less than 300 manuscripts and 200 printed editions of the Tractatus,
the latter dating from 1474 to 1639.
17
On Peter of Spain as a member of the Dominican Order, see Angel d’Ors, “Petrus Hispanicus
O.P., Auctor Summularum,” Vivarium 35 (1997), 39 (2001), 41 (2003). For Peter of Spain as
Pope John XXI, see Joseph Bochenski, introduction to Summulae Logicales, by Peter of Spain
(Turin: Marietti, 1947), xii.
18
For a quote of the relevant passage, see Norman Kretzmann, introduction to Introduction to
Logic, by William of Sherwood (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), 5.
19
Kretzmann, introduction, 8.
20
On the identity of the author of the Logica, see Thomas Maloney, “Who is the Author of the
Summa Lamberti?” International Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2009).
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mentioned logical treatises. However, given the uncertainties of authorship and dating
surrounding them, lines of influence among them cannot be properly traced.21 As noted
by De Rijk, the similarities between the treatises are better explained by the authors’
standing in a common tradition.22
Although Arabic logic was not as influential in the development of Latin tradition
of terminist logic as it was previously thought, it had not an insignificant influence either.
In a recent study, Langerlund has traced some lines of influence of Arabic logic on the
work of mid-thirteenth century Latin commentators of the logical works of Aristotle,
among them Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), Albert the Great (d. 1280), and Robert
Kilwardby (d. 1279).23 The most notable line of influence is the section on logic from AlGhazali’s Intentions of the Philosophers, which was the basic text from which Latin
scholars acquired their knowledge of Arabic philosophy. Latin scholars assumed that the
Intentions of the Philosophers contained the views of Al-Ghazali himself, but it was in
fact intended as a reworking of Avicenna’s doctrines contained in his Book of Science.24
Al-Ghazali’s work was translated in full into Latin early in the second half of the twelfth
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century, but it was not widely read until the thirteenth century.25 Al-Ghazali’s
presentation of Avicenna’s division of the matter of syllogism is found in several logic
texts of the mid-thirteenth century.26Avicenna’s view of logic as a science of second
intentions was also influential. Another line of influence explored by Lagerlund is
Averroes’ commentaries on the logical works of Aristotle. Latin translations of Averroes’
middle commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories, De interpretatione, Prior Analytics, and
Posterior Analytics, as well as his commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, became available
to Latin scholars between the 1220s and 1230s. Averroes’ views on differentia and modal
propositions appear to have been influential, but Averroes’s most notable influence is
manifested in the tendency of mid-thirteenth century Latin scholars to read metaphysics
and epistemology into the logic. 27
Other scholars have remarked that what characterizes the mid-thirteenth century
approach to semantics is the close connection between logic as a theory of language and
discussions on epistemology and ontology, a connection that was absent in the early
tradition of terminist logic.28 In this new approach to semantics, which dominated the
discussion at Paris from around 1250 to 1275, the key notion is that of signification
(significatio) as opposed to supposition (suppositio).29 The new developments in logic
during this period were determined by reflections on the discussions on equivocation,
Henrik Lagerlund, “Al-Ghazali on the Form and Matter of Syllogisms,” Vivarium 48 (2010):
194.
26
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Century including the Modistae,” in Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 2, Mediaeval and
Renaissance Logic, eds. Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008), 348.
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univocation, and analogy as found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and as developed by Arabic
authors, as well as by discussions on the operations of the soul from Aristotle’s De
anima.30 The period between 1250 and 1275 is often described as a pre-modistic period.31
During the last decades of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth
century, logic at Paris was dominated by speculative grammar or ‘modistic’ theory, socalled because of its focus on the notion of modus significandi or mode of signification;
those who wrote within this theory were accordingly called ‘modistae’.32 Some
characteristics of modistic theory are prefigured in the semantic discussions of midthirteenth terminist authors, most notably the connection between a theory of language
and epistemology and ontology. They saw parallels between modi significandi, modi
intelligendi, and modi essendi, a parallelism that has been taken to define ‘modism’.33 In
effect, they could be called ‘pre-modist terminists’.34 However, there are significant
differences on how this parallelism is approached. The modistae were most interested in
metalinguistic questions, such on the nature and structure of language, than in the
semantic analysis of terms. The modistae offered an ontological interpretation of the
structure of language. The modi significandi, the basic components of meaning, were
See Van der Lecq, “Logic and Theories of Meaning,” 348; De Libera, “Oxford and Paris,” 18284. On the influence of Aristotle’s De anima, see also De Rijk, “A Study on the Medieval
Intentionality Debate up to ca. 1350,” in Giraldus Odonis O.F.M. Opera Philosophica, vol. 2, De
intentionibus, ed. L. M. De Rijk (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 30-33.
31
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held to be reflections of the properties of real-world objects, that is, of the modi essendi
of extra-mental reality.35 Pre-modist terminist logicians of the mid-thirteenth century had
a more epistemological approach to the study of language.36 Discussions were centered
on the semantics of terms. The focus was on the property of signification and on the
connection between the modi significandi of terms and the modi intelligendi of our
intellect.
Let us turn next to a review of terminist logic. We begin with a brief overview of
the property of supposition; next, I focus the discussion on the property of signification
(significatio), as did thirteenth century logicians. Our primary sources will be the logical
treatises of Peter of Spain, William of Sherwood, and Lambert of Auxerre.

2.1.2

Thirteenth-Century Theory of Supposition

Aquinas was familiar with terminist theory of supposition and used it occasionally
throughout his works. He did not develop a theory of supposition, but he uses supposition
theory, not only in explaining theological statements such as concerning the Trinity, but
also to explain other notions related to signification, such as imposition and modes of
signification.
The theory of supposition was developed to address the relation between terms
and the real-world objects they ‘refer to’ or ‘stand for’ when used in a proposition. As
Spade notes, “Supposition is a property of categorematic words only when they serve as

See Pinborg, “Speculative Grammar,” 255-56; Covington, Syntactic Theory, 28.
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terms (in the strict sense), or extremes of sentences.”37 Accordingly, Peter of Spain
explains the difference between significatio and suppositio as follows:
Differunt autem suppositio et significatio,
quia significatio est per impositionem vocis
ad rem significandam, suppositio vero est
acceptio ipsius termini iam significantis
rem pro aliquo. Ut cum dicitur ‘homo
currit’, iste terminus ‘homo’ supponit pro
Sorte vel pro Platone, et sic de aliis.38

Signification and supposition differ
because signification is the result of the
imposition of a vocal [expression] upon a
thing to be signified, whereas supposition
is the taking of a term that already signifies
a thing for something; as when ‘a man
runs’ is said, this term ‘man’ stands for
Socrates, or for Plato, and similarly in other
cases.

The term ‘man’ signifies human nature, but it can ‘stand for’ or ‘supposit for’ several
things on different occasions of its use.
Terminist logicians distinguished various types of supposition according as to
what a term might stand for when used in a proposition. Supposition is then generally
divided into simple, material, and personal supposition. Simple supposition occurs when
a term stands for the nature it signifies, as in ‘homo est species’. A term has material
supposition when it stands for itself, as in ‘homo est disyllabum’. Finally, a term may
stand for one or more members of the class it signifies, as in ‘homo currit’; in this case, a
term is said to have personal supposition.39
For the most part, the propositional context in which a term occurs dictates what
the term supposits for in any particular occasion of its use. However, for both William of
Sherwood and Peter of Spain the context required for supposition is not necessarily

Spade, “Semantics of Terms,” 192.
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propositional.40 They distinguish between the supposition a term has in virtue of its
signification alone and the supposition a term has in virtue of its actual occurrence. When
a term acquires signification, it also acquires a natural capacity for supposition. William
of Sherwood refers to a term’s natural capacity for supposition as ‘habitual’ (suppositio
in habitu), and he contrasts it with ‘actual’ supposition (suppositio in actu), which is the
supposition of a term in an actual occurrence.41 For Peter of Spain, the distinction is
between ‘natural’ and ‘accidental’ supposition.42 Peter’s natural supposition is no
different from William’s habitual supposition inasmuch as no propositional context is
required. For Peter of Spain, a term’s natural capacity for supposition is the capacity of a
term to stand for all actual and possible individuals that are of such nature as to partake in
the form signified by the term. Thus, outside of any propositional context, the term
‘man’ supposits for all particular men, past, present and future. In contrast, for William of
Sherwood, a term’s natural capacity for supposition covers only actually existent
individuals.43

2.1.3

Thirteenth-Century Theory of Signification

In this section, I take up: the terminist notion of signification (significatio); the
distinction between consignification (consignificatio) and modes of signification (modi
significandi); and a type of signification of terms named ‘analogy’ (analogia).

On this issue, see De Rijk, “The Origins of the Theory of the Properties of Terms,” in
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A. The Signification of Terms

The first thing to note regarding the terminist notion of signification or
significatio is that it is associated with “signing” rather than, as we might suppose,
meaning.44 Signification is not meaning. For medieval logicians, the question about the
signification of terms is not a question about meaning but about what it is that terms sign.
Signification is understood as the property that a term has to sign something, that is, to
represent or make something known beyond itself. Thus, another common formula for
signification is “to establish an understanding” (intellectum constituere).45 This is not to
say that medieval logicians did not have a general notion of meaning. They talked about
sense (sensus) and about the thought or content (sententia) of a phrase. As Umberto Eco
writes, “meaning (be it mental correlate, semantic content, intension, or any form of
noematic, or ideal, or cultural entity), is represented in the Middle Ages, as well as in the
whole Aristotelian tradition, not by ‘significatio’, but by ‘sententia’ or by ‘definitio’.”46
The notion of significatio so understood has a long tradition; it has its roots in
Aristotle’s observation at the beginning of De interpretatione (16a3-8) that spoken words
are conventional “symbols” or “signs” of concepts, which in turn are likeness or icons of
things:
Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks
symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men,
neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of—
On the medieval notion of ‘signification’ as distinct from ‘meaning’, see Spade, “Semantics of
Terms,” 188-92; Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic:
A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991), 43-45.
45
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151.
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affections of the soul—are the same for all; and what these affections are
likenesses of—actual things—are also the same.47
From ancient to modern times, this passage has been the subject of multiple
commentaries. According to Boethius, by “affections of the soul” Aristotle means a
concept or understanding (intellectus).48 Boethius characterizes the relation between word
(vox) and concept (intellectus) with the term ‘signify’ (significare or designare). A word
signifies a concept in the soul; the concept signified by a word is the conception or
understanding of a thing.49 It would appear that words signify only concepts.50 However,
we should notice that the relation of signification is transitive.51 Accordingly, Boethius
remarks that words signify concepts primarily, but they also signify things in a secondary
way.52 Later terminist authors explicitly remark on the transitive character of
signification. Lambert writes:
Vox que est signum signi, scilicet
intellectus, erit signum significati, scilicet
rei, sed immediate est signum intellectus,
mediate autem signum rei.53

A word that is a sign of a sign, i.e. of a
concept, will be a sign of what is signified,
i.e. of a thing; but it is a sign of the concept
directly, and a sign of the thing indirectly.

Following Boethius, then, terminist logicians interpreted Aristotle’s remarks at the
beginning of De interpretatione along these lines: words primarily signify concepts and
only secondarily, through the mediation of concepts, things in the external world.
Accordingly, the property of significatio was thought to involve a twofold signing
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relation. A term signifies or is a sign of both a concept in the mind and the res that is the
object of that conception.
One of the most debated issues regarding the signification of terms in the Middle
Ages concerns the status of the res significata of terms. What are the “things” terms are
said to signify in a secondary way? This is the well known problem of universals. With
the exception of syncategorematic terms such as ‘not’ and of terms referring to mental
entities such as ‘concept’, the res significata of a term is typically considered to be a res
extra animam.54 Now, the general consensus was that, to use William of Sherwood’s
definition, “signification is a presentation of the form of something to the mind.”55 How
this claim is interpreted depends on the status assigned to common natures. From the
point of view of a realist position, common natures are the secondary significates of
terms. For nominalists, common natures exist only inasmuch as they are conceived by the
intellect. From this point of view, the duality of concept and ‘thing signified’ appears to
be lost. Indeed, some logicians held the view that the res significata of a term is the
intellect’s conception it signifies.56 One cannot, however, hold the view that terms signify
only concepts without committing oneself to the view that the only purpose of language
is to make our thoughts known. Thus, nominalists often held the view that individual
objects are the secondary significates of terms.57 Among terminist logicians there was
general agreement that terms do not signify individual objects; rather, terms “supposit
for” or “stand for” individual objects and “signify” the common nature in which they
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participate.58 Lambert makes it clear that the term ‘man’ signifies humanity, but stands
for Plato or for Socrates.59 When thirteenth century logicians asked whether terms
primarily signify concepts or things, the issue was whether concepts or common natures
should be taken as primary significates of terms.60
A further characteristic of the notion of significatio is that it is regarded as a
natural or essential property of terms.61 In order to understand this doctrine, we need to
consider a related notion to signification, that of “imposition” (impositio).62 Peter of
Spain, contrasting signification and supposition, writes:
Differunt autem suppositio et significatio,
quia significatio est per impositionem vocis
ad rem significandam, suppositio vero est
acceptio ipsus termini iam significantis rem
pro aliquo.63

Signification and supposition differ
because signification is the result of the
imposition of a word upon a thing to be
signified, whereas supposition is the
acceptance of a term, already signifying a
thing, for someone.

Imposition is a conventional act by which some entity, in this case a vocal word, is
appointed to sign something else. This is supposed to work as follows: a first “impositor”
investigates things and their properties and then “imposes” (imponit) vocal words to
signify things with such and such properties; when a word is “imposed” to signify a
certain thing, it acquires signification and becomes a sign or more precisely a term.64
From the point of view of the act of imposition, terms are said to have a conventional
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signification whereas concepts have natural signification.65 Presumably we all share the
same concepts of (elementary) things, but the terms we use to signify these concepts vary
since they are appointed by convention.66 Accordingly, Peter of Spain defines the
signification of a term as “the conventional representation of a thing by a word.”67 Once a
term acquires signification, however, its signification is considered a natural property
inasmuch as the relation of signing or signification between term and concept is essential
to the term. A term is a significative vocal expression. Lambert writes:
[S]ignificatio enim est intellectus rei qui
per vocem representatur, ante cuius
unionem cum voce non est terminus, sed
constituitur terminus in unione illius
intellectus rei cum voce.68

Signification is the concept of the thing
represented by means of a word, and before
the union of it with the word there is no
term; rather, a term is constituted in the
union of that concept of a thing with a
word.

One of the consequences of the doctrine of imposition is that a term has
signification prior to its use in a proposition.69 Medieval logicians were certainly aware of
the variations in the signification of terms in a propositional context. Their analysis of
fallacies, for instance, made those variations evident. However, use and context are
downplayed in favor of the view that the signification of a term on a particular occasion
of its use can ultimately be deduced from its fundamental signification. As a way to
explain the perceived variations in the signification of terms, medieval logicians
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introduced the idea that from the moment of imposition a term acquires, in addition to its
fundamental signification, a set of consignifications (such as time and number); modes of
signification (such as those explaining the distinction between abstract and concrete
terms), and secondary significations (as in the case of analogous terms). Let’s investigate
the notions of consignification and mode of signification, before turning to the secondary
signification of analogous terms.

B. Consignifications and Modes of Signification

In the context of logic and grammar, the consignification of terms was sometimes
linked to a term’s mode of signification, so that the two notions were used
interchangeably.70 Grammarians and logicians distinguished between two main groups of
modes of signification: ‘essential modes’ and ‘accidental modes’. When used as
equivalent to the notion of consignification, the notion of mode of signification refers to
‘accidental’ modes of signification.71 Aquinas keeps the notions of consignification and
mode of signification separate,72 which is why I have elected to treat them separately.

a. Consignification

The notion of consignification is used in two different contexts, each having to do
with a type of word. First, syncategorematic words are said to have consignification
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because they signify only when joined to categorematic words in a proposition.73 Second,
categorematic words are said to have consignification insofar as they have a secondary or
additional signification. For instance, based on Aristotle’s De interpretatione 16b6, as
translated by Boethius, verbs (unlike nouns) were thought to consignify time because the
notion of time is added to their proper signification.74 Notice that a verb’s
consignification of time differs from the signification of time by nouns such as ‘today’
and by adverbs of time.75 Just as verbs consignify time, nouns and adjectives consignify
gender, number, and case.76 In this context, the consignifications of a term were regarded
as accidental properties in contrast to the natural or essential property of signification.
Nonetheless, the consignification of a term is not dependent on use or context; rather, it is
assigned to a term from the moment of imposition. Peter of Spain, for instance, points out
that the one who imposes a term to signify such and such thing, also imposes it to signify
such and such gender and number.77 Peter does not include case among a term’s
consignification because, as he explains, a term’s case is assigned to it only so that it can
be ordered to other terms and thus it does not contribute to a term’s signification.78 Peter
considers case as an example of what he calls an “accidens respectivus,” which he
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contrasts with the “accidentia absoluta” of terms, such as time in the case of verbs, and
gender and number in the case of nouns.79

b. Modes of Signification

Regarding modes of signification, we begin by noting that although there are
remote foundations in Boethius and the Latin grammarian Priscian,80 the notion of modus
significandi is distinctively medieval. It developed primarily during the twelfth century
and by the late thirteenth century became one of the central notions in speculative
grammar.81 In the mid-thirteen century, within the context of logic and grammar, the
notion of modus significandi was used in two different senses, each resulting from its
application to a variety of semantic and grammatical issues.82
Grammatical Sense. The most common use of the notion was within the context
of grammar, where the term ‘modus significandi’ identifies diverse parts of speech.
Modes of signification include being a noun, an adjective, and a verb.83 In this context,
the mode of signification of a term was understood in connection with the res significata
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of the term. Thus, in distinguishing parts of speech, grammarians speak of a noun as a
term having the mode of signifying a substance, that is, an independent object, whereas
an adjective is a term having the mode of signifying something dependent and inherent,
such as a quality, a quantity, etc.84
Logical Sense. Within the context of logic, the notion of modus significandi
acquires a different connotation, wherein it conveys the general idea of signifying
‘according to’ or ‘in the manner of’ (significate sic, significare ut). In its logical sense,
the notion of modus significandi is used to analyze the signification of terms that belong
to the same family or that share the same root, such as ‘white’ (‘albus’) and ‘whiteness’
(‘albedo’). The focus here is not the grammatical opposition between a substantive name
(‘whiteness’) and an adjectival name (‘white’), although such opposition is often in the
background, but the different mode or manner in which these terms signify the same res.
In discussing modes of signification, logicians distinguish between signifying a
substance and signifying substantively (substantive); the latter says nothing about the
thing signified, it merely designates the mode or manner in which the thing is signified.85
Following on this line of thought, Peter of Spain argues against the use of the descriptive
terms ‘substantive’ and ‘adjectival’ in reference to the modi significandi of nouns and
adjectives. He explains that “being adjectival” and “being substantive” are modes of
things signified, not modes of signification. He recommends instead the use of the
adverbs ‘substantivally’ and ‘adjectivally’:
Significationis alia est rei substantive et
habet fieri per nomen substantivum, ut
‘homo’; alia est rei adiective et habet fiery
per nomen adiectivum vel per verbum, ut
84
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‘albus’ vel ‘currit’. Quare propie non est
significatio substantiva vel adiectiva, sed
aliquid significatur substantive et aliquid
adiective, quia adiectivatio vel
substantivatio sunt modi rerum que
significantur, et non significationis.86

by an adjectival noun or by a verb like
‘albus’ or ‘currit’. As a result, signification
is not properly substantive or adjectival;
rather, something is signified substantivally
and something adjectivally, since being
adjectival or being substantive are modes
of the things that are signified, not modes
of signification.

For Peter, then, the notion of modus significandi relates to the res significata of a term
only to the extent that it designates the manner in which the res significata is signified by
the term. As one will recall from our previous discussion of the terminist notion of
signification, the res significata of a term is signified through the mediation of the
intellect’s conception of it, which conception the term immediately signifies. Thus, the
mode of signification of a term, as understood by Peter, is ultimately a reflection of the
mode in which the res significata is conceived by the intellect. Peter’s understanding of
the notion of modus significandi in connection with the intellect’s conception signified by
terms explains why Peter uses the term ‘modus intelligendi’ as a synonymous with the
term ‘modus significandi’.87
As we indicated earlier, the notion of modus significandi, taken in its logical
rather than grammatical sense, was used to analyze the signification of terms that belong
to the same family or that share the same root (although distinctions among parts of
speech are also often mentioned). Logicians analyze such terms as signifying the same
res according to different modes (alio modo, aliter et aliter).88 The source for this use of
the notion is Boethius, who, distinguishing between the noun ‘cursus’ and the verb
‘currit’, remarks:
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Omne enim verbum aliquod accidens
designat. Cum enim dico cursus, ipsum
quidem est accidens, sed non ita dicitur ut
id alicui inesse vel non inesse dicatur. Si
autem dixero currit, tunc ipsum accidens in
alicuius actione proponens alicui inesse
significo.89

Every verb signifies an accident. When I
say ‘cursus’, an accident is signified, but it
is not said in such a way that it is said to be
or not to be in someone. But if I say
‘currit’, by asserting the accident in the
action of someone, I signify it as being in
someone.

Notice that the implication here is that the terms ‘cursus’ and ‘currit’ signify the same
res, in this case an accident, running, but in different modes. Notice also that although the
noun ‘cursus’ signifies an accident, i.e., something dependent and inherent, it does not
signify it in the mode of an accident, i.e., as inherent in someone (ut id alicui inesse). The
verb ‘currit’, on the other hand, signifies an accident in the mode of accidents. Peter of
Spain would say that the noun ‘cursus’ signifies its res “substantivally” whereas the verb
‘currit’ signifies its res “adjectivally.”
Next, we consider a case of terms having secondary significations, which came to
be known in the thirteenth century as ‘analogia’, and which logicians analyzed in terms
of signification: specifically, as they put it, signification per prius et posterius.

C. Analogy: Signification per prius et posterius

Logicians of the thirteenth century treated analogy or analogia as a species of
equivocation, given that equivocation covered all cases in which one and the same term
displays different significations on different occasions of its use.90 For, the signification
of analogous terms varies on different occasions of their use. The term ‘healthy’, for
example, has different significations as it is predicated of animal and food. Before we
consider the semantic structure of analogous terms, let us begin with an overview of the
89
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three different sources that framed the semantic discussion of equivocation and analogy
in the thirteenth century.91

a. Background of the Discussion of Equivocation and Analogy
in the Thirteenth Century

Boethius and Aristotle’s Categories. The first source is Boethius’ translation and
interpretation of Aristotle’s distinction between equivocal and univocal terms at the
beginning of the Categories. Equivocal terms are defined as having a name in common
but a different ratio. Univocal terms, on the other hand, have both a name in common and
the same ratio.92 Boethius divided equivocal terms into two groups: chance equivocals
(aequivoca a casu) and deliberate equivocals (aequivoca a consilio).93 Our interest lies
with deliberate equivocals where there is a relation between the occurrences of the
equivocal term. Boethius further subdivided deliberate equivocals into four groups
according to the way the occurrences of the equivocal term are related: (i) resemblance,
(ii) proportion (‘proportio’ in Latin, ‘analogia’ in Greek), (iii) “from one” (ab uno), and
(iv) “to one” (ad unum).94 The last two subdivisions were sometimes joined together
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under the label of signification ‘ut unum’.95 In the thirteenth century, the last two were
covered under the term ‘analogia’.96
The Discussion of Equivocation in Aristotle’s De sophisticis elenchis. The
second source is Aristotle’s De sophisticis elenchis, where Aristotle distinguishes
between three modes of equivocation: (i) when the term signifies more than one thing,
(ii) when the term is used equivocally by custom, and (iii) when terms signify more than
one thing in combination, but alone only one thing.97 In his Tractatus, Peter of Spain
identifies Aristotle’s second mode of equivocation as involving diverse things that are
signified secundum prius et posterius. His example is ‘healthy’ (‘sanum’) as said of a
person and of urine.98 He does not use ‘ens’ as an example, but later in the treatise Peter
speaks of a sort of unity “by proportion” which is said secundum prius et posterius; his
examples are ‘ens’ as said of all beings, and ‘sanum’ as said of all healthy things:
Et est aliud unum simpliciter quod est
unum et sub uno nomine. Et hoc subdivitur
per quinque partes. Quia huius unius
quoddam est quod est unum proportione, et
est illud quod est dictum secundum prius et
posterius, ut ‘ens’ de omnibus entibus et
‘sanum’ de omnibus sanis et ‘bonum’ de
omnibus bonis.99

[Among the modes of unity,] there is a
second ‘one’, simply speaking, which is
[both] one and under one name. This is
subdivided into five parts. For, to this ‘one’
belongs something that is one
proportionally, and it is that which is said
secundum prius et posterius, as ‘ens’ is
said of all beings, and ‘healthy’ of all
healthy things, and ‘good’ of all good
things.

In addition, earlier in the treatise, Peter remarks that ‘ens’ is equivocal because different
rationes were involved:
Predicari autem univoce est predicari
secundum unum nomen et rationem unam

To be predicated univocally is to be
predicated according to one name and one
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sumptam secundum nomen . . . Et ob hoc
ens non potest esse genus quia, licet
secundum unum nomen predicetur de
omnibus, non tamen secundum rationem
unam. Ratio enim entis, secundum quod
dicitur de substantia, est ens per se;
secundum autem quod dicitur de aliis
novem predicamentis, est ens in alio. Et ita
predicatur secundum diversas rationes. Et
ideo non predicatur univoce, sed potius
equivoce aut multipliciter.100

ratio taken according to that name . . . That
is why ens cannot be a genus; for, although
it is predicated of all things according to
one name, [it is not predicated] according
to one ratio. The ratio of ens, as said of a
substance, is ens per se; as said of the other
nine predicaments, it is ens in alio. Thus,
the name ‘ens’ is predicated according to
different rationes. And, for that reason, it is
not predicated univocally but equivocally
or in different ways.

Peter’s remarks above indicate that there is a kind of unity among the different
conceptions or rationes involved in the signification of analogous terms. The various
conceptions or rationes involved are ‘one’ according to a certain ‘proportio’ or ‘relation’,
so that one is ‘prior’ and the others ‘posterior’. Hence, the language of signification
secundum prius et posterius.
Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the Work of Arabic Authors. The recovery of
Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the introduction into the Latin west of the work of Arabic
authors constitute a third source.101 In Metaphysics 4.2 (1003a33-35) Aristotle remarks
that ‘ens’ is predicated of both substance and accidents without being equivocal.102 This
remark directly contradicts Porphyry’s claim in his Isagoge that ‘ens’ is said
equivocally.103 In order to solve the difficulty, logicians interpreted Aristotle’s remark in
the Metaphysics as a denial that ‘ens’ is equivocal according to the first mode of
equivocation distinguished in De sophisticis elenchis. The term ‘ens’ is equivocal
100
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according to the second mode of equivocation. In the long commentary on Metaphysics
4.2 (1003a33-1003b10), Averroes remarks that Aristotle classifies the term ‘healthy’ as a
case of relation to one as an end, the term ‘medical’ as a case of relation to one as an
agent, and the term ‘ens’ as a case of relation to one subject.104 Accordingly, to
accommodate ‘ens’ into Boethius’ subdivision of deliberate equivocals, logicians
expanded the last two subdivisions into three.105 Another important Arabic source was
Al-Ghazali’s Logic, through which logicians acquired the notion of ambiguous terms (of
which ‘ens’ is an example) which are intermediaries between equivocal and univocal
terms and which are said of different things in a prior and a posterior way (secundum
prius et posterius).106 Al-Ghazali refers to such ambiguous terms as ‘convenientia’, that
is, terms related by agreement.107

b. The Semantic Structure of Analogous Terms

Lambert’s exposition of analogous terms illustrates how the various sources
discussed above came together in the mind of mid-thirteenth century logicians. Indeed, of
the three authors we are studying, Lambert alone incorporates the term ‘analogia’ into his
discussion of equivocation. He writes:
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Secunda species provenit ex eo quod aliqua
dictio significat unum predicatum tamen a
pluribus, ita quod ab uno per prius, ab alio
sive aliis per posterius, unde secundum
istam speciem equivocatio fit in terminis
analogis. Terminus analogus unum
significat sub diversis tamen intentionibus:
hoc est, sub ratione prioris et posterioris in
hiis a quibus predicatur, ut ens unum
significat, sed prius est predicatum a
substantia, per posterius ab accidente, unde
est terminus analogus.108

The second species [of equivocation] arises
from the fact that an expression signifies
one thing that is nonetheless predicated of
many in such a way that it is [predicated]
primarily of one, and secondarily of
another or of others. Thus, this species of
equivocation occurs in analogous terms.
An analogical term signifies one thing,
nonetheless under different concepts
(intentionibus), that is, under the concept
(ratio) of priority and posteriority in
connection with those things of which it is
predicated, as ‘ens’ signifies one thing, but
it is predicated primarily of substance and
secondarily of accident; thus ‘ens’ is an
analogous term.

Following this passage, Lambert examines the term ‘healthy’ (‘sanum’) as said of animal,
urine, food, and diet. He explains that the “one thing” signified by the term ‘sanum’ is
health. When ‘sanum’ is said of the animal, health is signified per prius; when ‘sanum’ is
said of urine, food, and diet, health is signified per posterius. Lambert suggests that
‘sanum’ is said per prius of the animal inasmuch as health is first in the animal as in a
subject, whereas it is said per posterious of the others inasmuch as each of the objects
involved relates to the health in animals in some way, e.g., as a sign or as a cause of
health.109 Based on Lambert’s definition of analogy in the passage quoted above, we may
deduce that the term ‘sanum’, when said of animal, urine, food, and diet, signifies the
same thing, namely health, but under different concepts (ratio or intentio).
Several other points regarding the logicians’ understanding of the semantic
structure of analogous terms are important before we conclude this section.
We begin with a quick note regarding analogy and imposition. When the term
‘ens’ is predicated of an accident, or when the term ‘sanum’ is predicated of food, it
108
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appears as if the term ‘ens’ and ‘sanum’ acquire a new signification which, as it happens,
is neither the same nor completely different from their original signification (i.e. from the
signification they have standing outside a propositional context).110 Yet, from the point of
view of terminist logic and the doctrine of imposition, the “new” signification, cannot be
the direct result of use and context. Within the semantic framework of terminist logic,
words signify precisely what they were imposed to signify. Terminist logicians were
generally willing to concede that some grammatical features such as case are relational,
but there was a strong belief that once a term’s signification is set by imposition, it is not
altered by sentential context.111 Thus, in order to explain the perceived alterations in the
signification of terms like ‘ens’ and ‘sanum’ when they are predicated of different
objects, without at the same time destroying the theory of signification, logicians needed
to place the source of the new signification at the moment of the imposition of the term
with signification.112 This does not mean, of course, that all significations of a term must
be ascribed to its original imposition; within the terminist framework, it is possible for a
term to acquire an additional or secondary signification by an additional act of
imposition. The central point here is that the signification of a term must be the result of
an act of imposition. This proved to be quite a challenge for terminist logicians when
applied to equivocal terms in general. The most common account runs as follows. Purely
equivocal terms (such as ‘canis’) are imposed to signify more than one thing, when taken
alone, and only one thing, when taken in certain propositional contexts. The case of
analogous terms was thought to be the opposite. They are imposed to signify only one
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thing when taken alone (e.g., the term ‘ens’ by itself signifies only substance), and one or
the other significate, when taken in a propositional context, so that senses must be
distinguished before verification can take place.113
In examining the semantic structure of analogous terms, terminist logicians in
general shared the view that the variation in signification of analogous terms has nothing
to do with their res significata but rather with the intellect’s conception of the res
significata. Discussions on analogy in the thirteenth century were largely centered on the
precise nature of the conception or conceptions involved.114 One subject of debate,
having to do with the interpretation of the phrase ‘per prius et posterius’, concerns the
question of whether the various significations of an analogous terms are either the result
of one ratio or intentio used in different ways (William of Sherwood) or the result of
more than one ratio or intentio used in very similar ways (Lambert of Auxerre and Peter
of Spain).115 Aquinas, we shall see, takes diverse positions on the matter, eventually
arriving at the claim that the conceptions involved are neither one nor many. In
addressing the issue, William agrees that a term must have signification before it enters a
proposition, but he argues that within a propositional context slight variations in a term’s
signification can take place. “This applies,” he writes, “not to every word, but to that
[word] whose signification or consignification is one concept (intentio) shared
(participata) by many secundum prius et posterius.”116 But, even if one claims that there
is in fact more than one ratio involved, there is no denying the similarities among them.
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Peter of Spain, we have seen, speaks of a certain unity among the various rationes or
conceptions involved, which, he explains, are “one” according as they are ordered
secundum prius et posterius.117 Thus, with regards to the number of rationes involved in
analogous signification, we may say that there is a sense in which more than one ratio or
conceptio is involved, and there is another sense in which only one ratio or conceptio is
involved. When we look at the internal semantic structure of the analogous term, we find
a single res significata and distinct but similar conceptiones or rationes. There is a
primary (prior) conception, which provides the primary signification of the term, and one
or more secondary conceptions which are consequent upon (posterius) the primary one.
In this manner, the primary conception is somehow contained in all secondary
conceptions, so that one may speak of there being only one ratio involved.
We turn next to the second part of the chapter, devoted to a review of Aquinas’
theory of signification.

2.2

Aquinas’ Theory of Signification

Now that I have reviewed the main notions of the standard thirteenth-century
theory of signification, I turn to that theory in Aquinas. In examining Aquinas’ theory of
signification, I consider the following topics: Aquinas’ view on the nature of the
conceptio and res signified by terms; his theory of modi significandi, specially the
concrete and abstract modes of signification; and his account of the semantic structure of
analogous terms. As we shall see from the following discussion, there is significant
overlap between Aquinas’ theory of signification and that of terminist logicians of the
mid-thirteenth century.
117
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2.2.1. Aquinas’ Account of the Nature of the Conceptio and Res
Signified by Terms

In terminist semantics, we might recall, the notion of signification was understood
to entail a twofold ‘signing’ relationship: between a term, on the one hand, and a concept
or a thing, on the other. For Aquinas, a term immediately signifies a concept or
conception in the mind (conceptio, intellectus, ratio, intentio, or verbum interius)118, but
ultimately it signifies the thing (res) that is the object of that conception.119 The
signification of the res is thus for Aquinas always mediated by the conceptio signified by
the term. He writes:
Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum
Philosophum, voces sunt signa
intellectuum, et intellectus sunt rerum
similitudines. Et sic patet quod voces
referuntur ad res significandas, mediante
conceptione intellectus. Secundum igitur

I answer that, according to the Philosopher,
words are signs of ‘intellections’ and
‘intellections’ are the likenesses of things.
And so, it is evident that words are related
to the things signified through the
mediation of the conception of the intellect.

I have found that in the context of signification the terms ‘conceptio’ and ‘intellectus’ appear
more often than any of the other terms. For the sake of consistency in the exposition, though,
throughout the following pages I use ‘conceptio’ or ‘conception’ to refer to this side of a term’s
signification. In addition, with this use, I seek to avoid possible misunderstandings given the
various meanings of ‘ratio’. Also, the notion of ‘verbum interius’ appears more often in
epistemological than in semantic contexts, although, as we shall see, the two are deeply
connected. Regarding the notion of ‘intentio’, which I will also use on occasion, it should be
noted that in the context that interests us it is used as equivalent to ‘conceptio’. Aquinas speaks of
both ‘conceptio rei intellectae’ and ‘intentio rei intellectae’ as what the intellect produces and
properly understands (ST I, q. 27, a. 1; SCG I, c. 53); and he identifies ‘verbum interius’ with both
‘conceptio’ (De pot., q. 8, a. 1; De ver., q. 4, a. 2) and ‘intentio’ (SCG IV, c. 11). Another notion
we will encounter is that of ‘definitio’, but this notion is quite ambiguous. It is sometimes
identified with the ratio or conception signified by a term (In I Post. Anal., lect. 4, lines 110-112;
De pot., q. 8, a. 1; and q. 9, a. 5), but ‘definitio’ can also be that which signifies the intention or
ratio of the thing understood (SCG I, c. 53).
More will be said about these terms and phrases when we discuss the nature of the conception
signified by terms. For now, I point out that (i) strictly speaking, what a term signifies in the mind
is ‘that which the intellect understands’ about the thing signified, and (ii) ‘that which the intellects
understands’ can be considered as both a psychological and a logical entity. Whichever term is
used, then, greatly depends on the context.
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quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci
potest, sic a nobis potest nominari.120

Therefore, according as something is
known by us in an ‘intellection’, in this
way it can be named by us.

The doctrine of the mediation of the intellect’s conceptio in the signification of the res
establishes a relation between signification and intellection, and more broadly between
semantics and epistemology, that deeply shapes Aquinas’ theory of signification.121 As I
indicated earlier, the relation between semantics and epistemology is characteristic of the
version of terminist logic that is distinctive of mid-thirteenth century Latin Europe (c.
1250-75), a version sometimes called ‘pre-modism’, in which is highlighted a
correspondence between the modi significandi of terms and the modi intelligendi of our
intellect.122 Notice how this theme emerges in the passage last quoted: the manner in
which something is named parallels that in which it is known. We will encounter this
same theme often as we discuss Aquinas’ account of the nature of the res and conceptio
signified by terms.

A. The Res Signified in Aquinas

Regarding the nature of the res significata of a term, we should mention first that
Aquinas identifies the res significata of a term with a form or nature rather than with an
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individual or a collection of individuals.123 The res significata of the term ‘man’, for
example, is not any particular man but human nature or humanity. As Aquinas explains,
the term ‘man’ signifies (significat) human nature and stands for (supponit) individuals
having that form, i.e., individual human beings.124
[H]oc enim nomen homo non significat
aliquem singularium hominum, sed solum
hominem in communi.125

This name ‘man’ does not signify any
individual man, but only man in general.

The fact that a term signifies a nature has implications, of course, for what it of itself
stands for in propositions, for its per se supposition. And so, Aquinas observes:
Quia enim forma significata per hoc
nomen homo, idest humanitas, realiter
dividitur in diversis suppositis, per se
supponit pro persona.126

Since the form signified by this name
‘man’, namely, humanity, is really divided
in different subjects, in itself it supposits
for a person [i.e., an individual of a
rational nature].

One might think that the term ‘humanity’ signifies human nature while the term ‘man’
signifies an individual human being. The difference in signification between these terms,
however, does not rest in the res they signify. Aquinas points out that the terms ‘man’
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and ‘humanity’ signify the same res, human nature or humanity, according to different
modes of signification.127
The identification of the res significata of a term with a form or nature rather than
with an individual thing is a direct consequence of the mediation of the intellect’s
conceptio in the signification of the res. The res significata of a term is the object of the
intellect’s conception immediately signified by the term.128 As such, the res significata is
that which the conceptio signified by the term makes us aware of, and this is some form
or nature without its individuating conditions.129 The object of the intellect’s conception,
the thing that is understood and subsequently signified, is thus intrinsically qualified by
the way in which the intellect works. Aquinas writes:
Ulterius autem considerandum est quod
intellectus, per speciem rei formatus,
intelligendo format in seipso quandam
intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio
ipsius, quam significat definitio. Et hoc
quidem necessarium est: eo quod
intellectus intelligit indifferenter rem

In addition, it must be considered that the
intellect, informed by the species of the
thing, forms in itself in understanding a
certain intention of the thing understood,
which is its ratio, which the definition
signifies. This is necessary because the
intellect understands a thing indifferently,

See De ente, c. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 373, lines 292-94: “Sic igitur patet quod essentiam
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Aquinas’ conception of ‘modes of signification’ in the following section.
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absentem et praesentem, in quo cum
intellectu imaginatio convenit; sed
intellectus hoc amplius habet, quod etiam
intelligit rem ut separatam a conditionibus
materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura
non existit; et hoc non posset esse nisi
intellectus sibi intentionem praedictam
formaret. 130

[whether] absent or present. In this the
imagination agrees with the intellect. But,
in addition, the intellect has that it
understands the thing as separated from the
material conditions without which it does
not exist in reality. And this could not be so
unless the intellect forms for itself the
aforementioned intention.

Accordingly, the object of the intellect’s conception signified by the term ‘man’ cannot
be humanity in its individual and material particularity, i.e. this or that man. The res
significata of the term ‘man’, the object of the intellect’s conception signified by this
term, is not an individual human being, but human nature or humanity.
We should be careful, however, not to mistake the res significata of terms with a
universal that can only exist in the mind. Aquinas explains that “humanity is something
in reality, but there it does not have the ratio of a universal, for there is not some
humanity outside the soul that is common to many.”131 Human nature as such exists in
reality only in this or that man; it is only accidental to this nature to be apprehended by
the intellect without its individuating conditions:
[H]umanitas quae intelligitur, non est nisi
in hoc vel in illo homine, sed quod
humanitas apprehendatur sine
individualibus conditionibus, quod est
ipsam abstrahi, ad quod sequitur intentio
universalitatis, accidit humanitatis
secundum quod percipitur ab intellectu, in
quo est similitudo naturae speciei, et non
individualium principiorum.132
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The humanity which is understood exists
only in this or that man, but that humanity
be apprehended without the conditions of
individuality, that is, that it be abstracted,
[such that] to it belongs the intention of
universality, befalls humanity according as
it is perceived by the intellect, in which
there is that likeness of the nature of a
species and not [that of] individuating
principles.

SCG I, c. 53, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 150, lines 3-14B.
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Certainly, the form signified by a term in this particular thing is numerically different
from the form signified by the same term in that particular thing. Nevertheless, there is
something in reality that is the same in this and that particular thing and that corresponds
to the object of the conception formed by the intellect. As Aquinas explains:
[N]on enim oportet, si hoc est homo et illud
homo, quod eadem sit humanitas numero
utriusque, sicut in duobus albis non est
eadem albedo numero; sed quod hoc
similetur illi in hoc quod habet
humanitatem sicut illud; et intellectus
accipiens humanitatem non secundum quod
est hujus, sed ut est humanitas, format
intentionem communem omnibus.133

[I]t is not necessary that, if this is a man
and that is a man, they both have
numerically the same humanity, just as in
two white things whiteness is not
numerically the same; but rather that this
man be ‘assimilated’ to that man in that
this man has humanity just as does that
man; and the intellect, taking humanity not
as it belongs to this [man], but as it is
humanity, forms an intention that is
common to all.

Therefore, although the res significata is generally identified with some form or nature
without its individuating conditions, it should not be regarded in itself as a universal, as a
one over the many; what is common to many and has the ratio of universality is rather the
conception or intention formed by and as in the intellect. What the conception of ‘man’
makes us aware of, i.e. the object of this conception, is, not the intention of humanity, but
human nature.
The res significata of the term ‘man’ is, therefore, neither a particular nor a
universal;134 it is rather that which in the nature of things renders this and that man
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equally a man. So considered, the res significata of a term is often characterized as the
form or nature that renders an individual such that it actually falls under the term. The res
significata of a term is that on account of which the term is said of (also “imposed upon”)
some individual. The res significata of ‘man’ is that on account of which the term ‘man’
is said of this and that man. Humanity is that by which something is denominated ‘man’,
just as whiteness is that by which something is denominated ‘white’. At the same time, if
one considers the “imposition” of a term with signification, the res significata of a term is
identified with the form or nature from which the term is originally “imposed with”
signification. On this distinction Aquinas writes:
[I]n quolibet nomine est duo considerare:
scilicet id a quo imponitur nomen, quod
dicitur qualilas nominis; et id cui
imponitur, quod dicitur substantia nominis.
Et nomen, proprie Ioquendo, dicitur
significare formam sive qualitatem, a qua
imponitur nomen; dicitur vero supponere
pro eo cui imponitur.135

In a name two things can be considered:
that from which the name is imposed,
which is called the quality of the name; and
that upon which the name is imposed,
which is called the substance of the name.
A name, properly speaking, is said to
signify the form or quality from which it is
imposed, and it is said to stand for that
upon which it is imposed.

We will discuss in some detail the dynamics of imposition and denomination in Aquinas
shortly. For now I will remark on the assigned role of the res significata in the passage
just quoted. The res that a term signifies is the form or nature from which the term is
imposed with its signification as well as that on account of which an individual is
denominated by a term.136 Thus, to use Aquinas’ terminology, the res significata of the
term ‘man’, i.e. human nature or humanity, is that from which the term ‘man’ is
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“imposed with” its signification as well as that on account of which the term ‘man’ is
“imposed upon” individual human beings.137
As a final note on the nature of the res significata, I want to point out that, as
Klima rightly remarks, “the significata of common terms need not necessarily be
regarded metaphysically as forms in all cases.”138 Without doubt, a significant number of
terms signify a res that is metaphysical a form and that has actual existence in the nature
of things. However, the intellect can conceive and hence signify not only forms that exist
in reality, but also something completely non-existent as well as something that exists
only in the operation of the intellect itself. For example, there are terms such as ‘genus’
and ‘species’ that signify a res that has nothing but mental existence.139 On the other
hand, there are terms such as ‘blind’ that signify a privation, and terms such as ‘chimera’
that signify an imagination. On the diversity of things signify by terms, Aquinas writes:
[E]orum quae significantur nominibus,
invenitur triplex diversitas. Quaedam enim
sunt quae secundum esse totum completum
sunt extra animam; et hujusmodi sunt entia
completa, sicut homo et lapis. Quaedam
137

There is a three-fold diversity among
things signified by names. For some are
outside the soul according to their total,
complete being; and of this kind are
complete beings, such as a man and a

Notice that a term stands for and is imposed upon the things having the form or nature the term
signifies. A term signifies the form or nature from which it was imposed, and stands for, for
example, the individuals having the form signified by the term and upon whom the term is
imposed precisely on account of their having that form.
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otherwise committed to a hylomorphist metaphysics, the fact that not all terms signify a res that is
metaphysically a form was a commonplace.
139
The type of conception signified by these terms is called ‘second intention’ because it has as
its object an intention or conception. The terms that signify such type of conception are called
‘terms of second imposition’. For discussion and references on second intentions in Aquinas, see
Klima, “Semantic Principles,” 99-102; Robert Schmidt, The Domain of Logic According to Saint
Thomas Aquinas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 117-29. Since neither ‘ens’ nor ‘esse’ are
identified as terms of second imposition, we will not concern ourselves with the signification of
such terms beyond what has been noted. It is sufficient to know that they too signify a res and a
conceptio in the mind, but the res significata is not metaphysically a form. The same is true for
‘ens’ and ‘esse’, as we shall see.
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autem sunt quae nihil habent extra animam,
sicut somnia et imaginatio Chimerae.
Quaedam autem sunt quae habent
fundamentum in re extra animam, sed
complementum rationis eorum quantum ad
id quod est formale, est per operationem
animae, ut patet in universali.140

stone. Some have nothing outside the soul,
such as dreams and the imagination of a
chimera. And some have a foundation in
reality outside the soul, but the
completeness of their ratio, with respect to
that which is formal, is through the
operation of the soul, as is clear in the case
of the universal.

Therefore, although the res significata is characterized as a form or nature, we should not
take this claim to imply that the res significata of terms is in every case metaphysically a
form. ‘Form’ is used here for the object of semantics, as, for example, ‘humanity’, not as,
first of all, an ontological feature such as ‘a substantial form’ (which is not humanity, but
the soul).
What should we make, then, of the characterization of the res significata as a
form or nature? When the res significata of a term is characterized as a ‘form’, what is
implied is that the res a term ultimately signifies is signified in the mode of form. As
Aquinas explains:
[I]llud a quo aliquid denominatur, non
oportet quod sit semper forma secundum
rei naturam, sed sufficit quod significetur
per modum formae, grammatice
loquendo.141

That by which something is denominated
need not always be a form in reality; it is
sufficient for it to be signified,
grammatically speaking, in the mode of a
form.

We mentioned before that the res significata of a term is identified with that which
renders an individual such that it actually falls under the term. Now, although there is
nothing in the nature of things that is, say, a chimera – and hence no ‘form’ of chimera
actually exists – from a semantic perspective the term ‘chimera’ is said to signify a res
140

In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 486. To this threefold division of the res
significata corresponds a threefold division of the conceptio intellectus signified by terms; some
concepts have a foundation in reality, either immediate or remote, and some concepts do not, such
as ‘genus’, as opposed to ‘universal’ (see In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3). A similar division of
conceptions is found in De pot., q. 1, a. 1, ad 10.
141
De pot., q. 7, a. 10, ad 8, Marietti ed., p. 211.
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which is that by which something is denominated a chimera. In this sense, we speak of
the res signified by the term ‘chimera’ as a form. The same analysis applies to the res
significata of the term ‘blind’, which signifies a privation: blindness is that by which
something is denominated ‘blind’, and as such it is signified as if it were some form. This
analysis is consistent with Aquinas’ theory of predication. Aquinas remarks that in
forming a proposition the intellect either applies to or removes from the thing signified by
the subject-term some form signified by the predicate-term.142 In the case of a privation
or deformity, which has no being in the nature of things, Aquinas says that the privation
is predicated of a subject “as if it were some form.”143
Notice that although some terms signify a res that is nothing in the nature of
things, it is not the case that there is no identifiable res significata for these terms. The
mediation of the intellect’s conceptio in the signification of the res – i.e. the fact that the
res significata is the object of the intellect’s conception immediately signified by the
term– makes it possible for terms to retain their signification even if the external objects
they denote become extinct;144 similarly, it makes possible for terms like ‘chimera’ to
have signification even if there is no such thing as a chimera in the nature of things. As
Aquinas points out, anything our intellect is able to conceive we are able to name.145
ST I, q. 16, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 208: “[I]n omni propositione aliquam formam
significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab
ea.”
143
In II Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 947: “[I]ntellectus componit
privationem cum subjecto, sicut forman quamdam.”
144
De ver., q. 18, a. 4, ad 10, Leonine ed., vol. 22/2, p. 543: “Alio modo dicitur aliquis
cognoscere rem in propria natura per modum definitionis: dum scilicet cognoscit aliquis quid sit
propria natura alicuius rei; et sic etiam res non existens potest in propria natura cognosci, ut si
omnes leones essent mortui, possem scire quid est leo;” also SCG I, c. 66.
145
See ST I, q. 13, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 139: “[A]liquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest,
sic a nobis potest nominari.” Note that this claim does not commit Aquinas to the view that the
possession of a concept is a sufficient condition for being able to express that concept; the
possession of a concept is rather a necessary condition for our ability to use language
142
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From a purely semantic perspective, the terms ‘man’ and ‘chimera’ share the same
semantic structure; each signifies some conception in the mind and the object of that
conception. The fact that the conception signified by the term ‘man’ has an immediate
foundation in reality adds nothing to the signification of ‘man’ over that of ‘chimera’.
Whether or not the res significata of a term is actually realized in some individual or
another does not enter into the signification of the term. Indeed, one may know what a
term signifies without knowing whether there is something in reality to which the term
applies. Furthermore, knowledge of what a term signifies does not guarantee that we are
able to provide a proper definition of the term.146

B. Aquinas and the Conceptio Signified

We turn our attention now to the nature of the intellect’s conception signified by
terms. As we have seen, although our terms are ultimately imposed to signify some res,
they do not do so directly. For Aquinas, a term immediately signifies an intellectual
conception, namely, the intellect’s conception of the res that the term is ultimately
imposed to signify. Accordingly, Aquinas describes the conceptio signified by a term as
“the intellect’s conception of the res signified by the term.”147 There are two points to be

successfully. Given that significant words immediately signify a concept in the mind, a
significant word necessarily entails the existence of a corresponding mental concept in the
original linguistic community. Pasnau, “Thought’s Linguistic Nature,” 563-66. Now, a mental
concept may or may not have a foundation in reality, but in either case there surely is some
identifiable res intellecta, i.e. the object of the mental concept.
146
What is in the background here is the distinction between ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ definition, or
between the quid nominis and the quid rei. The distinction is frequently mentioned by Aquinas. In
II Post. Anal., lects. 6 and 8; In V Meta., lect. 4, n. 805; SCG I, c. 35; De pot., q. 7, a. 2; ST I, q. 2,
a. 2, ad 2.
147
ST I, q. 13, a. 4, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 144: “Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio
intellectus de re significata per nomen.” Aquinas’s use of the term ‘ratio’ in the context of
signification can be rather ambiguous. The term ‘ratio’ is used in reference to both the
‘conception’ signified by a term (ST I, q. 13, a. 4 just quoted) and the ‘form’ that is the object of
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made regarding the nature of this conception: (i) it is a simple or non-composite
conception, and (ii) it is not equivalent to knowledge.

a. Simple vs. Complex Conceptions

Let us begin by distinguishing between the signification of a term and the
signification of a proposition. Aquinas writes:
[S]ignificatio orationis differt a
significatione nominis uel uerbi, quia
nomen uel uerbum significat simplicem
intellectum, oratio autem significat
intellectum compositum.148

The signification of a proposition differs
from the signification of a noun or verb,
because a noun or a verb signifies a simple
understanding, a proposition signifies a
composite understanding.

Both a term and a proposition signify an intellectual conception (here: ‘intellectus’), but
the nature of each conception differs. The conception signified by a term is simple,
whereas the conception signified by a proposition is complex or composed. Aquinas
relates the conception signified by a term to the first operation of the intellect and the
conception signified by a proposition to the second operation of the intellect:
Set dicendum est quod duplex est operatio
intellectus, ut supra habitum est; ille qui
dicit nomen uel uerbum secundum se,
constituit intellectum quantum ad primam
operationem, que est conceptio alicuius . . .
non autem constituit intellectum quantum
ad secundam operationem, que est
intellectus componentis et diuidentis.149

It should be said that the operation of the
intellect is twofold, as was held above; and
he who speaks a noun or a verb by itself
brings about an understanding with respect
to the first operation, which is the
conception of something, . . . but [the verb
or the noun said by itself] does not bring
about an understanding with respect to the
second operation, which belongs to the
intellect composing and dividing.

that conception. For the latter use, see In VIII Meta., lect. 1, n. 1687, Marietti ed., p. 403-404:
“Forma vero, quae et ratio nominatur, quia ex ipsa sumitur ratio speciei, dicitur substantia quasi
ens aliquid actu, et quasi ens separabile secundum rationem a materia.” For a discussion of
Aquinas’ doctrine of the ratio signified by terms as being both in the mind and in the thing, see
Klima, “Semantic Principles,” 99-104.
148
In I Periher., lect. 6, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 32, lines 20-23.
149
In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 29, lines 277-86.
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Therefore, a term, as opposed to a proposition, immediately signifies the intellect’s
simple conception of some res – a conception that is effected by the intellect through its
first operation.
Especially in epistemological contexts, Aquinas calls the conception formed by
the intellect, whether simple or composed, ‘word’ (‘verbum’) or ‘inner word’ (‘verbum
interius’). He writes:
Hoc ergo est primo et per se intellectum,
quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re
intellecta, sive illud sit definitio, sive
enuntiatio, secundum quod ponuntur duae
operationes intellectus, in III de Anima.
Hoc autem sic ab intellectu conceptum
dicitur verbum interius, hoc enim est quod
significatur per vocem; non enim vox
exterior significat ipsum intellectum, aut
formam ipsius intelligibilem, aut ipsum
intelligere, sed conceptum intellectus quo
mediante significat rem: ut cum dico,
«homo» vel «homo est animal».150

Therefore, what is primarily and per se
understood is what the intellect in itself
conceives about the thing understood,
whether it be a definition or a proposition –
according as two operations of the intellect
are affirmed in De Anima 3. And this
[thing] conceived by the intellect in this
way is called the interior word, for this is
what is signified by the voice; for, the
exterior voice does not signify the intellect
itself, or its intelligible form, or the act of
understanding, but the concept of the
intellect through whose mediation it
signifies the thing: as when I say, ‘man’,
or, ‘Man is an animal’.

[V]erbum intellectus nostri, secundum
cuius similitudinem loqui possumus de
verbo divino, est id ad quod operatio
intellectus nostri terminatur, quod est
ipsum intellectum, quod dicitur conceptio
intellectus, sive sit conceptio significabilis

The word of our intellect, according to
whose likeness we can speak of the divine
word, is that in which the operation of our
intellect terminates, which is what is
understood itself, which is called the
conception of the intellect – whether it be a

De pot., q. 9, a. 5, Marietti ed., p. 236. Note that here the terms ‘definitio’ and ‘enuntiatio’ are
used to refer, not to the external linguistic expression, but to the internal conception, and that
propositions are also “conceived.” For the use of ‘definitio’ as the internal conception signified,
see also, De pot., q. 8, a. 1, Marietti ed., p. 215: “Intellectus enim sua actione format rei
definitionem, vel etiam propositionem affirmativam seu negativam. Haec autem conceptio
intellectus in nobis proprie verbum dicitur: hoc enim est quod verbo exteriori significatur: vox
enim exterior neque significat ipsum intellectum, neque speciem intelligibilem, neque actum
intellectus, sed intellectus conceptionem qua mediante refertur ad rem” (note in this passage that
the conception signified by a term is differentiated from the intelligible species and from the act
of the intellect); In I Post. Anal., lect. 4, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/2, p. 19, line 11: “[D]effinitio enim
est ratio quam significat nomen;” and In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3. For an example of the use
of ‘definitio’ as the external linguistic expression, see SCG I, c. 53 in note 130.
150
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per vocem incomplexam ut accidit quando
intellectus format quidditates rerum, sive
per vocem complexam ut accidit quando
intellectus componit et dividit.151

conception signifiable by (i) a non-complex
word (vox), as occurs when the intellect
forms the quiddities of things; or by (ii) a
complex word (vox), as occurs when the
intellect composes and divides.

The ‘inner word’, then, is that which the intellect conceives about the thing understood. It
is the immanent product of the intellect, that which the intellect produces through either
of its two operations. Aquinas calls the ‘inner word’ alternatively conception (conceptio)
and concept (conceptus),152 although intention (intentio) is also used.153
Now, according to the two operations of the intellect, two different kinds of
conceptions are produced, each kind is signified by linguistic expressions of diverse
nature: one simple, the other complex or composed. The conception signified by a simple
‘external word’, such as the term ‘man’, is a simple conception. The conception signified
by a complex ‘external word’, such as the proposition ‘Man is an animal’, is complex. On
the distinction between simple and complex words Aquinas writes:
Voces enim incomplexae neque verum
neque falsum significant; sed voces
complexae, per affirmationem aut
negationem veritatem aut falsitatem habent
. . . Et cum voces sint signa intellectuum,
similiter dicendum est de conceptionibus
intellectus. Quae enim sunt simplices, non
151

Non-complex words signify neither truth
nor falsity; but complex words, through
affirmation or negation, have truth and
falsity . . . And, since words are the signs
of concepts, the same is said with respect to
the conceptions of the intellect. Those
which are simple do not have truth and

De ver. q. 4, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 22/1, p. 123-24, lines 101-109.
De pot., q. 9, a. 5; De ver. q. 4, a. 2, both quoted above. In light of these texts, Gilson’s
terminological distinction between ‘conceptio’ and ‘conceptus’ (where ‘judgment’ is a
‘conceptio’ but not a ‘conceptus’) is highly questionable.
153
SCG IV, c. 11, Leonine ed., vol. 15, p. 32, lines 32-33B: “[I]psa intentio verbum interius
nominatur, quod est exteriori verbo significatum.” On the different meanings of the term
‘intentio’ in Aquinas, see Henri-Dominique Simonin, “La notion d’ ‘intentio’ dans l’oeuvre de s.
Thomas d’Aquin,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 19 (1930); also Schmidt,
Domain of Logic, 94-129. A nice summary of the role of ‘intentio’ in Aquinas’ doctrine of
cognition can be found in L.M. De Rijk, “Medieval Intentionality,” 113-126. For the Arabic
sources of the notion of ‘intentio’ in its logico-semantic sense, see Kwame Gyekye, “The Terms
‘Prima Intentio’ and ‘Secunda Intentio’ in Arabic Logic,” Speculum 46 (1971); Christian
Knudsen, “Intentions and Impositions,” in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg (eds), Cambridge
History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 479-82.
152
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habent veritatem neque falsitatem, sed
solum illae quae sunt complexae per
affirmationem vel negationem.154

falsity, but only those which are complex
through affirmation or negation [have truth
and falsity].

Notice that the simplicity of the internal and external ‘word’ is not material but formal.
The term ‘man’ is materially simple, but it is equivalent to phrases such as ‘rational
animal’ or ‘animal with two legs’, which are materially composite. These phrases and the
single term ‘man’ signify a conception that is formally simple, although it too can be
linguistically expressed by a phrase such as ‘what has humanity’ (‘habens
humanitatem’).155 The complexity of the interior and exterior ‘word’ is associated with its
being the subject of truth and falsity, and hence with predication. As noted by Aquinas,
only in predication is a comparison made between the thing denoted by the subject-term
and the form signified by the predicate-term.156 Such comparison makes possible the
conception of truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei.157 The conception signified by simple
words is not subject to truth and falsity because it contains no predication. A conception
is said to be simple or non-composite (conceptio incomplexa) because it lacks the
composition of a proposition. As Aquinas explains:
Cum aliquod incomplexum vel dicitur vel
intelligitur, ipsum quidem incomplexum,
quantum est de se, non est rei aequatum
nec rei inaequale: cum aequalitas et
inaequalitas secundum comparationem
dicantur; incomplexum autem, quantum est
de se, non continet aliquam comparationem
vel applicationem ad rem. Unde de se nec
verum nec falsum dici potest: sed tantum
complexum, in quo designatur comparatio
154

When something non-complex
(incomplexum) is said or understood, the
incomplexum, as it is in itself, is neither
equal nor unequal to the thing; because
equality and inequality are said according
to a comparison. But the incomplexum, as it
is in itself, does not contain a comparison
or application to the thing. Thus, in itself, it
cannot be said to be true or false; but only
the complexum, in which is designated a

In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1223-1224, Marietti ed., p. 309.
The reason for this phrasing of the conception signified by the term ‘man’ will be explained in
the next section, once we discuss ‘modes of signification’.
156
See, ST I, q. 16, a. 2.
157
We shall explore this connection further in Chapter IV in examining Aquinas’ theory of
predication.
155
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incomplexi ad rem per notam
compositionis aut divisionis.158

comparison of the incomplexum to the
thing through the note of composition and
division [is said to be true or false].

Truth and falsity are not per se found in the first operation of the intellect and in its
product (conceptio, intentio, definitio).159 The first operation results in a simple, noncomposite conception which is signified by a linguistic expression such as the single term
‘man’ or the phrase ‘rational animal’.
We have shown, then, that for Aquinas the intellect’s conception signified by
terms is simple or non-composite, that is, it lacks the composition of subject and
predicate, which characterizes the sort of conception that propositions signify.

b. Signification and Knowledge

After the distinction between simple and composite conception and signification,
the second point to be made regarding the nature of the intellect’s conception of the res
signified by our terms is that it is not equivalent to knowledge.160 Even though we can
come to know the real definition of what our terms signify, this knowledge is not required
for signification, that is, for our ability to use the terms of a language successfully. Our

158

SCG I, c. 59, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 167, lines 24A-1B.
There is a sense, nonetheless, in which both truth and falsity are found in the first operation of
the intellect. Aquinas notes that falsity may be accidentally found in the ‘definition’ in three
ways: because one applies the definition to the wrong thing, because the definition contains a
logical contradiction (e.g. ‘non-sensitive animal’), or because the definition does not denote a real
thing (e.g. ‘four-footed flying animal’). In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7; In IX Meta., lect. 11, n.
1908; ST I, q. 58, a. 5; q. 85, a. 6. Similarly, in a certain respect, truth may also be found in the
first operation or in the ‘definition’. In I Post. Anal., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/2, p. 26, lines
179-82: “[L]icet deffinitio in se non sit propositio in actu, est tamen uirtute proposition, quia,
cognita deffinitione, apparet deffinitionem de subiecto uere praedicari;” and In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5,
a. 1, ad 7, where the definition is said to be true insofar as the quiddity is an ens rationis:
“[Q]uidditatis esse est quoddam esse rationis, et secundum istud esse dicitur veritas in prima
operatione intellectus: per quem etiam modum dicitur definitio vera;” Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p.
489.
160
Klima, “Semantic Principles,” 100, 104.
159
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intellect can have an initial apprehension of human nature without its individualizing
conditions, even without this apprehension yet amounting to a determinate and complete
knowledge of what such nature is in itself.
Aquinas’ discussion on the imposition of the term ‘lapis’ with signification is
helpful on this issue.161 He points out that we know substances only indirectly through
their properties and effects; yet we impose our terms to signify, not these properties and
effects, but the form or nature of the substance. Thus, even though we know stones
through their propensity to hurt feet (laedere pedem), we impose the term ‘lapis’ to
signify the nature, stone.162 Indeed, we do not apply the term ‘lapis’ to everything that
has the propensity to hurt feet. It would thus be a mistake to identify the res signified by
the term ‘lapis’ with ‘foot-hurting’. The least cognition we have of a stone as such
provides the basis for our imposing a term to signify the stone’s nature. In this sense, the
nature of stone can still be viewed as that from which, on the part of the thing, the name
was imposed.163 Since we know a stone’s nature only through its properties and effects,
the intellect’s conception of the nature of stone does not in itself guarantee that we are

161

ST I, q. 13, a. 8 corpus and ad 2; q. 13, a. 2, ad 2; q. 59, a. 1, ad 2. For a more detailed
discussion of Aquinas’ handling of the lapis example, see Ashworth, “Signification and Modes,”
49-50.
162
De ver., q. 4, a. 1, ad 8, Leonine ed., vol. 22/1, p. 121-22, lines 343-46: “[L]apis imponitur ab
effectu qui est laedere pedem, et hoc non oportet esse principaliter significatum per nomen sed
illud loco cuius hoc ponitur.”
163
Aquinas distinguishes between id a quo nomen imponitur ex parte rei and id a quo nomen
imponitur ex parte imponentis. Thus, in the case of the term ‘lapis’, that from which the term was
imposed ex parte rei is the nature of stone, whereas that from which it was imposed ex parte
imponentis is the property to hurt feet (De ver., q. 4, a. 1, ad 8). We must not confuse this
distinction with the one previously discussed between that from which a term is imposed (id a quo
imponitur nomen) and that upon which a term is imposed (id cui imponitur nomen). For a
discussion on the two distinctions, including references to their historical background, see
Ashworth, “Signification and Modes,” 47-50. A useful overview on the imposition of words in
Aquinas can be found in McInerny, Logic and Analogy, 54-59.
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able to provide a real definition of the nature of stone; such conception suffices, however,
for us to be able to use the term ‘lapis’ successfully.164
In regards to our ability to use terms in a language successfully, it makes no
difference whether or not one has complete knowledge of what the res signified is. One
may know the meaning of a term or its nominal definition (the quid nominis) without
knowing what the thing signified is in itself (the quid rei). Our terms have signification
inasmuch as they signify or sign a conception in the mind, but having such a conception
is not equivalent to knowing what the object of that conception is. Moreover, having such
a conception does not amount to knowledge of whether the term in question denotes a
real thing, that is, whether the things the term stands for have actual existence in the
nature of things.165 Thus, knowing the signification of the term precedes any answer to
the questions ‘is it’ and ‘what is it’. Aquinas observes that knowledge of whether
something is (an sit) precedes knowledge of what something is (quid sit), but knowing
whether something is presupposes knowledge of the signification of the term.166

De ver., q. 4, a. 1, ad 9, Leonine ed., vol. 22/1, p. 122, lines 350-58: “[Q]uantum ad rationem
verbi pertinet non differt utrum aliquid intelligatur per similitudinem vel essentiam: constat enim
quod exterius verbum significat omne illud quod intelligi potest, sive per essentiam sive per
similitudinem intelligatur. Et ideo omne intellectum, sive per essentiam sive per similitudinem
intelligatur, potest verbum interius dici.”
165
De pot., q. 9, a. 4, ad 18, Marietti ed., p. 64: “[L]icet universale non possit esse praeter
singularia, potest tamen intelligi, et per consequens significari. Et propter hoc sequitur, si non est
aliquod singularium, quod non sit universale. Non tamen sequitur, si non intelligitur aut
significatur aliquod singularium, quod non intelligatur vel significetur universale: hoc enim
nomen homo non significat aliquem singularium hominum, sed solum hominem in communi.”
166
In I Post. Anal., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/2, p. 11, lines 63-69: “[Q]uia antequam sciatur de
aliquo an sit, non potest sciri proprie de eo quid est (non entium enim non sunt deffinitiones),
unde quaestio «an est» praecedit quaestionem «quid est»; sed non potest ostendi de aliquo an sit
nisi prius intelligatur quid significatur per nomen;” In II Post. Anal., lect. 7, Leonine ed., vol.
1*/2, p. 199, lines 122-24: “[E]st impossibile, ut scilicet sciamus quid est, ignorantes si est;” In
VII Meta., lect. 7, n. 1666, Marietti ed., p. 397: “Nam esse est praesuppositum ad hoc quod
quaeritur quid est.” On the relation between the questions ‘an sit’ and ‘quid sit’ in Aquinas, see
Jan Aertsen, Nature and Creature. Thomas Aquinas’s Way of Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 1253; David Twetten, “To Which ‘God’ Must a Proof of God's Existence Conclude for Aquinas?”
164
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To conclude our discussion on Aquinas’ understanding of the nature of the
conceptio and res signified by terms, I want to point out that Aquinas recognizes that the
duality of signing of conceptio and res is a source of ambiguity when one inquires about
what a term signifies.167 Even though it is important for the purpose of our investigation
to keep these two notions separated, it is equally important not to lose sight of the fact
that a term’s signification is always comprised by the ‘conception signified’ and the
‘thing signified’. Even more important is not to lose sight of the interconnection between
the two sides of a term’s signification. We must keep in mind that, for Aquinas, the
signification of the res is always mediated by the intellect’s conceptio of the res. One
corollary of the aforementioned semantic structure of terms is that the res significata of a
term is signified according to the mode or manner in which it is conceived by the
intellect. The mediated character of the signification of the res grounds, as we are about
to see, Aquinas’ claim of a correlation between modi significandi and modi intelligendi, a
correlation that will be key to identifying the sort of simple conception the terms ‘ens’
and ‘esse’ signify.

in Laudemus Viros Gloriosos: Essays in Medieval Philosophy in Honor of Armand Augustine
Maurer, C.S.B., ed. R. E. Houser (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007) 14683, at 155-59. It should be noted that in early texts Aquinas states that the quiddity of a thing may
be known without knowing whether the thing exists (see, e.g., De ente, c. 4; In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4,
a. 2). This statement is a central premise of the so-called “intellectus essentiae argument” for the
distinction between being and essence, an argument that has been the subject of great debate. The
discussion centers on the question whether or not the argument proves that the distinction
between being and essence is real and not merely conceptual. For a survey of the discussion, see
Walter Patt, “Aquinas’ Real Distinction and Some Interpretations,” New Scholasticism 26 (1988).
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2.2.2. Aquinas on Modes of Signification

A. Preliminary Remarks

Thirteenth-century theologians made use of the logical notion of modi significandi
in order to address questions regarding religious language, especially the possibility of
naming God. Their approach to the notion varies just as it did for logicians. Bonaventure
(1227-1274), for example, links the notion of modus significandi with that of modus
intelligendi or ratio cognoscendi: the ‘mode of signification’ of a term follows on the
‘mode of understanding’. For Albert the Great (1200-1280), on the other hand, modus
intelligendi and modus significandi correspond primarily to the modus essendi of the
thing understood and signified.168 Aquinas too uses the notion of modus significandi
primarily in the context of religious language and the divine names.169 Regarding
Aquinas’ approach to the notion of modus significandi, I have found that Aquinas’
understanding of the notion resembles that of Peter of Spain.170 Aquinas’s doctrine of
modes of signification links the modus significandi of a term to the modus intelligendi of
the conception of the res. As it did for Peter of Spain, the doctrine of the mediation of the

On Bonaventure and Albert the Great, see Rosier, “Res significata et modus significandi,”
147-50. On the general use of the notion of modus significandi among theologians of the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries, see M.-D. Chenu, “Grammaire et théologie aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles,” in
Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 10 (1935-36).
169
We shall briefly touch on the topic of divine names in Aquinas at the end of this section.
170
Ashworth, on the contrary, identifies Aquinas’s use of the notion of modus significandi with
the most common use of the notion wherein ‘modus significandi’ is linked with the different parts
of speech. See “Signification and Modes,” 57; and “Analogy and Equivocation,” 105. She
expresses, however, some hesitation in the face of selected passages (In I Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 2;
ST I, q. 13, a. 11) where Aquinas does not link the notion of modus significandi very closely to
the notion of word-class: “It is not clear,” she writes, “whether we are dealing with word-class or
with an extended notion of modi significandi that is independent of word-class” (“Signification
and Modes,” 58-59). Perhaps the reason is that in her review of modes of signification, Ashworth
does not recognize the second, logical, sense of modus significandi distinguished earlier in this
chapter.
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intellect’s conception in the signification of the res significata plays a central role in
Aquinas’ understanding of modes of signification. Given that the res significata of a term
is signified thorough the intellect’s conception, the mode in which the res is signified by
a term is a consequence of the mode in which the res is conceived by the intellect.
Aquinas writes: “the mode of signification in the terms that are by us imposed upon
things follows on [our] mode of understanding.”171 Therefore, the modus significandi of a
term is a reflection of the modus intelligendi in which the res significata is conceived by
the intellect. As such, though, the modus significandi of a term is a feature, not of the
intellect’s mode, but of the conceptio signified by the term. The term ‘man’ signifies a
conception of humanity which is linguistically expressed by a phrase like ‘what has
humanity’ (‘habens humanitatem’). The mode in which the term ‘man’ signifies
humanity is contained in the conception signified: ‘man’ signifies humanity ‘as subsisting
in a subject’ or ‘as a substance’ (per modum substantiae).
There is in Aquinas a necessary correspondence between the modus intelligendi
and modus significandi, but there is no necessary correspondence between the modus
essendi of the res significata and the modus significandi of the term.172 The mode in
which the res significata of a term is conceived by the intellect may or may not

De pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 7, Marietti ed., p. 56: “[M]odus significandi in dictionibus quae a nobis
rebus imponuntur sequitur modum intelligendi; dictiones enim significant intellectuum
conceptiones, ut dicitur in principio Periher.” See, also, SCG I, c. 30, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 92,
lines 31-32A: “Nam nomine res exprimimus eo modo quo intellectu concipimus;” ST I, q. 45, a.
2, ad 2; De pot., q. 7, a. 5, ad 2; In VII Meta., lect. 1, n. 1253-54.
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On this point, see Keith Buersmeyer, “Aquinas on the Modi Significandi,” Modern Schoolman
64 (1987): 79-81; Rosier, “Res significata et modus significandi,” 151-52; and Rocca, “Res
Significata and Modus Significandi,” 189-90. This is an essential point for Aquinas. As Rocca
remarks, it is precisely because there is no correspondence between the creaturely mode of
signification of the terms we predicate of God and God’s objective mode of being that Aquinas is
able to maintain that, although the reality (res) signified by the predicate term might be suitable to
God, we need to deny our mode of signification in all divine predication.
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correspond to the mode of being of the res. The term ‘whiteness’ (‘albedo’), for instance,
signifies whiteness in the mode of a substance (per modum substantiae), yet whiteness
does not have the mode of being of a substance.173 In addition, observe that within this
semantic framework it is possible for more than one term to signify the same res
according to different modes; such is the case of the term ‘man’ (‘homo’) and the term
‘humanity’ (‘humanitas’).174 As a result, terms cannot be differentiated only in reference
to their res significata. Indeed, Aquinas points out that the unity or diversity of words,
whether simple or complex, does not depend merely on the unity or diversity of the thing
signified; it depends, rather, on the unity or diversity of either the external word (as in the
case of synonyms that signify the same res) or the understanding (as in the case of ‘man’
and ‘humanity’).175
Throughout his writings Aquinas recognizes various modes of signification, some
of which overlap. Following on the traditional distinctions made by logicians, Aquinas
maintains that substantive names signify thorough the mode of substance (per modum
substantiae) or substantively (substantive), while adjectival names signify through the
mode of accident (per modum accidentis) or adjectivally (adiective).176 However, as we
shall see next, a term like ‘white’ (‘albus’), which is an adjectival name, is also said to
In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 894, Marietti ed., p. 239: “Hoc autem nomen album significat subiectum
ex consequenti, inquantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex
consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. Albedo enim etsi
significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae.”
174
See De ente, c. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 373, lines 292-94: “Sic igitur patet quod essentiam
hominis signifìcat hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen humanitas, sed diuersimode.”
175
See Quodl. IV, q. 9, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 25/2, p. 338-39, lines 58-60/63-66: “Manifestum est
autem quod unitas uocis significatiue uel diuersitas non dependet ex unitate uel diuersitate rei
significate . . . Dependet igitur unitas uel diuersitas uocis significatiue, siue complexe siue
incomplexe, ex unitate uel diuersitate uocis aut intellectus.”
176
ST I, q. 39, a. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 400: “[N]omina substantiva significant aliquid per
modum substantiae: nomina vero adiectiva significant aliquid per modum accidentis;” also In I
Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 2; In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 894.
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signify in a concrete mode (in concretione). In the following pages I shall concentrate on
the distinction between abstract and concrete modes of signification given that these are
the modes of signification Aquinas frequently assigns to the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’.177

B. Concrete and Abstract Modes of Signification in Aquinas

The distinction between an abstract and a concrete term may be summarized as
follows: A concrete term signifies something as composite and as subsistent, either as a
subject or in a subject, whereas an abstract term signifies something as simple and as that
whereby something is. Aquinas writes:
[Q]uod significatur concretive, significatur
ut per se existens, ut homo vel album . . .
quod significatur in abstracto, significatur
per modum formae, cujus non est operari
vel subsistere in se, sed in alio.178

What is signified concretely is signified as
existing per se, as ‘man’ or ‘white’ . . .
what is signified in the abstract is signified
in mode of form, to which it belongs, not to
act or to subsist in itself, but [to subsist] in
another.

[O]mnia nomina a nobis imposita ad
significandum aliquid completum
subsistens, significant in concretione, prout
competit compositis; quae autem
imponuntur ad significandas formas
simplices, significant aliquid non ut
subsistens, sed ut quo aliquid est, sicut
albedo significat ut quo aliquid est
album.179

[A]ll words imposed by us to signify
something complete and subsistent signify
in the concrete, as befits composite things.
Words imposed to signify simple forms
signify something not as subsistent, but as
that whereby something is, as ‘whiteness’
signifies as that whereby something is
white.
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On the distinction between abstract and concrete modes of signification in Aquinas, see e.g.
Ralph McInerny, “Can God Be Named By Us. Prolegomena to Thomistic Philosophy of
Religion,” Review of Metaphysics 32 (1978) 53-73; Buersmeyer, “Aquinas on the Modi
Significandi,” 79-83; Jordan, “Modes of Discourse,” 411-15. Klima discusses the distinction in
relation to supposition theory (“Semantic Principles,” 110-113). For Aquinas’ use of the
grammatical distinction between abstract and concrete terms in his Trinitarian theology, see
James Egan, “Naming in St. Thomas’ Theology of the Trinity,” in From an Abundant Spring, ed.
The Thomist staff (New York: P. J. Kennedy & Sons, 1952).
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In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 770.
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ST I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 140.
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If we consider signification alone, a concrete term and its abstract counterpart differ only
with respect to the conceptio they signify, not with respect to the res they signify. The
terms ‘man’ and ‘humanity’, for instance, signify the same res (humanity inherent in
composite things), but the conceptio differs: ‘humanity’ signifies humanity with
precision, that is, by ‘prescinding’ from other things, as ‘that whereby something is’,
whereas ‘man’ signifies humanity without prescinding, but ‘mixed together’ with other
things, and as subsisting.180 Thus, Aquinas points out that the terms ‘humanity’ and ‘man’
signify the same nature but while the term ‘humanity’ signifies human nature “ut partem”
or “per modum partis,” the term ‘man’ signifies human nature “ut totum” or “per modum
totius.”181 Similarly, the modi significandi of abstract and concrete terms are said to differ
inasmuch as a concrete term signifies “per modum completi participantis” and an abstract
term signifies “per modum diminuti et partis formalis.”182 Notice that the difference in
mode of signification between the terms ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ explains why we predicate
See De ente, c. 2; In I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 1. On the difference between signification “with
precision” (cum praecisione materiae designatae) and “without precision” (sine praecisione
materiae designatae), see Joseph Owens, “The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the
Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas,” in St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: Collected
Papers of Joseph Owens, ed. John R. Catan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980).
Owens speaks of “abstraction” with or without precision, but that is not an expression Aquinas
uses. On the other hand, the semantic distinction between abstract and concrete terms corresponds
to two ways of abstraction Aquinas distinguishes: abstraction of the form from matter, and
abstraction of the universal from the particular (De Trin., q. 5, a. 3; ST I, q. 40, a. 3; In I Meta.,
lect. 10, n. 158).
181
De ente, c. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 373, lines 292-304: “Sic igitur patet quod essentiam
hominis significant hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen humanitas, sed diuersimode, ut dictum est:
quia hoc nomen homo significat eam ut totum, in quantum scilicet non precidit designationem
materie sed implicite continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est quod genus continet
differentiam; et ideo predicatur hoc nomen homo de indiuiduis. Sed hoc nomen humanitas
significat eam ut partem, quia non continet in significatione sua nisi id quod est hominis in
quantum est homo, et precidit omnem designationem; unde de indiuiduis hominis non
predicatur;” In VII Meta., lect. 5, n. 1379, Marietti ed., p. 339: “[H]omo significat ut totum,
humanitas significat ut pars;” and Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1.
182
Super De causis, prop. 22, Saffrey ed., p. 116, lines 25-27: “[O]mne nomen a nobis
impositum, vel significat per modum completi participantis sicut nomina concreta, vel significat
per modum diminuti et partis formalis sicut nomina abstracta.”
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the term ‘man’ and not ‘humanity’ of a human being, even though the term ‘man’
signifies humanity, and a human being is denominated ‘man’ from his humanity.183
But the distinction between concrete and abstract modes of signification applies
not only to names, substantive or adjectival; it also applies to infinitive verbs and their
respective verbal nouns and participles, for instance, ‘esse’, ‘essendum’, and ‘ens’.
Aquinas contrasts the pair ‘esse’ and ‘ens’ and the pair ‘currere’ and ‘currens’ as
signifying in the abstract and concrete respectively:
Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod
dicimus esse et aliud per id quod dicimus id
quod est, sicut et aliud significamus cum
dicimus currere et aliud per hoc quod
dicitur currens. Nam currere et esse
significantur in abstracto sicut et albedo;
sed quod est, id est ens et currens,
significantur sicut in concreto, uelut
album.184

We signify one thing by saying ‘to be’
(esse) and another by saying ‘that which is’
(id quod est), just as also we signify one
thing when we say ‘to run’ (currere) and
another when ‘the [one] running’ (currens)
is said. For, ‘currere’ and ‘esse’ are
signified in the abstract, as is ‘whiteness’;
but ‘quod est’, namely ‘ens’, and ‘currens’
are signified in the concrete, as is ‘white’.

The semantic structure of the pair ‘currens’ and ‘currere’, as well as that of ‘ens’ and
‘esse’, is parallel to that of ‘white’ and ‘whiteness’; they share the same res significata
but differ in their mode of signification. The pair ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, then, is simply one
among other examples of a concrete term and its abstract counterpart. They signify the
same res, but while ‘ens’ signifies esse in a concrete mode, ‘esse’ signifies esse in an
abstract mode.
A problem arises, however, with regards to Aquinas’ account of the mode of
signification of verbs of the infinitive mode when one considers the following passage:
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I shall return to this topic at the end of the section. Also, notice that in light of the introduction
of ‘modes of signification’, the previous account of the imposition of a term upon things, wherein
a term is imposed upon a thing on account of its having the ‘form’ signified by the term, needs
further qualification.
184
In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 270-71, lines 39-45.
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[V]ita non hoc modo se habet ad vivere,
sicut essentia ad esse; sed sicut cursus ad
currere; quorum unum significant actum in
abstracto, aliud in concreto.185

The relation between ‘vita’ and ‘vivere’ is
not the same as that between ‘essence’ and
‘esse’; it is rather the same as ‘cursus’ and
‘currere’, one of which signifies the act in
the abstract, the other in the concrete.

In the preceding translated text (In De hebdom., lect. 2) Aquinas claims that the term
‘currere’ signifies in the abstract, yet in this text (ST I, q. 54, a. 1, ad 2) he declares that it
signifies in the concrete. How is it possible for ‘currere’ to signify both in the abstract
and in the concrete? The answer is found in the following passage, where Aquinas
distinguishes the different modes in which action is signified:
[P]otest autem actio significari tripliciter:
uno modo, per se in abstracto, uelut
quedam res, et sic significatur per nomen;
ut ‘actio’, ‘passio’, ‘ambulatio’, ‘cursus’ et
similia; alio modo per modum actionis, ut
scilicet est egrediens a substancia et
inherens ei ut subiecto, et sic significatur
per uerba aliorum modorum, que
attribuuntur personis; sed, quia etiam ipse
processus uel inherencia actionis potest
apprehendi ab intellectu et significari ut res
quedam, inde est quod ipsa uerba infinitiui
modi, que significant ipsam inherenciam
actionis ad subiectum, possunt accipi ut
uerba, ratione concretionis, et ut nomina,
prout significant quasi res quasdam.186

Action can be signified in three ways. In
one mode, per se in the abstract, as a
certain thing, and thus it is signified by a
noun, such as ‘action’, ‘passion’, ‘a walk’,
‘a run’ (cursus), and the like. In another
mode, through the mode of action, as
proceeding from a substance and inhering
in it as in a subject, and in this way it is
signified by verbs of the different modes,
which [verbs] are attributed to persons. But
because the proceeding itself or the
inherence of an action can be apprehended
by the intellect and signified as a certain
thing, verbs in the infinitive mode, which
signify inherence of action in a subject, can
be taken as verbs by reason of ‘concretion’
and as nouns according as they signify, as
it were, certain things.

We should observe that this distinction is brought out to explain why verbs of the
infinitive mode, unlike other modes of verbs, can be placed in the subject position. In
light of the distinction, then, there are three modes of signifying action. In the first place,
action is signified per se as a certain thing and in the abstract by a noun such as ‘cursus’.
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ST I, q. 54, a. 1, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 5, p. 39, quoted also by Gilson (see Chapter I, note 37).
For Gilson’s interpretation of this passage, see Étienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers,
2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), 231-32.
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In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 26, lines 59-72.
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It is evident that when an action is signified by a noun as a certain thing, the term may
serve as a subject or a predicate term. In another mode, action is signified “as proceeding
from a substance and inhering in it as in a subject.” In this way action is signified by
verbs, in any of their grammatical modes, with their indications of person, tense, and
mood. An example would be ‘currit’ (he or she runs). Aquinas accordingly describes this
mode of signification as “per modum actionis.”187 And, just as actions are not found in
the world as existing per se, but as existing in their subjects, so verbs are predicated of
subjects; thus, the mode in which verbs signify action explains why the verb is always in
the predicate role: action as action requires a subject. Finally, action is signified by one
term (a verb of the infinitive mode, such as ‘currere’) in two different modes according
to the mode in which the “inherence of action” is conceived by the intellect. In the first
place, when the intellect apprehends the inhering action as a certain thing, the action is
signified in the abstract. In this case the infinitive takes on the function of a noun and thus
may occupy the subject position (Aquinas’ principal interest in the context). But when the
intellect takes the inhering action per modum concretionis, namely, in the concrete as
mixed together with the subject in whom it inheres as its action, the infinitive is a verb
proper and thus cannot be placed in the subject position.
Here we begin to see the answer to our question. Just as two terms can signify the
same res in different modes (as the terms ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ do), so it is possible for
one and the same term to signify the same res in different modes. According to the mode
in which the res significata is conceived by the intellect, the term ‘currere’ signifies the
187

See also the following passage where these two modes of signifying action, by the noun
‘cursus’ and the verb ‘currit’, are mentioned: “‘[C]ursus’, quia significat actionem non per
modum actionis, set per modum rei per se existentis, eo quod est nomen, non significat tempus;
‘currit’ uero, cum sit uerbum significans actionem, consignificat tempus;” In I Periher., lect. 5,
Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 27, lines 93-97.
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same res, the act of running, either in the concrete, in which case the term functions
grammatically as a verb (as in the proposition ‘dux dicit Pheidippidem currere’: ‘the
commander tells Pheidippides to run’), or in the abstract, in which case the term functions
grammatically as a noun and may thus serve as the subject of a proposition.
Let us now return to the texts in question in order to resolve the dilemma. In the
first passage (In De hebdom., lect. 2), the term ‘currere’ is the abstract counterpart of the
concrete term ‘currens’; the relation between these terms is paralleled with that of
‘whiteness’ and its concrete counterpart ‘white’. A particular attribute of this kind of
concrete-abstract pairs of terms is that the abstract term both signifies and stands for its
res significata (in what the terminists call ‘simple’ supposition), which is the res
significata of its concrete counterpart. This is why we can refer to the res significata of
the concrete term by its abstract counterpart: we say that ‘man’ signifies humanity (but
stands for a human being, (in what is called ‘personal’ supposition).188 Now, in the
second passage (ST I, q. 54, a. 1, ad 2) a different kind of concrete-abstract pair of terms
is introduced. The relation between the terms ‘cursus’ and ‘currere’ is paralleled to that
of ‘vita’ and ‘vivere’. Here the abstract terms are ‘cursus’ and ‘vita’, and the concrete
terms are ‘currere’ and ‘vivere’. Notice that unlike the abstract terms at In De hebdom.,
lect. 2, the abstract terms ‘cursus’ and ‘vita’ do not stand for their respective res
significata. That role belongs to the abstract terms ‘currere’ and ‘vivere’ because, as we
shall see next, the terms ‘currere’ and ‘vivere’ signify their res as a form or as ‘that by
which’, whereas ‘cursus’ and ‘vita’ signify their res as existing per se.
See Klima, “Semantic Principle,” 112-13. The distinction between abstract and concrete
signification can also be explained in terms of supposition. Aquinas notes that a concrete term has
a mode of signification such that although it signifies a form, it stands for a person; an abstract
term has a mode of signification such that it does not stand for individuals (see ST I, q. 39, a. 4
and 5).
188
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Now, at In De hebdom., lect. 2, grammatically speaking, the contrast is between
two names (noun and/or adjective) that signify the same res in different modes, while at
ST I, q. 54, a. 1, ad 2 the contrast is between a name (a noun) and a verb that signify the
same res in different modes. Consider the following parallel text:
‘[C]ursus’, quia significat actionem non
per modum actionis, set per modum rei per
se existentis, eo quod est nomen, non
significat tempus; ‘currit’ vero, cum sit
verbum significans actionem, consignificat
tempus.189

The term ‘cursus’, because it signifies an
action, not in the mode of action but in the
mode of a thing existing per se, by the fact
that it is a noun does not signify time. The
term ‘currit’, however, since it is a verb
signifying action, consignifies time.

If we consider signification alone, the abstract terms ‘cursus’ and ‘currere’ and the
concrete terms ‘currit’ and ‘currens’ all signify the same res, the act of running, in
different modes according to different modes of understanding. Therefore, although the
res significata is the same, the conception signified varies. The terms ‘cursus’ and
‘currere’ signify in the abstract inasmuch as the res is conceived and signified as simple
and not as composite; they differ, however, in that while ‘cursus’ signifies action as
existing per se, ‘currere’ signifies action as a form or as ‘that by which’. The terms
‘currit’ and ‘currens’ signify in the concrete inasmuch as the res is conceived and
signified as composite. They differ inasmuch as ‘currit’ signifies the res as in a subject
while ‘currens’ signifies the res as a subject. Incidentally, it is the abstract ‘currere’
which both signifies and stands for the res significata of all four terms.

189

In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 27, lines 93-97.
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C. Concluding Remarks on Aquinas’ Account of Modes of
Signification

By way of conclusion, I want briefly to comment on two general points regarding
Aquinas’ account of modi significandi that are gathered from the previous discussion on
the different modes of signifying action.
First, although different parts of speech are mentioned in connection to one mode
of signification or another, the discussion of modes of signification is not intended to
establish a grammatical distinction between different parts of speech. On the contrary,
these distinctions are already presupposed, since what brings about the distinction of
modes of signifying action is the question how a term (‘currere’) that would otherwise
function as a verb in a proposition can sometimes function as a noun does. Aquinas
certainly recognizes that the modi significandi of terms have grammatical implications
(we have seen him, for example, describing verbs as signifying per modus actionis and
substantive nouns as signifying per modus substantiae), but his theory of modes of
signification does not link the notion of modus significandi as such to the grammatical
properties of terms. Indeed, although references to different parts of speech in the context
of the distinction between modes of signification are common in Aquinas, there are
instances where the notion of modus significandi is not directly connected to any
particular part of speech.190 The modi significandi of terms are for Aquinas first and
foremost a function of our modi intelligendi. It is precisely in this capacity, that is,
inasmuch as they reflect our modes of understanding, that the notion of modi significandi,
as we shall see shortly, plays a central role in Aquinas’ theory of religious language.
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See In I Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 2; and ST I, q. 13, a. 11.
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Second, Aquinas’ approach to the notion of modi significandi is in line with one
of the central doctrines in the tradition of terminist logic: it is not use and context that
determines the signification of a term, but rather the signification of a term is what
determines its use in any given propositional context.191 Whether a term can be placed in
the subject position, in the predicate position, or both, ultimately depends for Aquinas on
the mode of signification of the term. Now, regarding terms that can be placed in the
predicate position, whether or not the term can be predicated of this or that subject is also
determined by the mode of signification of the term. Early on we mentioned that the res
significata of a term is that on account of which something is denominated by that term.
The statement is true, but in light of the foregoing discussion on modes of signification it
needs further qualification. Both ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ signify human nature, but only
‘man’ may be predicated of an individual man. The term ‘man’ may be predicated of
Socrates, not only on account of its res significata, that is, not on account of its signifying
human nature, but also on account of the mode in which human nature is signified by the
term ‘man’. The concrete term ‘man’ can be predicated of an individual man because it
signifies human nature ut totum or per modum totius, that is, it signifies ‘what has
humanity’ (‘habens humanitatem’). The abstract term ‘humanity’, on the other hand,
cannot be predicated of an individual man because it signifies human nature ut partem or
per modum partis, that is, it signifies humanity as a form or as ‘that by which’ [man is
man].192 In the predication of a term, then, a distinction needs to be made between the res
significata and the modus significandi of the term. Both belong to the conception
signified.
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The distinction is central to Aquinas’ account of the divine names. For Aquinas,
our difficulty in naming God results primarily from imperfections in the modi
significandi of our terms. There are indeed terms that are improper of God given their res
significata, and these terms can be said of God only metaphorically. But, if we consider
modes of signification alone, argues Aquinas, all of our terms fall short when naming
God because we impose our terms with signification on the basis of our modes of
understanding. Even when we impose our terms to signify absolute perfections which are
suitable to God, such as wisdom and goodness, our modus intelligendi and therefore our
modus significandi of those perfections will always fall short. Our terms have either a
concrete or an abstract mode of signification. A concrete term predicated of God has the
advantage of signifying what subsists, but the disadvantage of suggesting composition.
An abstract term predicated of God has the advantage of simplicity, but the disadvantage
of signifying as ‘that by which’. Accordingly, Aquinas writes:
Quia igitur et Deus simplex est, et
subsistens est, attribuimus ei et nomina
abstracta, ad significandam simplicitatem
eius; et nomina concreta, ad significandum
subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius,
quamvis utraque nomina deficiant a modo
ipsius, sicut intellectus noster non
cognoscit eum ut est, secundum hanc
vitam.193

And because God is simple and subsistent,
we attribute to Him abstract names to
signify His simplicity, and concrete names
to signify His subsistence and perfection;
although both these names fall short of His
mode [of being] just as our intellect in this
life does not know Him as He is.

As a result, Aquinas maintains that we have to deny or transcend the modus significandi
of our terms when we predicate them of God, even if the perfection signified is otherwise
suitable to God.194
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ST I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 140. See also In I Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 1; ST I, q. 3,
a. ad 1; De pot., q. 8, a. 2, ad 7.
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Aquinas does not deny the possibility of predicating a concrete or an abstract term
of God. We can use the same terms of God and creatures, that is, both God and creatures
can receive the same predicate; thus, we say ‘God is good’ and ‘that woman is good’. In
either case the mode of signification of the term ‘good’ is the same; whether ‘good’ is
predicated of God or a woman, it signifies goodness in a concrete mode.195 Now, given
that concrete mode of signification of the term ‘good’ is not suitable to God’s mode of
being, we must transcend the mode of signification of goodness contained in the term
‘good’ when we predicate it of God, that is, we must predicate goodness of God in a
different mode from the one that belongs to creatures: God is goodness itself, we add. It is
in the context of predication, then, that we have to deny or compensate for the mode of
signification of the terms we apply to God. In order to account for the difference in modi
predicandi when we predicate the same term of God and creatures, Aquinas introduces
into the discussion the notion of ‘analogy’.196

2.2.3. Aquinas on the Signification of Analogous Terms

In this last section, I concentrate on Aquinas’ semantic account of analogous
terms. We shall see that Aquinas’ treatment of the various issues related to the
signification of these terms overlaps with that of contemporary terminist logicians.
One of the issues regarding the signification of analogous terms that was subject
to debate among terminist logicians was the number of conceptions or rationes involved.
Aquinas offers different answers to this question.197 In his commentary on the Sentences,

Rocca, “Res Significata and Modus Significandi,” 189-90.
See Jordan, “Modes of Discourse,” 415; Buersmeyer, “Aquinas on the Modi Significandi,” 8586; Rosier, “Res significata et modus significandi,” 155.
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he claims that only one intentio is involved which is used in different ways. In De
principiis naturae he speaks of a plurality of rationes.198 In the Summa theologiae we are
told that neither one ratio nor diverse rationes are involved.199 Similar remarks are made
in the commentary on the Metaphysics. Here, Aquinas explains that the rationes involved
are “partly different and partly not.”
Sed sciendum quod aliquid praedicatur de
diversis multipliciter: quandoque quidem
secundum rationem omnino eamdem, et
tunc dicitur de eis univoce praedicari, sicut
animal de equo et bove. - Quandoque vero
secundum rationes omnino diversas; et tunc
dicitur de eis aequivoce praedicari, sicut
canis de sidere et animali. - Quandoque
vero secundum rationes quae partim sunt
diversae et partim non diversae: diversae
quidem secundum quod diversas
habitudines important, unae autem
secundum quod ad unum aliquid et idem
istae diversae habitudines referuntur; et
illud dicitur «analogice praedicari». 200

It should be understood that something is
predicated of different things in many
ways. Sometimes it is predicated according
to a ratio that is entirely the same, and then
it is said to be predicated univocally of
[things], as animal is predicated of a horse
and of an ox. Sometimes it is predicated
according to rationes that are entirely
different, and then it is said to be
predicated of them equivocally, as dog is
predicated of a star and of an animal.
Sometimes it is predicated according to
rationes which are partly different and
partly not; they are different inasmuch as
they imply different relationships, and one
inasmuch as these different relationships
are referred to one and the same thing, and
[then the term] is said to be predicated
analogously.

According to this passage, the rationes involved in analogical predication are different
with respect to the relationships they imply but the same with respect to the one thing
they signify.
But, for Aquinas, as for the logicians, the unity among the rationes or conceptions
involved results not only from their sharing one res significata. In the Summa theologiae
Aquinas suggests that the one thing which serves as the focal point for the rationes

198

See In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2 ad 1; De principiis naturae, c. 6, n. 46.
See ST I, q. 13, a. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 146: “Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur,
est una ratio, sicut est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis.”
200
In IV Meta., lect. 1, n. 535, Marietti, ed., p. 151.
199

86
involved in analogous predication is not the nature signified, but the ratio according to
which the term is predicated primarily (per prius). Speaking of terms which are
predicated analogically of many, Aquinas points out that a term of this kind must be
predicated primarily of that which is placed in the definition or ratio of the things of
which the term is predicated secondarily. The example is ‘healthy’ (‘sanum’): ‘healthy’
as predicated of animals comes into the definitio or ratio of ‘healthy’ as predicated of
medicine inasmuch as medicine is said to be ‘healthy’ according as it is the cause of
health in animals.201 Therefore, the ratio according to which a term is predicated
primarily must be contained in the ratio according to which the term is predicated
secondarily. The reason the ‘primary ratio’ is contained into the ‘secondary rationes’ is
that the secondary rationes are the result of some qualification to the primary ratio. In De
veritate Aquinas writes:
[Q]uod aliquid simpliciter dictum
intelligitur quandoque de eo quod per
posterius dicitur ratione alicuius adiuncti,
sicut ens in alio intelligitur accidens; et
similiter vita ratione eius quod adiungitur,
scilicet liber, intelligitur de vita creata,
quae per posterius vita dicitur.202

That which is said simpliciter is sometimes
understood of that which is said
secondarily by reason of something
adjunct. As when ‘a being’ [with the
adjunct] ‘in another’ is understood [as] an
accident. And similarly ‘life’, by reason of
what is added, namely, ‘book’, is
understood of created life, which is called
‘life’ secondarily.

Without doubt different conceptions or rationes are involved in analogous predication,
but an analogous term is not purely equivocal, because there is one primary conception
See ST I, q. 13, a. 6, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 150: “[I]n omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus
analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum: et ideo illud unum
oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium. Et quia ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut
dicitur in IV Metaphys., necesse est quod illud nomen per prius dicatur de eo quod ponitur in
definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis, secundum ordinem quo appropinquant ad illud
primum vel magis vel minus: sicut sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione sani quod
dicitur de medicina, quae dicitur sana inquantum causat sanitatem in animali; et in definitione
sani quod dicitur de urina, quae dicitur sana inquantum est signum sanitatis animalis.”
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from which all others are derived by reason of some addition or qualification. All
secondary significations of analogous terms contain, therefore, a reference to the primary
signification of the term. In this sense, each secondary signification is an extension of the
original signification of the term.
The examples in the previous translated text show how the original ratio of an
analogous term is subject to qualification by addition: when ‘in another’ is added to the
primary ratio of ‘a being’ (‘ens’), the term is predicated of an accident. But the original
or primary ratio of a term can also be subject to qualification by removing something
from it, as when the element of composition is removed from the ratio of ‘good’ when
predicated of God. We have seen that Aquinas often remarks that we need to deny or
transcend the mode of signification of our terms when we predicate them of God. It was
also mentioned that the way to do so involves analogous predication. The doctrine of the
modus significandi certainly plays a central role in Aquinas’ account of the divine names,
but so does the doctrine of analogy. Within the context of the divine names, as others
have pointed out, the doctrine of analogy extends that of modes of signification; analogy
represents the means by which we transcend the bonds of the imperfect modi significandi
of our terms.203 Notice that it is only within the context of Aquinas’ discussion on the
divine names that the two doctrines come together. As Ashworth has shown, the notion of
modus significandi plays no role on Aquinas’ theory of analogy as such.204 Unlike other
cases where a term features various significations that contain the same res significata,
the various significations of an analogous term are not the result of changes in the mode
of signification of the res. The reason an analogous term retains its mode of signification
203
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throughout its various significations is that the secondary significations share in the
conception primarily signified, and it is the primary conception that sets the mode of
signification of the term.
The unity among the conceptions involved in analogous predication is what
distinguishes the various significations of an analogous term from the various
significations of an univocal term that signifies the same res according to different modi
significandi. In the case of the term ‘currere’, which signifies the same res in the abstract
and in the concrete mode, there are two very distinct conceptions of the same res
involved. The only thing that relates the two conceptions signified by the term ‘currere’
is their sharing one res significata. In the case of ‘sanum’ or ‘ens’, on the other hand, the
mode of signification remains the same even as the conception signified varies with each
occurrence of the term. Indeed, an analogous term retains its mode of signification
throughout its various significations. For example, regardless of whether the term ‘ens’
is said of a substance or of an accident, ‘ens’ has the same mode of signification (it
signifies esse in a concrete mode).205
I would like to close this section with some final remarks regarding analogy and
predication. In the semantic structure of an analogous term, the secondary significations
of the analogous term are accounted for by the qualifications to the original ratio or
conception signified. As we indicated earlier, within the framework of the theory of
signification to which Aquinas subscribes, the secondary significations of a term are set
by an act of imposition. Yet, it is only within a propositional context that the various

On the relation (or lack thereof) between Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy and his doctrine of
modes of signification, see Ashworth, Les théories de l’analogie, 34-37; and “Analogy and
Equivocation,” 126. On this point Ashworth disagrees with Ralph McInerny. See Ashworth,
“Signification and Modes,” 60-61; Les théories de l’analogie, 36-37.
205
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significations of an analogous term can properly be differentiated. Indeed, according to
the logicians, an analogous term is so imposed that when standing alone it signifies only
its primary signification.206 Therefore, although the notion of modus significandi is in no
way central to analogous signification, the notion of modus praedicandi is. Aquinas
seems to agree on this point, as he explicitly links a term’s analogous significations with
the term’s modes of predication.207 The subject of the role of the notion of modus
praedicandi in Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy is worth pursuing; but it is beyond the scope
of our present investigation.
What we need to take away from the present discussion is that although an
analogous term is more complex in its signification than a univocal term, both kinds of
term have the same basic semantic structure. Regardless of which signification an
analogous term features, it signifies a conception in the mind and the object of that
conception. Furthermore, the qualifications introduced to the primary conception
signified by an analogous term so as to form secondary conceptions do not alter the mode
of signification of the term. The term ‘ens’, for instance, regardless of the sense in which
it is used, signifies its res significata, which is esse, in the concrete mode. In the next
chapter, we shall examine Aquinas’ account of the signification of ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, both
analogous terms. Our focus will be on their modes of signification. The question we shall
consider is whether, for Aquinas, the conception signified by the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ is

206

On analogy and imposition, see the discussion beginning on p. 48 above.
See In I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2, where Aquinas says that an analogous term is divided
according to different modi praedicandi; he then explains that ‘ens’ is divided among the ten
categories according to ten modi praedicandi. The link between modes of predication and the
division of ‘ens’ among the ten categories is not uncommon (see, e.g., In III Phys., lect. 5, n. 15),
but the Sentences text is the only one I know of where analogy is explicitly mentioned.
207

90
simple (as with any other term) or complex (as the doctrine of the judgment of esse
suggests).

CHAPTER III

AQUINAS ON THE SIGNIFICATION OF ESSE

Now that we have delineated Aquinas’ theory of signification in the preceding
chapter, we are ready to examine Aquinas’ account of the signification of the terms that
signify esse, namely, of ‘ens’ and ‘esse’. At the end of this chapter it will emerge that for
Aquinas the conception of esse signified by these terms (given the language of Aquinas’
semantics reviewed in Chapter II) is simple in nature. Accordingly, this chapter offers
conclusive evidence that, given his semantic theory, Aquinas recognizes a simple
conception of esse.
The chapter is divided into three sections, the first of which consists of a review
of the main features of the signification of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ gathered from the
preceding chapter’s discussion of Aquinas’ signification theory. In the subsequent two
sections I examine Aquinas’ account of the signification of (i) the term ‘ens’ and its
abstract counterpart ‘esse’, and (ii) the verb ‘est’. We shall see that Aquinas’ semantic
analysis of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ is in essence no different from that of other pairs of
concrete and abstract terms such as ‘currens’ and ‘currere’, ‘homo’ and ‘humanitas’.
Likewise, his analysis of the verb ‘est’ is in essence no different from that of other verbs
such as ‘currit’. The terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ signify the same res significata, which
in this case is esse, but they signify according to different modi significandi, modes that
track the different modi intelligendi of esse, which result in the conceptio incomplexa
signified by each term.
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Such semantic analysis of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ is perfectly in line with
the theory of signification to which Aquinas subscribes. Let us point out at the outset,
then, that there is no evidence to the claim advanced by Gilson that Aquinas subscribes to
a semantic perspective wherein (all) verbs and verbal nouns, and notably, of course,
‘esse’ and ‘ens’, signify esse and the ‘judgment’ of esse (whereas nouns such as ‘homo’
and ‘humanitas’ signify essences and their ‘concepts’).1 The semantic view Gilson
attributes to Aquinas is dictated by the doctrine that essence alone, not esse, can be
grasped in a ‘concept’; as Gilson puts it, esse “cannot be known by the simple conceptual
apprehension of an essence, which it is not.”2 Indeed, if only essence can be
conceptualized in a simple conceptio, then, as Gilson observes, verbs and verbal nouns,
none of which signify an essence but rather an act, must signify in the mind not a
‘concept’ but a ‘judgment’, namely, a complex conceptio.3 Having already identified
essence and ‘concept’, on the one hand, and esse and ‘judgment’ on the other, Gilson has
no problem declaring that “the same metaphysical distinction between esse and essentia .
. . entails the logical distinction between simple apprehensions and judgments, as well as
the grammatical distinction between nouns and verbs.”4
Aquinas’ writings on logic and semantics, however, reveal a very different
picture. The fundamental distinction is that between terms and propositions. Propositions
signify the composition or division of the intellect, that is, they signify a complex
conception. Categorematic terms, on the other hand, regardless of their grammatical
1

Étienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Studies, 1952), 230-32. According to Gilson’s terminology, a ‘concept’ (‘conceptus’) is the
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function as nouns or verbs, signify the simple conception of some res.5 The grammatical
distinction between nouns and verbs depends neither on the nature or content of the res
significata, nor on that of the conceptio signified, but rather on the mode of signification
of the res.6 Thus, ‘concepts’, the products of the first operation of the intellect, are not
restricted to being signified only by nouns, as opposed to also by verbs. Moreover, as we
shall see in the following pages, ‘concepts’ are not restricted to being about one
metaphysical constituent alone, essence. Indeed, the noun ‘ens’ and the verb ‘esse’
signify a ‘concept’ of esse, not the ‘judgment’ of esse; that is to say, the conception of
esse signified by ‘ens’ and by ‘esse’ is as simple in nature or content as the conception
signified by any other categorematic term.

3.1

Preliminary Remarks on the Signification of the Terms
‘Ens’ and ‘Esse’ in Aquinas
This section provides an overview of the semantic features of the terms ‘ens’ and

‘esse’ that are gathered from the preceding discussion on Aquinas’ theory of
signification, and discusses some of the difficulties associated with some of those

See, e.g., In I Periher., lect. 6, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 32, lines 20-23: “[S]ignificatio orationis
differt a significatione nominis uel uerbi, quia nomen uel uerbum significat simplicem
intellectum, oratio autem significat intellectum compositum;” also De ver. q. 4, a. 2; De pot., q. 8,
a.1; q. 9, a. 5; In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1223-1224. On the nature of the conception signified by
terms and proposition in Aquinas, see Chapter II (section 2.2.1).
6
See, ST I, q. 39, a. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 400: “[N]omina substantiva significant aliquid per
modum substantiae: nomina vero adiectiva significant aliquid per modum accidentis;” In I
Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 26, lines 59-72: “[P]otest autem actio significari
tripliciter: uno modo, per se in abstracto, uelut quedam res, et sic significatur per nomen; ut
‘actio’, ‘passio’, ‘ambulatio’, ‘cursus’ et similia; alio modo per modum actionis, ut scilicet est
egrediens a substancia et inherens ei ut subiecto, et sic significatur per uerba aliorum modorum,
que attribuuntur personis; sed, quia etiam ipse processus uel inherencia actionis potest apprehendi
ab intellectu et significari ut res quedam, inde est quod ipsa uerba infinitiui modi, que significant
ipsam inherenciam actionis ad subiectum, possunt accipi ut uerba, ratione concretionis, et ut
nomina, prout significant quasi res quasdam.” On Aquinas’ use of modes of signification to
differentiate between nouns and verbs, see Chapter II (section 2.2.2).
5
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features. There are three issues to consider: the first regard the mode of signification of
these terms; the second their character as analogous terms; and the third, the nature of the
‘conceptio’ and ‘res’ signified by the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’.

3.1.1

The Modes of Signification of the Terms ‘Ens’ and ‘Esse’
Aquinas introduces the pair ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ as an example of a concrete term and

its abstract counterpart, paralleling the signification of ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ to that of ‘white’
and ‘whiteness’ as well as that of ‘currens’ and ‘currere’.
Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod
dicimus esse et aliud per id quod dicimus id
quod est, sicut et aliud significamus cum
dicimus currere et aliud per hoc quod
dicitur currens. Nam currere et esse
significantur in abstracto sicut et albedo;
sed quod est, id est ens et currens,
significantur sicut in concreto, uelut
album.7

We signify one thing by saying ‘to be’
(esse) and another by saying ‘that which is’
(id quod est), just as also we signify one
thing when we say ‘to run’ (currere) and
another when ‘the [one] running’ (currens)
is said. For, ‘currere’ and ‘esse’ are
signified in the abstract, as is ‘whiteness’;
but ‘quod est’, namely ‘ens’, and ‘currens’
are signified in the concrete, as is ‘white’.

For Aquinas, then, the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ signify the same res according to different
modi significandi. That is to say, they share the same res significata but differ with regard
to the conceptio signified inasmuch as the res is understood (and hence signified)
according to different modi intelligendi. In addition, we should note that the term ‘esse’,
like the term ‘currere’, is an ambiguous term that is ambiguous even in its mode of
signifying. The term ‘esse’ may be taken as signifying either in the abstract (in which
case it is the abstract counterpart term of the term ‘ens’) or in the concrete (in which case
it is the infinitive form of the verb ‘est’, as in the sentences ‘Plato cognoscit Socratem
esse’). In order to differentiate the two possible modes of signification of the term ‘esse’,
I will refer from this point on to the verb ‘esse’ as ‘est’, leaving the term ‘esse’ to stand
7

In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 270-71, lines 39-45.
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for the abstract counterpart of ‘ens’.8 As a result, we have three rather than two terms that
signify esse to work with: ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’. Each of these terms signifies esse
according to different modi significandi. The term ‘esse’ signifies in the abstract mode,
that is, it signifies esse with precision (cum praecisione materiae designatae) and as ‘that
by which x is’ (quo est). The terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ signify in the concrete mode, that is,
without precision (sine praecisione materiae designatae); however, whereas ‘ens’
signifies esse in the mode of substance, ‘est’ signifies esse in the mode of action as
inhering as in a subject. Given that there is for Aquinas a direct correspondence between
modus significandi and modus intelligendi, insofar as the former follows from the later,9
the individual mode of signification of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ will play a central
role in our investigation into the intellect’s conceptio each term signifies.

3.1.2

Analogy of ‘Ens’ and ‘Esse’

We cannot fail to remark on the fact that we are dealing with analogous terms. On
that note, a distinction needs to be made between the primary (per prius) and secondary
(per posterius) significations of each term. Although we shall make reference to the
secondary significations Aquinas identifies for the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’, our focus
will be on their primary signification. More precisely, given the purpose of the present
chapter, the discussion will center on the nature of the primary conceptio signified by the
terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’.
From a purely semantic perspective, our focus on the primary ratio or conceptio
signified is justified by the fact that we are examining these terms as standing alone and
When no distinction is made, however, the term ‘esse’ should be taken as standing for both its
possible significations.
9
See ST I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2; De pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 7; In VII Meta., lect. 1, n. 1253-54.
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not within a propositional context. Like other analogous terms, standing alone these terms
signify only their primary signification. But the most important consideration, which we
shall say more about later in the chapter, is that even as we add or remove from the
primary conception of esse signified by each of these terms to form secondary
conceptions, the conception signified remains a simple one, for the addition and division
in question is not equivalent to the addition and division that constitutes a complex
conception. For example, the addition of ‘in another’ to the simple conception ‘what has
being’, forming the conception ‘(accidental) being’, does not turn the primary conception
signified by ‘ens’ into a complex conception. Furthermore, although the term ‘ens’ may
signify per posterius the composition of a proposition, as in ‘Socrates is wise’, as an ens
rationis, the conception signified by ‘ens’ in this instance is not in itself a judgment or
complex conception.

3.1.3

The ‘Conceptio’ and ‘Res’ Signified by ‘Ens’ and ‘Esse’

As we saw in Chapter II, categorematic terms, on Aquinas’ theory of
signification, immediately signify a conception in the mind, but ultimately they signify
the object of that conception.10 The object of the intellect’s conception signified by the
terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ – i.e., their res significata, is not difficult to identify; clearly,
these terms signify esse as their res. Recall that in the case of a concrete term and its
abstract counterpart, such as the pair ‘homo’ and ‘humanitas’ or the pair ‘currens’ and
‘currere’, the abstract term both signifies and stands for or supposits for the res signified
See In I Periher., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 11, lines 109-12: “[I]deo necesse fuit
Aristotili dicere quod uoces significant intellectus conceptiones inmediate, et eis mediatibus res;”
ST I, q. 13, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 139: “[V]oces referuntur ad res significandas, mediante
conceptione intellectus;” and ST I, q. 13, a. 4, ad 1, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 145: “[N]omen non
significat rem, nisi mediante conceptione intellectus.”
10
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by the concrete term (and, by parity of reasoning, the same is true for any such pair of
terms). Thus, the term ‘humanitas’ both signifies and supposits for the res signified by
the term ‘homo’. Similarly, the term ‘currere’ both signifies and supposits for the res
signified by the terms ‘cursus’, ‘currens’, and ‘currit’. Given that Aquinas identifies the
terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ as an example of a concrete term and its abstract counterpart,
paralleling their signification with that of ‘currens’ and ‘currere’,11 the abstract term
‘esse’ must both signify and supposit for the res signified by the concrete term ‘ens’ and
by the verb ‘est’.
Recall also that the res significata of a concrete term is that on account of which
something is denominated by that term. For instance, humanitas is that on account of
which an individual is denominated ‘homo’, just as albedo is that on account of which
something is denominated ‘album’. Aquinas identifies esse or actus essendi as that by
which something is denominated ‘ens’ in act in the world:
Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis in
quantum est ens, id est quo denominatur
aliquid ens actu in rerum natura.12

In another way, esse is said to be the act of
‘a being’ inasmuch as it is ‘a being’, that is,
that by which something is denominated ‘a
being’ in act in reality.

Therefore, the res significata of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’, the object of the
intellect’s conception signified by these terms, is esse in the sense of actus essendi, that
which the abstract term ‘esse’ not only signifies but also supposits for.
The claim that the esse is the object of the conception signified by linguistic
expressions such as ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ is not, I believe, a subject of contention. The
11

See In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 270-71, lines 39-45 quoted above (note 7).
Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 25/1, p. 94, lines 41-43. See also In IV Meta., lect. 2, n.
553, Marietti ed., p. 155: “[H]oc vero nomen Ens, imponitur ab actu essendi;” ST I, q. 5, a. 1, ad
1, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 56: “[S]ecundum primum esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens
simpliciter;” In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 195: “[H]oc nomen ‘qui est’ vel
‘ens’ imponitur ab ipso actu essendi.”
12

98
real issue is whether or not esse may be conceived by the intellect in the same manner in
which the intellect conceives a form or nature such as humanity and whiteness, that is,
through the intellect’s first operation, in a simple or non-composite conception (conceptio
incomplexa). Everyone agrees that esse as actus essendi is simple.13 The question is
whether this ‘simple’ can be grasped in a non-complex mental act, and so can be the res
significata of the simple terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’.
If we consider Aquinas’ account of the nature of the conceptio signified by terms
as opposed to propositions, wherein terms signify a simple conception whereas
propositions signify a complex or composite conception,14 the nouns ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ as
well as the verb ‘est’ ought to signify a simple, non-composite conception of esse as act.
However, according to the traditional doctrine of the judgment of esse, grounded on an
interpretation of Aquinas’ comments in his early Scriptum on the Sentences and Super De
trinitate, a simple conception of esse is not possible.15 For Aquinas, it appears, what the
intellect apprehends in simple conceptualization is essence. Since esse, for him, is not an
essence, it cannot be the object of conceptualization. Therefore, most Aquinas scholars
conclude, esse is grasped by the intellect only in judgment.
A possible way to reconcile Aquinas’ theory of signification and the doctrine of
the judgment of esse is to maintain that the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ constitute an
exception on account of their res significata. One might argue that the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’,
and ‘est’ do not signify, as Aquinas’ theory of signification indicates, a simple conception

Insofar as esse as actus essendi is one of the two principles in things, ‘that by which’ something
is or exists in the reality, it is in itself simple.
14
See In I Periher., lect. 6, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 32, lines 20-23: “[S]ignificatio orationis
differt a significatione nominis uel uerbi, quia nomen uel uerbum significat simplicem
intellectum, oratio autem significat intellectum compositum.”
15
See chapter 1, passim.
13

99
of esse, since one is impossible, but rather the judgment of esse.16 But such a
reconstruction of Aquinas’ semantic theory faces several problems, which we shall
discuss in detail in the subsequent sections of this chapter. Aquinas’ account of the
signification of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ contains every indication that these terms
signify a simple conception. Aquinas explicitly denies that the noun ‘ens’ and the verb
‘est’ signify a judgment or composed conception. Moreover, in several places the
intellect’s conception of ens is identified explicitly as a simple conception. 17 There is
ample evidence that Aquinas recognizes a simple conception of esse. If that is indeed the
case, and I submit that it is, then we have reason to question the doctrine of the
impossibility of a simple conceptual apprehension of esse and the interpretation of
Aquinas’ remarks in the commentaries on the Sentences and on the De trinitate that
supports it.
Whether or not Aquinas rules out the possibility of a simple conception of esse in
those texts is a topic we shall address in the Chapter IV. Let us return now to the question
of the simple conceptio of esse. In the next section I examine Aquinas’ account of the
signification of the term ‘ens’ and its abstract counterpart ‘esse’ to show that, indeed,
these terms signify a simple conception rather than a judgment.18

16

For an example of this line of argument, see Étienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers,
230-31.
17
See In III Sent., d. 23 q. 2 a. 2 qc. 1; De pot., q. 9, a. 5; De ver. q. 4, a. 2 and q. 14, a. 1; SCG I,
c. 59; Quodl. V, q. 5 a. 2; In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1223-1224; In I Periher., lect. 5 and 6.
18
A similar endeavor has been undertaken by Ralph McInerny in Being and Predication:
Thomistic Interpretations (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 173228. McInerny’s main concern is the “predicability” of existence; those who deny a “concept” of
esse also deny that ‘est’ can function as a predicate term in an existential proposition such as
‘Socrates is’. McInerny’s criticism of this doctrine is directed in particular at Gilson’s remarks on
the matter in Being and Some Philosophers (including Gilson’s response to Louis-Marie Régis’
review of the first edition of the book). McInerny’s treatment of the issue of whether ‘est’ is a
predicate contains multiple remarks regarding the nature of the conception signified by the terms
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3.2

Aquinas on the Signification of the Concrete Term ‘Ens’ and
its Abstract Counterpart ‘Esse’

3.2.1

The Signification of the Concrete Term ‘Ens’
If there is a term that appears to signify a complex conception, it is ‘ens’. The

term ‘ens’ signifies ‘quod est’, says Thomas repeatedly; that is, it signifies ‘what is’ or
‘what has being’. Accordingly, it appears to signify the complex conception ‘something
is’. On this subject, Aquinas writes:
Et tamen maxime uidebatur de hoc quod
dico ‘ens’, quia ‘ens’ nichil aliud est quam
‘quod est’, et sic uidetur <et> rem
significare, per hoc quod dico <‘quod’, et
esse, per hoc quod dico> ‘est’. Et si quidem
hec dictio ‘ens’ significaret esse
principaliter sicut significat rem que habet
esse, procul dubio significaret aliquid esse;
set ipsam compositionem, que importatur
in hoc quod dico ‘est’, non principaliter
significat, set consignificat eam in quantum
significat rem habentem esse; unde talis
consignificatio compositionis non sufficit
ad ueritatem uel falsitatem, quia
compositio in qua consistit ueritas et
falsitas non potest intelligi nisi secundum
quod innectit extrema compositionis.19

Nevertheless, [that something is signified
to exist] seemed [to Aristotle] especially
[true] in the case of the expression ‘ens’,
because ‘ens’ is nothing other than ‘what
is’, and thus it appears to signify <both> a
thing, by expressing <‘what’, and esse, by
expressing> ‘is’. If the expression ‘ens’
were to signify esse principally just as it
does signify a thing that has esse, without
doubt it would signify that something is;
but [‘ens’] does not principally signify the
composition itself that is conveyed in
saying ‘is’; rather, [‘ens’] consignifies
[composition] inasmuch as it signifies a
thing having esse. But such consignifying
of composition is not sufficient for truth or
falsity because the composition in which
truth and falsity consist can be understood
only according as it connects the extremes
of a composition.

In this passage, taken from the commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias, Aquinas
comments on Aristotle’s remark that verbs, in and by themselves, have signification but
they do not signify whether something is or is not (si est aut non est). That this is so,
observes Aquinas, Aristotle proves by those terms most susceptible to appear to assert
‘ens’ and ‘est’ (See in particular pp. 181-87 and 218-27). In this regard, McInerny’s study points
us in the right direction.
19
In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 362-76.
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that something is, namely the verb ‘est’ and the participle ‘ens’. Indeed, ‘ens’, says
Aristotle, in and by itself is nothing (ipsum ens nihil est).20
After examining the readings of other commentators, Aquinas offers his own. The
conception signified by ‘ens’ implies the composition of thing and esse inasmuch as ‘ens’
signifies ‘what is’, ‘what has esse’, or ‘a thing having esse’. Thus, it could appear to
signify a thing to be. Yet, the term ‘ens’ does not signify the composition signified when
one says ‘something is’, i.e., the kind of composition to which truth or falsity
applies.Were ‘ens’ to signify esse principally (principaliter) in the way that it signifies ‘a
thing that has esse’, adds Thomas, it would signify that something is. But, of course, it
does not signify esse principally (but rather ‘that which is’).21Aquinas’ next point is one
that we have not seen before. It should be said, he points out, that the term ‘ens’
consignifies composition inasmuch as it signifies ‘a thing having esse’. As for Aristotle’s
remark that ‘ens’ by itself is nothing (ipsum ens nihil est), Aquinas explains:
Et ideo, ut magis sequamur uerba
Aristotelis, considerandum est quod ipse
dixerat quod uerbum non significat rem
esse uel non esse; addit autem quod non
solum uerbum non significat rem esse uel
non esse, set nec hoc ipsum ‘ens’ significat
rem esse uel non esse, et hoc est quod dicit:
«nichil est», id est non significat aliquid
esse.22

20

Therefore, so as to follow more [closely]
the words of Aristotle, we should consider
that he had said that the verb does not
signify a thing to be or not to be; and he
adds that not only does the verb not signify
a thing to be or not to be, but not even this
[term] ‘ens’ itself signifies a thing to be or
not to be, and this is what [he means when]
he says: ‘it is nothing’, that is, it does not
signify something to be.

See Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 16b19-25. The Latin translation Aquinas has reads ipsum
‘est’ nihil est instead of ipsum ‘ens’ nihil est as corresponds to the Greek original. Aquinas is
aware of this (see In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 30, lines 311-12) and comments
on both readings.
21
Notice that when Aquinas denies that ‘ens’ signifies esse principally, he does not have in mind
the res significata of ‘ens’, which is esse. He is referring to the way in which esse is signified by
‘ens’. We shall discuss the sense of ‘principaliter’ as Aquinas uses it here shortly, but note that it
should not be confused with ‘per prius’.
22
In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 355-61.
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In short, the doctrine Aquinas relays for us here is that although ‘ens’ signifies ‘what is’
(‘quod est’), it does not signify ‘something is’ (‘aliquid est’).
In the following pages, I explore in detail two of Aquinas’ remarks regarding the
signification of ‘ens’ found in the first of the two passages quoted above. The first is that
“the term ‘ens’ consignifies composition.” Here I explain the distinction between
signification and consignification and examine the sense in which ‘ens’ is said by
Aquinas to consignify rather than signify composition. The second remark, closely related
to the first, is that “the term ‘ens’ does not signify composition,” that is, it does not
signify the kind of composition to which truth or falsity applies. The central issue here,
we shall see, is the distinction between the sense in which a proposition signifies esse and
the sense in which the term ‘ens’ signifies esse. After we have examined these two
remarks by Aquinas on the signification of ‘ens’, we will be in a position to explain why
‘ens’ does not signify ‘something is’ (‘aliquid est’), and hence, it does not signify a
judgment.
A. The Term ‘Ens’ Consignifies Composition
The notion of ‘consignificatio’ has its origins in Boethius’ logical works. It was
originally used to refer to the additional signification of time by verbs, which differs from
the proper signification of time by nouns such as ‘today’ and by adverbs of time.
Beginning in the late eleventh century logicians and grammarians progressively began to
expand the notion to include the consignification of person, tense, and mood by verbs as
well as the consignification of number, gender, and sometimes case by nouns and
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adjectives.23 In the thirteenth century, the notion of ‘consignification’ acquired various
connotations; one of them refers to the idea of a secondary signification, or signification
ex consequenti, to that which the term signifies principally (principaliter).24 In this sense,
the consignification of a term was regarded as an ‘accidental’ property, or as resulting
from the accidental properties of a term. In addition, the notion of consignification at
large was often linked to a term’s mode of signification, so that the two notions were
used interchangeably.25 Specifically, in the sense of the notion that interests us here, to
have consignification was to have an ‘accidental’ mode of signification.26
Aquinas keeps the notions of consignification and mode of signification
separate.27 He speaks of the consignification of time by verbs and participles, as in the
case of the participle ‘datum’; he also mentions the consignification of gender, but he is
not particularly concerned with such merely grammatical issues.28 Although Aquinas
does not identify a term’s consignification as a mode of signification in the way logicians

Irène Rosier, “Res significata et modus significandi: Les implications d’une distinction
médiévale,” in Sprachtheorien in Spätantike und Mittelalter, ed. Sten Ebbesen (Tübingen: Gunter
Narr Verlag, 1995), 137.
See, Lambert, Logica, ed. Franco Alessio (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1971), p. 9, lines 37-39:
“Dicitur autem [nomen] consignificare illud quod ei accidit ultra principale significatum ut
«homo» consignificat nominativum casum et numerum singularem, et alia que sibi accidunt.”
24
Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A preface to
Aquinas on Analogy,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 53-54. Note that the
distinction between what a term signifies secondarily or ex consequenti (i.e., what it consignifies)
and what it signifies principally (principaliter) must not be confused with the distinction between
the primary (per prius) and secondary (per posterious) signification of analogous terms.
25
Ashworth, “Signification and Modes,” 54.
26
See, Peter of Spain, Tractatus, ed. L. M. De Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), p. 133, lines 5-7:
“In nomine etiam est alius accidentalis modus significandi a parte accidentium, secundum quod
nomen significat masculine vel feminine, et sic de aliis.” Also, when discussing different types of
equivocation in terms, Peter writes that two of them arise from the side of the signification of the
term, whereas a third type arises “from the side of consignification, in which the diversity
expected is not of the things signified, but of modes of signification” (Tractatus, p. 105, lines. 2627). On accidental modes of signification, see Ashworth, “Signification and Modes,” 55-56.
27
Ashworth, “Signification and Modes,” 57.
28
For references in Aquinas, see Ashworth, “Signification and Modes,” 57.
23
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often did, I have found that the two notions are nonetheless closely related: one can speak
of an “ex consequenti relation,” and at times Aquinas uses this language. A term’s
consignification is not a mode of signification, but in some cases it results ex consequenti
from the mode of signification of a term. For example, Aquinas points out that the term
‘white’ (‘album’) signifies quality alone, namely whiteness, but given that it signifies
whiteness per modum accidentis, its ratio includes ex consequenti the subject of
whiteness and hence the term ‘white’ (‘album’) may be said to signify the subject of
whiteness ex consequenti. The term ‘whiteness’ (‘albedo’), in contrast, does not signify
whiteness per modum accidentis but rather per modum substantiae; as an abstract noun, it
does not consignify any subject.
Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod
praedicata, quae sunt in generibus
accidentis, principaliter significant
substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut
hoc quod dico album et musicum. Nam
album ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam
qualitatem significat. Hoc autem nomen
album significat subiectum ex consequenti,
inquantum significat albedinem per modum
accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex
consequenti includat in sui ratione
subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse.
Albedo enim etsi significet accidens, non
tamen per modum accidentis, sed per
modum substantiae. Unde nullo modo
consignificat subiectum.29

What Avicenna says is not true: that
predicates that belong to the genera of
accidents principally signify a substance
and secondarily an accident, as in what I
call ‘white’ and ‘musical’. For, ‘white’, as
it is said in the categories, signifies quality
alone. But this term ‘white’ signifies a
subject ex consequenti, inasmuch as it
signifies whiteness in the mode of accident.
Therefore, its ratio includes some subject
ex consequenti, for, ‘to be’ (esse) for an
accident is ‘to be in’ (inesse). The term
‘whiteness’ also signifies an accident, yet
not in the mode of accident, but in the
mode of substance. Thus, in no way does it
consignify a subject.

Similarly, Aquinas relates the consignification of time by verbs to their mode of
signification. Verbs signify action alone, but given that they are imposed to signify action
per modum actionis, that is, in the concrete as mixed together with the subject from
whom it proceeds, the notion of time is included ex consequenti, we may say, in the ratio
29

In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 894, Marietti ed., p. 239.
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or conceptio of the corresponding action. Consequently, verbs do not signify time
principally (principaliter), in the way a term such as ‘today’ does; rather, they consignify
time inasmuch as the notion of time is included ex consequenti in the conception verbs
signify by virtue of their mode of signification:
‘[C]ursus’, quia significat actionem non per
modum actionis, set per modum rei per se
existentis, eo quod est nomen, non
consignificat tempus; ‘currit’ uero, cum sit
uerbum significans actionem, consignificat
tempus, quia proprium est motus tempore
mensurari, actiones autem nobis note sunt
in tempore; dictum est autem supra quod
consignificare tempus est significare
aliquid ut tempore mensuratum; unde aliud
est significare tempus principaliter ut rem
quamdam, quod potest nomini conuenire,
aliud autem est significare cum tempore,
quod non conuenit nomini, set uerbo. 30

Since ‘cursus’, insofar as it is a noun
signifies action, not in the mode of an
action, but in the mode of a thing existing
per se, it does not consignify time. But
‘currit’, since it is a verb signifying action,
consignifies time, because to be measured
by time is proper to motion, and actions are
known by us in time. It was said above,
moreover, that to consignify time is to
signify something as measured in time.
Thus, it is one thing to signify time
principally, as a certain res ([or] thing),
which [signification] can belong to a noun;
and another thing to signify with time,
which belongs, not to a noun, but to the
verb.

Similar remarks can be made regarding the conception signified by concrete
terms. The conceptio signified by concrete terms, by virtue of their modus significandi,
implies composition; accordingly, a concrete term consignifies composition. We have
seen in the previous chapter that a concrete term signifies its res without prescinding
(sine praecisione materiae designatae) and hence as composite, either as a subject with
attributes or as an attribute in a subject. Aquinas, then, describes the signification of
concrete terms as signifying “ut totum” and “per modum completi participantis (through
the mode of the complete thing as participating).”31 A concrete term such as ‘homo’
30

See In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 27, lines 93-105.
Cf. In VII Meta., lect. 5, n. 1379 (Marietti ed., p. 339): “[H]omo significat ut totum, humanitas
significat ut pars;” Super De causis, prop. 22 (Saffrey ed., p. 116, lns. 25-27): “[O]mne nomen a
nobis impositum, vel significat per modum completi participantis sicut nomina concreta, vel
significat per modum diminuti et partis formalis sicut nomina abstracta.”Cf. also De ente, c. 2,
lns. 292-304; Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1.
31
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signifies its res (humanity) without prescinding, but ‘mixed together with other things’,
as their subject. Thus, the conceptio signified by the term ‘homo’ implies or includes
composition inasmuch as it signifies its res significata (humanity) ut totum, as a whole. In
order to represent linguistically the conception signified by the concrete term ‘homo’
grammarians use the phrase ‘habens humanitatem’ (‘what has humanity’). Similarly, the
conception signified by the concrete term ‘ens’ may be linguistically represented by the
phrase ‘habens esse’ (‘what has esse’). Notice that the term ‘ens’ and the term ‘homo’
were imposed to signify this whole unit: ‘the thing having esse’ and ‘the thing having
humanitas’. Surely, then, a certain composition of thing and esse and of thing and
humanitas is implied in the conception signified by the term ‘ens’ and by the term
‘homo’, but none of these terms was imposed to signify this composition, namely, ‘the
composition of a thing and esse’ or ‘the composition of a thing and humanitas’. Rather,
the term ‘ens’ and the terms ‘homo’ were imposed to signify ‘the subject of esse’ and ‘the
subject of humanitas’ respectively. In other words, neither ‘ens’ nor ‘homo’ signifies
composition. Given their concrete mode of signification, though, the conceptio each term
signifies includes composition ex consequenti; accordingly, we may say, they consignify
composition.
In order to understand fully the conceptual distinctions at work here, more needs
to be said regarding the modus significandi of concrete terms. We mentioned already that
Aquinas describes a concrete term as signifying ut totum, but another of Aquinas’
characterizations of the mode of signification of concrete terms is that they signify ut
subsistens or ut per se existens. Aquinas writes:
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[Q]uod significatur concretive, significatur
ut per se existens, ut homo vel album.32

What is signified in the concrete is
signified as existing per se, as ‘man’ or
‘white’.

[O]mnia nomina a nobis imposita ad
significandum aliquid completum
subsistens, significant in concretione, prout
competit compositis.33

All nouns imposed by us to signify
something as complete and subsistent
signify in the concrete, as befits composite
things.

A concrete term signifies its res as complete and subsistent, either in the mode of a noun
‘as a subject (of attributes)’ (as in the case of ‘homo’ and ‘ens’) or in the mode of an
adjective, ‘as in a subject’ (as in the case of ‘album’). Although both ‘homo’ and ‘album’
signify some subject, the term ‘homo’, we may say, signifies the subject of humanity
principaliter, not ex consequenti, whereas the term ‘album’ as an adjectival noun
signifies the subject of whiteness ex consequenti. The term ‘album’ signifies the subject
of whiteness ex consequenti because it signifies whiteness per modum accidentis, i.e., ‘as
in a subject’.34 The subject of whiteness is implied or contained ex consequenti in the
conception signified by ‘album’; as a result, ‘album’ consignifies the subject of
whiteness. In contrast, the term ‘homo’ signifies the subject of humanity principaliter, we
may say, because it signifies humanity per modum substantiae and ‘as a subject (with
attributes)’.35 Like ‘homo’ the term ‘ens’ signifies its res, esse, in the concrete ‘as a
subject (with attributes)’, for ‘ens’ signifies ‘what has esse’. Accordingly, the term ‘ens’
32

In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 770.
ST I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 140.
34
See In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 894 quoted above in note 29.
35
See ST I, q. 39, a. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 400: “[N]omina substantiva significant aliquid per
modum substantiae : nomina vero adiectiva significant aliquid per modum accidentis, quod
inhaeret subiecto;” also De pot., q. 9, a. 6; In I sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 2.
Note that abstract terms may also be said to signify “per modum substantiae” inasmuch as they
signify their res ‘as a certain thing’. See, e.g., In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 894, Marietti ed., p. 239:
“Albedo enim etsi significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum
substantiae. Unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum.” But, unlike a concrete term which
signifies its res as ‘complete and subsistent’, an abstract term signifies its res as ‘that by which’;
which fact explains why it neither signifies nor consignifies a subject.
33
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signifies the subject of esse (subiectum essendi) principaliter, as Aquinas maintains in the
following passage. Describing the signification of the concrete term ‘ens’ alongside the
concrete term ‘currens’, Aquinas writes:
[Q]uod est, idest ens et currens,
significatur sicut in concreto velud album .
. . . [S]et id ipsum quod est, significatur
sicut subiectum essendi, sic id quod currit
significatur sicut subiectum currendi: et
ideo sicut possumus dicere de eo quod
currit, sive de currente, quod currat,
inquantum subiicitur cursui et participat
ipsum; ita possumus dicere quod ens, sive
id quod est, sit, inquantum participat actum
essendi.36

[T]hat which is, that is, ‘a being’ and ‘[one]
running’, are signified as in the concrete, as
is ‘white’. . . . ‘[T]hat which is’ is signified
as the subject of being, as ‘that which runs’
is signified as the subject of running. Thus,
just as we can say of ‘that which runs’, or
of ‘a runner’, that it runs, inasmuch as it is
the subject of running and participates in it,
we can say that ‘a being’, or ‘that which
is’, is, inasmuch as it participates in the act
of being.

As we mentioned before, given its concrete mode of signification, the conceptio
signified by the term ‘ens’ implies or includes composition ex consequenti, not
principally; as a result, ‘ens’ consignifies composition. Following Aquinas’ standard
account of the conceptio signified by terms as opposed to propositions, the conception
signified by ‘ens’, namely ‘quod est’ or ‘habens esse’, is a simple or non-composite
conception (conceptio incomplexa), so that, as Aquinas puts it, “as in itself
[incomplexum], does not contain a comparison or application to a thing.”37 On close
examination we find that although some composition is implied in ‘ens’, there is, in fact,
no comparison or application of esse to a thing in the conception signified by ‘ens’; there
is only the subject of esse (subiectum essendi) or the thing having esse (habens esse).
Since what is conceived by the intellect and subsequently signified by the term ‘ens’ is
not the comparison or application of esse to a thing, the term ‘ens’ does not signify ‘the
composition of a thing and esse’. Rather, the term ‘ens’ consignifies composition or
36

In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 271, lines 44-45, 52-59.
SCG I, c. 59, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 167, lines 28-30: “[I]ncomplexum autem, quantum est de
se, non continet aliquam comparationem vel applicationem ad rem.”
37
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signifies composition ex consequenti. The term ‘ens’ consignifies composition inasmuch
as the conceptio signified by ‘ens’ consists in the intellect’s conception of esse without
prescinding (sine praecisione materiae designatae) and hence as composite.
We have explained, then, the sense in which Aquinas says that ‘ens’ consignifies
composition. I turn now to another remark by Aquinas regarding the signification of
‘ens’, namely, that ‘ens’ does not signify composition.38
B. The Term ‘Ens’ Does not Signify Composition
We should not mistake the kind of composition ‘ens’ consignifies with the kind of
composition it does not signify. In the passage quoted at the beginning of this section
(3.2.1), Aquinas tells us that the composition consignified by ‘ens’ is not the kind of
composition to which truth or falsity applies, for it lacks a connection between the
extremes of the composition.
[T]alis consignificatio compositionis non
sufficit ad ueritatem uel falsitatem, quia
compositio in qua consistit ueritas et
falsitas non potest intelligi nisi secundum
quod innectit extrema compositionis.39

[S]uch consignifying composition is not
sufficient for truth or falsity because the
composition in which truth and falsity
consist cannot be understood unless it
connects the extremes of the composition.

As we shall see next, the kind of composition ‘ens’ does not signify is the kind of
composition sufficient for truth or falsity. The fact that ‘ens’ does not signify, and does
not consignify, the kind of composition to which truth or falsity applies explains why, for
Aquinas, ‘ens’ does not signify ‘something is’ (‘aliquid est’).40 We begin by examining
what sort of composition Aquinas considers to be sufficient for truth or falsity.

38

See In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 362-76.
In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 372-76.
40
See In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 355-61.
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On the subject of the conceptions of the intellect signified by words (voces), both
complex and simple, Aquinas writes:
Voces enim incomplexae neque verum
neque falsum significant; sed voces
complexae, per affirmationem aut
negationem veritatem aut falsitatem habent
. . . Et cum voces sint signa intellectuum,
similiter dicendum est de conceptionibus
intellectus. Quae enim sunt simplices, non
habent veritatem neque falsitatem, sed
solum illae quae sunt complexae per
affirmationem vel negationem.41

Non-complex words signify neither truth
nor falsity; but complex words, through
affirmation or negation, have truth and
falsity . . . And, since words are the signs
of concepts, the same is said with respect to
the conceptions of the intellect. Those
which are simple do not have truth and
falsity, but only those which are complex
through affirmation or negation [have truth
and falsity].

There are two important points to take from this passage. The first one is that Aquinas
considers as subject of truth or falsity only those conceptions which are complex
(conceptiones complexae). Non-complex conceptions, or conceptiones incomplexae, on
the other hand, do not have truth or falsity. Now, elsewhere, Aquinas points out that a
proposition signifies a complex conception, whereas a term, namely a noun or a verb,
signifies a simple conception.
[S]ignificatio orationis differt a
significatione nominis uel uerbi, quia
nomen uel uerbum significat simplicem
intellectum, oratio autem significat
intellectum compositum.42

The signification of a proposition (oratio)
differs from the signification of a noun or
verb, because a noun or a verb signifies a
simple understanding, a proposition
signifies a composite understanding.

[D]uplex est significatio uocis, una que
refertur ad intellectum compositum, alia
autem que refertur ad intellectum
simplicem, prima significatio competit
orationi, secunda uero competit parti
orationis.43

[T]he signification of a word (vox) is
twofold: one [signification] refers to a
composite understanding; the other refers
to a simple understanding. The first
signification belongs to a proposition;
whereas the second belongs to a part of a
proposition.
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In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1223-1224, Marietti ed., p. 309.
In I Periher., lect. 6, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 32, lines 20-23.
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In I Periher., lect. 6, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 32-33, lines 35-39.
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Furthermore, Aquinas, while paraphrasing Aristotle, links the conception signified by a
noun or verb with the first operation of the intellect, and the conception signified by a
proposition with the intellect’s second operation:
Hoc ergo est primo et per se intellectum,
quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re
intellecta, sive illud sit definitio, sive
enuntiatio, secundum quod ponuntur duae
operationes intellectus, in III de Anima.
Hoc autem sic ab intellectu conceptum
dicitur verbum interius, hoc enim est quod
significatur per vocem; non enim vox
exterior significat ipsum intellectum, aut
formam ipsius intelligibilem, aut ipsum
intelligere, sed conceptum intellectus quo
mediante significat rem: ut cum dico,
«homo» vel «homo est animal».44

Therefore, what is primarily and per se
understood is what the intellect in itself
conceives about the thing understood,
whether it be a definition or a proposition –
according as two operations of the intellect
are affirmed in De Anima 3. And this
[thing] conceived by the intellect in this
way is called the interior word (verbum),
for this is what is signified by the [exterior]
word (vox); for, the exterior word (vox)
does not signify the intellect itself, or its
intelligible form, or the act of
understanding, but the concept of the
intellect through whose mediation it
signifies the thing: as when I say, ‘man’,
or, ‘Man is an animal’.

Accordingly, the conceptio signified by a term, or simple word (vox), is that which the
intellect produces through its first operation, that is, a simple conception (conceptio
incomplexa), which is neither true nor false. A proposition, or complex word, on the other
hand, signifies a complex conception (conceptio complexa), the product of the second
operation of the intellect, and what is subject to truth or falsity.45
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De pot., q. 9, a. 5, Marietti ed., p. 236. See also, In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p.
29, lines 277-86): “Set dicendum est quod duplex est operatio intellectus, ut supra habitum est;
ille qui dicit nomen uel uerbum secundum se, constituit intellectum quantum ad prima
operationem, que est conceptio alicuius . . . non autem constituit intellectum quantum ad
secundam operationem, que est intellectus componentis et diuidentis.”
45
The same doctrine is found in De ver. q. 4, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 22/1, p. 123-24, lines 101109: “[V]erbum intellectus nostri, secundum cuius similitudinem loqui possumus de verbo
divino, est id ad quod operatio intellectus nostri terminatur, quod est ipsum intellectum, quod
dicitur conceptio intellectus, sive sit conceptio significabilis per vocem incomplexam ut accidit
quando intellectus format quidditates rerum, sive per vocem complexam ut accidit quando
intellectus componit et dividit.”
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The second point to take from above, and which further confirms the doctrine
regarding the second operation of the intellect, complex conceptions, and propositions, is
that Aquinas explains that a conceptio complexa is complex through affirmation or
negation. The complexity of the conception to which truth or falsity applies is, therefore,
associated with predication. Only in predication are the extremes (the subject-term and
predicate-term) connected inasmuch as the intellect establishes a comparison between the
thing denoted by the subject-term and the form signified by the predicate-term wherein
the form or nature is either applied or removed from the thing.46 Aquinas, thinking of the
complexum in comparison with the incomplexum, writes:
Cum aliquod incomplexum vel dicitur vel
intelligitur, ipsum quidem incomplexum,
quantum est de se, non est rei aequatum
nec rei inaequale: cum aequalitas et
inaequalitas secundum comparationem
dicantur; incomplexum autem, quantum est
de se, non continet aliquam comparationem
vel applicationem ad rem. Unde de se nec
verum nec falsum dici potest: sed tantum
complexum, in quo designatur comparatio
incomplexi ad rem per notam
compositionis aut divisionis.47

When something non-complex
(incomplexum) is said or understood, the
incomplexum, as it is in itself, is neither
equal nor unequal to the thing, because
equality and inequality are said according
to a comparison; the incomplexum, as it is
in itself, does not contain a comparison or
application to the thing. Thus, in itself, it
cannot be said to be true or false; but only
the complexum, in which is designated a
comparison of the incomplexum to the
thing through the note of composition or
division [is said to be true or false].

The incomplexum or simple conception, then, does not contain a comparison to a thing by
either affirmation or negation; as such it is not subject to truth or falsity. The complexum
or complex conception, on the other hand, contains a comparison of the incomplexum to a
thing. That is, a complex conception contains a comparison (through composition or
See ST I, q. 16, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 208: “[N]am in ommi propositione aliquam formam
significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab
ea.” Note that the terms of a proposition are not taken equally; a term in the subject position is
taken “materially”, i.e. what it supposits for, while a term in the predicate position is taken
“formally”, i.e., what it signifies (See, e.g., In I Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 3; ST I, q. 13, a. 12 and q. 31, a.
3, ad 2; In IX Meta., lect. 11, n. 1898).
47
SCG I, c. 59, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 167, lines 24a-1b.
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division) of the simple conception signified by the predicate-term to the thing the subjectterm denotes or supposits for. Note that although the conception signified by a
proposition is complex, in itself it constitutes a unified unity. A conceptio complexa is
one sole complex object of understanding.
[P]redicatum comparatur ad subiectum
sicut forma ad materiam . . . ex forma
autem et materia fit unum simpliciter. 48

[T]he predicate is related to the subject as
form to matter . . . from form and matter
results one thing simply.

What is conceived by the intellect through its second operation and subsequently
signified by a proposition is the comparison itself, i.e., the composition of res and
incomplexum, or a division of one from the other. In other words, a proposition or
statement signifies one thing, a comparison of one thing to another, by way of
composition (per modum compositionis) or division (per modum diuisionis).49
Accordingly, Aquinas holds that a proposition signifies the composition or division of the
intellect.50 In other words, an affirmative proposition signifies composition, the
composition of res and incomplexum.
Let us consider an example: the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’. The intellect’s
conceptio signified by the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’ is a complex conception
(conceptio complexa) conceived by the intellect through its second operation. It consists
in the comparison of the simple conception ‘what has humanity’ (signified by the
predicate-term ‘man’) to the subject ‘Socrates’ in the manner of composition.
Accordingly, the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’ signifies composition, namely, the
composition of Socrates and the simple conception ‘what has humanity’. The term ‘man’,

48

See In I Periher., lect. 8, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 42, lines 176-79.
See In I Periher., lect. 8, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 44, lines 336-55.
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See ST I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3, Leonine ed., vol. 5, p. 335: “Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est
definitio; et enuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus.”
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in contrast, taken alone cannot be said to signify composition, for the intellect’s conceptio
‘what has humanity’ which the term ‘man’ signifies does not consist in a comparison of
one thing to another. The term ‘man’ does not signify that some x has humanity; rather, it
signifies the humanity in a concrete mode, as a subject with attributes. The conceptio
signified by the term ‘man’ is, therefore, a simple conception (conceptio incomplexa); it
is the simple, non-composite conception of humanity as a subsistent subject which the
intellect conceives through its first operation. Now, as a concrete term, the term ‘man’
consignifies composition, or signifies composition ex consequenti. But, the kind of
composition the term ‘man’ consignifies is not the kind of composition the proposition
‘Socrates is a man’ signifies, for the composition that ‘man’ consignifies does not
consists in a comparison of one thing to another and as such is not subject of truth or
falsity. Rather, the composition the term ‘man’ consignifies is the kind of composition
contained ex consequenti in the conception signified by a concrete term insofar as its res
is conceived by the intellect without prescinding (sine praecisione materiae designatae)
and hence as composite.
Given that the term ‘ens’ signifies ‘quod est’ (‘what is’), it could appear to signify
‘aliquid est’ (‘something is’). However, the expression ‘quod est’ is not equivalent to the
expression ‘aliquid est’. The former represents to a simple conception, the latter a
complex conception wherein a comparison is made between a thing and esse. Aquinas’
remarks regarding the verb ‘est’ within a propositional context are helpful here:
Ad cuius euidenciam considerandum est
quod hoc uerbum ‘est’ quandoque in
enunciatione predicatur secundum se, ut
cum dicitur: «Sortes est», per quod nichil
aliud intendimus significare quam quod
Sortes sit in rerum natura; quadoque uero

To understand this one must consider that
this verb ‘is’ is sometimes predicated in a
proposition in itself, as when one says
‘Socrates is’, by which we do not intend to
signify anything other than that Socrates
exists in reality. But sometimes the verb
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non predicator per se, quasi principale
predicatum, set quasi coniunctum principali
predicato ad connectendum ipsum subiecto,
sicut cum dicitur: «Sortes est albus»: non
enim est intention loquentis ut assertat
Sortem esse in rerum natura, set ut attribuat
ei albedinem mediante hoc uerbo ‘est’; et
ideo in talibus ‘est’ praedicatur ut adiacens
principali praedicato.51

‘is’ is not predicated in itself, as if [it were]
the principal predicate, but, as it were,
conjoined to the principal predicate in order
to connect it to the subject, as when one
says ‘Socrates is white’. For, it is not the
intention of the speaker to assert that
Socrates exists in reality, but to attribute to
him whiteness by means of the verb ‘is’;
and for this reason ‘is’ in such cases is
predicated as adjacent to the principal
predicate. . . .

There are, then, according to Aquinas, two different kinds of propositions containing the
verb ‘est’: one where ‘est’ is predicated per se (as in the proposition ‘Socrates is’, by
which we signify that something is in reality), the other where ‘est’ is adjacent to the
predicate (as in the proposition ‘Socrates is white’, by which we signify that whiteness
inheres in Socrates). The first kind is the one that interests us here. In a proposition such
as ‘Sortes est’ (‘Socrates is’), the verb ‘est’ is the predicate-term and ‘Sortes’ is the
subject-term. The proposition ‘Sortes est’ signifies a complex conception. Specifically,
the proposition ‘Sortes est’ signifies the intellect’s conception of the comparison or
application of the simple conception of esse, signified by the predicate-term ‘est’, to the
subject-term Socrates. This is why Aquinas remarks in the passage immediately quoted
above that the proposition ‘Sortes est’ signifies that Socrates is in reality. Now, the kind
of complex conception a proposition like ‘Sortes est’ signifies is the kind of complex
conception the term ‘ens’ can appear to signify. The term ‘ens’ signifies ‘quod est’, but
the ‘est’ in ‘quod est’ is not a predicate. The term ‘ens’ does not signify something to be
in reality, that is, it does not signify ‘aliquid est’. What is conceived by the intellect and
signified by the term ‘ens’ is rather what has esse, ‘quod est’.

51

In II Periher., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 88, lines 35-46.
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If ‘ens’ were to signify that something is (‘aliquid est’), it would signify esse
principally (principaliter), which it does not. The term ‘ens’ signifies esse, but it does not
signify esse principally. The term ‘ens’ signifies esse in the same way the term ‘homo’
signifies humanitas; that is to say, ‘ens’ signifies esse to the extent that esse is the object
of the conception it signifies. Properly speaking the term ‘ens’ signifies not esse but the
conception of esse in the concrete, i.e., it signifies the thing having esse (‘quod est’). In
contrast, the proposition ‘aliquid est’ signifies esse principally, for it signifies ‘to be’
(esse), i.e., it signifies ‘something is’. Every proposition may in fact be said to principally
signify esse. In In I Periher., lect. 6, Aquinas sugguests that what signifies according to
affirmation or negation signifies esse uel non esse. Thus, every proposition signifies esse
uel non esse (i.e. to be, to be such and such, or not to be).52 Now, no term signifies that
something is or is not. Aquinas writes that “no verb signifies the being or not being of a
thing (esse rei uel non esse), that is, that a thing is or is not.”53 And, he further remarks
that “not even this term ‘ens’ signify a thing to be or not to be.”54 Surely, inasmuch as
‘ens’ signifies ‘quod est’, it may be understood as signifying a thing and esse, but it
cannot be said to signify the being of a thing (esse rei), for it does not signify the

Note that a proposition of the form ‘Socrates runs’ may be reconstructed as ‘Socrates is
running’ (See In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 893). In order to refer to the signification of a proposition, I
prefer, however, the expression esse rei uel non esse, which Aquinas also uses, as in the
following note, since every proposition signifies either ‘something is’ or ‘something is such and
such’. The object of the intellect’s conception signified by a proposition is ultimately the being or
not being of a thing. We shall examine the sense of the expression “esse rei,” when used in this
context, in the next chapter.
53
In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, pp. 29-30, lines 302-303: “nullum uerbum est
signum esse rei uel non esse, id est quod res sit uel non sit.” See also, In I Periher., lect. 5,
Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 30, lines 307-308: “[N]ullum uerbum significat hoc totum, rem esse uel
non esse.” Similar remarks are made regarding the term the term ‘homo’. In I Periher., lect. 6,
Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 34, lines 112-14: “[H]oc nomen ‘homo’ . . . significat aliquid, set not ut
affirmatio aut negatio, quia non significat esse uel non esse.”
54
In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31 lines 359-60: “[S]et nec hoc ipsum ‘ens’
significat rem esse uel non esse.”
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composition of a thing and esse. Rather, ‘ens’ signifies a thing having esse (habens esse)
or the subject of being (subiectum essendi). Whereas the proposition ‘aliquid est’
signifies the esse of a thing (esse rei), the term ‘ens’ signifies the subject of being
(subiectum essendi). Accordingly, the proposition ‘aliquid est’ signifies esse principally,
whereas ‘ens’ signifies the subject of being principally.
We are now in a better position to understand Aquinas’ remarks regarding ‘ens’ in
the passage quoted at the beginning of section 3.2.1:
Et tamen maxime uidebatur de hoc quod
dico ‘ens’, quia ‘ens’ nichil aliud est quam
‘quod est’, et sic uidetur <et> rem
significare, per hoc quod dico <‘quod’, et
esse, per hoc quod dico> ‘est’. Et si quidem
hec dictio ‘ens’ significaret esse
principaliter sicut significat rem que habet
esse, procul dubio significaret aliquid esse;
set ipsam compositionem, que importatur
in hoc quod dico ‘est’, non principaliter
significat, set consignificat eam in quantum
significat rem habentem esse; unde talis
consignificatio compositionis non sufficit
ad ueritatem uel falsitatem, quia
compositio in qua consistit ueritas et
falsitas non potest intelligi nisi secundum
quod innectit extrema compositionis.55

Nevertheless, [that something is signified
to exist] seemed [to Aristotle] especially
[true] in the case of the expression ‘ens’,
because ‘ens’ is nothing other than ‘what
is’, and thus it appears to signify <both> a
thing, by expressing <‘what’, and esse, by
expressing> ‘is’. If the expression ‘ens’
were to signify esse principally just as it
does signify a thing that has esse, without
doubt it would signify that something is;
but [‘ens’] does not principally signify the
composition itself that is conveyed in
saying ‘is’; rather, [‘ens’] consignifies
[composition] inasmuch as it signifies a
thing having esse. But such consignifying
of composition is not sufficient for truth or
falsity because the composition in which
truth and falsity consist can be understood
only according as it connects the extremes
of a composition.

The term ‘ens’ signifies ‘quod est’, but it does not signify that something is (‘est’ or
‘aliquid est’) because it does not signify the composition of some subject and esse. The
term ‘ens’ consignifies composition inasmuch as, given its concrete mode of
signification, some composition is implied or contained ex consequenti in the conception
‘ens’ signifies (henceforth, “composition1”). The kind of composition ‘ens’ consignifies
55
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118
is not, however, the kind of composition to which truth or falsity applies (henceforth,
“composition2”), wherein a comparison of one thing to another is made, and which a
proposition such as ‘aliquid est’ signifies. On the other hand, although ‘ens’ signifies
esse, it does not signify esse principally. The term ‘ens’ signifies esse insofar as esse is
the object of the intellect’s conception which ‘ens’ immediately signifies. The term ‘ens’
does not signify esse in the sense of esse rei vel non esse i.e., the “composition2” of some
subject and esse; rather, ‘ens’ signifies habens esse or the subject of being. Therefore, the
conceptio of esse that the term ‘ens’ signifies is not a complex conception (conceptio
complexa). Like any other term, the term ‘ens’ signifies a simple conception (conceptio
incomplexa), the intellect’s simple conception of its res, esse, in the concrete ‘as a subject
(with attributes)’.
The analysis from a semantic perspective of the intellect’s conceptio signified by
‘ens’ as simple is in accordance with Aquinas’ remarks regarding ens as one of the
primae conceptiones of the intellect.56 The primary conceptions of the intellect are
described by Aquinas as either simple (incomplexa) or complex (complexa); and among
the primary simple conceptions Aquinas lists ‘ens’:
[P]raeexistunt in nobis quaedam
scientiarum semina, scilicet primae
conceptiones intellectus, quae statim
lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur per
species a sensibilibus abstractas, sive sint
complexa, sicut dignitates, sive
incomplexa, sicut ratio entis, et unius, et
huiusmodi, quae statim intellectus
apprehendit.57

56

There pre-exist in us certain seeds of the
sciences, that is, the first conceptions of the
intellect, which are known at once by the
light of the agent intellect through species
abstracted from sensible things, whether
they are complex, as are axioms, or noncomplex, as is the ratio of being, of one,
and so on, which the intellect at once
apprehends.

This line of argument is pursued in greater detail by McInerny (Being and Predication, 18184). McInerny discusses Aquinas’ doctrine in light of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas.
57
De ver., q. 11, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 22/2-1, p. 350, lines 266-72. See also Quodl. X, q. 4, a. 1
where the prima principia naturaliter nota are described by Aquinas as either complexa or
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Furthermore, elsewhere, once again discussing the primary conceptions of the intellect,
Aquinas identifies the conception of ens as attained through the first operation:
Ad huius autem evidentiam sciendum est,
quod, cum duplex sit operatio intellectus:
una, qua cognoscit quod quid est, quae
vocatur indivisibilium intelligentia: alia,
qua componit et dividit: in utroque est
aliquod primum: in prima quidem
operatione est aliquod primum, quod cadit
in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod
dico ens; nec aliquid hac operatione potest
mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens.58

To make this evident it should be
understood that since the operation of the
intellect is twofold: one by which it knows
that which [a thing] is, which is called the
understanding of indivisibles; the other by
which it composes and divides. There is in
both something first. In the first operation
there is some first that falls into the
conception of the intellect, namely, what I
call being (ens); and in this operation
nothing can be conceived by the mind
unless being (ens) is understood.

Aquinas, then, identifies ens not only as a simple conception attained through the
intellect’s first operation, but also as what is analytically first and thus indispensable for
understanding anything else in this operation.59
Its character of prima conceptio as described above renders the conception of ens
the most universal.60 Its universality is further revealed in the modus significandi of the
term ‘ens’. Aquinas writes that ‘qui est’ or ‘ens’ is the most general and universal of all
terms on account of its modus significandi, for whereas any other term determines some
mode of the substance of a thing (modus substantiae rei), ‘ens’ does not determine any
mode of being (modus essendi).61 Indeed, according to its mode of signification, the term

incomplexa. For Aquinas’ use of ‘conceptio’ in this context, see also Quodl. VIII, q. 2, a. 2; and
De trin., q. 6, a. 4.
58
In IV Meta., lect. 6, n. 605, Marietti ed., p. 167-68.
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Aquinas further states that understanding of the principle of non-contradiction, one of the
primary complex conceptions (i.e. the first principles, also called ‘dignitates’), depends on the
understanding of the conception of ‘ens’. See In IV Meta., lect. 6, n. 605; ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2; SCG
II, c. 83.
60
See In I Meta., lect. 2, n. 46, Marietti ed., p. 13: “Sed dicendum, quod magis universalia
secundum simplicem apprehensionem sunt primo nota, nam primo in intellectu cadit ens.”
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See ST I, q. 13, a. 11 co and ad 1. On ‘qui est’ as equivalent to ‘ens’, see In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a.
1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 195: “[H]oc nomen «qui est» vel «ens» imponitur ab actu essendi.”
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‘ens’ signifies the conception of esse in the concrete mode as a subject, that is, ‘ens’
signifies the subject of being (subiectum essendi). Now, in different places, Aquinas
remarks that ‘ens’ does not signify any form or nature but only esse.62 The reason ‘ens’
does not signify any essence is that it signifies the subiectum essendi without any
determination as to its modus essendi.63 In other words, the conception signified by ‘ens’
leaves the subject of esse (quod est) undetermined as to its modus essendi. Further
evidence of the indeterminate character of the conception of ‘ens’ with respect to any
modus essendi is that what is denominated ‘ens’ is denominated solely ad actu essendi.64
In fact, it is precisely the indeterminate character of the conception signified by ‘ens’
with respect to the modus essendi of the subiectum essendi that makes it possible for
‘ens’ to be divided among its various analogous significations.
We have seen that at different places Aquinas states that ‘ens’ does not signify
essence. Yet, at the same time he declares that ‘ens’ “signifies the essence of a thing
(essentia rei) and is divided by the ten genera.”65 In regards to this apparent
contradiction, I point out that ‘ens’ is not said to signify essence as such as though it were
the res significata. If we consider the subject of esse – i.e., the quod in ‘quod est’, then

See In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 2 ad 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 223: “Ens autem non dicit
quiditatem, sed solum actum essendi;” ST I, q. 13, a. 11, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 162: “Non enim
significat formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse.”
63
I am in debt to Ralph McInerny for this inside. See McInerny, Being and Predication, 218-21.
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See In IV Meta., lect. 2, n. 553, Marietti ed., p. 155: “[H]oc vero nomen Ens, imponitur ab actu
essendi;” SCG I, c. 25, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 77b, lines 13-14: “[N]omen autem rei a quidditate
imponitur, sicut nomen entis ab esse.” Also, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1; Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2.
65
See Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 25/2, p. 215, lines 66-72 (italics mark the citation of
Averroes, In Meta. 5.7, made explicit by Aquinas): “[S]ed uerum est quod hoc nomen ‘ens’,
secundum quod importat rem cui competit huiusmodi esse, sic significat essenciam rei, et
diuiditur per decem genera. Non tamen uniuoce, quia non eadem ratione competit omnibus esse,
set substancie quidem per se, aliis autem aliter.” See, also, SCG III, c. 8, Leonine ed., vol. 14, p.
22, lines 14-17: “Ens enim dupliciter dicitur, ut Philosophus in Metaphysica docet. Uno modo,
secundum quod significat essentiam rei, et dividitur per decem praedicamenta;” and In II Sent., d.
37, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3.
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‘ens’ signifies essence (as opposed to esse), because ‘essence’ names the quod formally:
the quod is a ‘what’, or, better, what has whatness. Thus considered, ‘ens’ is divided by
the ten genera, that is, ‘ens’ is predicated of substance and accident alike. Notice that this
is only possible because no kind of essence is included in the conception signified by
‘ens’. A thing, substance or accident, is denominated ‘ens’ from esse alone, but is
denominated ‘substance’ or ‘accident’ from its modus essendi.66 Similar remarks apply to
the more general division of ‘ens’ between what is commonly referred to as the
distinction between ‘ens reale’ and ‘ens rationis’. Aquinas writes that in the former sense
(‘ens reale’, or what he elsewhere calls ens quod est extra animam or ens perfectum67),
‘ens’ signifies essence and is divided by the ten genera, for ‘essence’ names something in
reality (aliquid in natura existens). In the latter sense (‘ens rationis’), ‘ens’ signifies the
truth of a proposition and the composition of the intellect, for something is or has being
in this sense insofar as it is the subject of a proposition, that is, when reason affirms or
denies something of it.68 Once again, the fact that ‘ens’ signifies the subject of being
(essendi) without any determination as to its modus essendi, makes the division of ‘ens’

See also In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 885, Marietti ed., p. 237-38: “Ens igitur dividitur in substantiam
et accidens, secundum absolutam entis considerationem . . . Divisio vero entis in substantiam et
accidens attenditur secundum hoc quod aliquid in natura sua est vel substantia vel accidens.”
67
In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 889, Marietti ed., p. 238.
68
See In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 873: “Uno enim modo dicitur ens
quod per decem genera dividitur: et sic ens significat aliquid in natura existens; sive sit substantia,
ut homo; sive accidens, ut color. Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis;
prout dicitur, quod affirmatio est vera, quando significat esse de eo quod est; et negatio, quando
significat non esse de eo quod non est; et hoc ens compositionem significat, quam intellectus
componens et dividens adinvenit. Quaecumque ergo dicuntur entia quantum ad primum modum,
sunt entia quantum ad secundum modum: quia omne quod habet naturale esse in rebus, potest
significari per propositionem affirmativam esse; ut cum dicitur: color est, vel homo est. Non
autem omnia quae sunt entia quantum ad secundum modum, sunt entia quantum ad primum: quia
de privatione, ut de caecitate, formatur una affirmativa propositio, cum dicitur, caecitas est; nec
tamen caecitas aliquid est in rerum natura; sed est magis alicujus entis remotio: et ideo etiam
privationes et negationes dicuntur esse entia quantum ad secundum modum, sed non quantum ad
primum.”
66
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into its particular analogous senses possible. Incidentally, note that the composition of the
intellect is no more contained in the conception signified by ‘ens’ than essence is.
Throughout its analogous significations, such as ens perfectum and even propositional
ens, the conception of ‘ens’ remains a simple one. What is conceived by the intellect and
signified by the term ‘ens’ is esse under the simple conception ‘quod est’ or ‘habens
esse’. As we add or remove from it in analogous predication, the conception signified by
‘ens’ remains a simple one. The conception of ‘ens rationis’ is equivalent to the
conception ‘what is in the mind’ or ‘what has being in the mind’. At no point ‘ens’ does
signify ‘something is’.

3.2.2

The Signification of the Abstract ‘Esse’
Unlike what is the case with the concrete ‘ens’, Aquinas says very little about the

signification of its abstract counterpart ‘esse’ beyond that it signifies in abstracto just as
the terms ‘albedo’ and ‘currere’ do.69 There is no reference to the possibility of the
abstract ‘esse’ signifying some complex conception, as it is the case with both ‘ens’ and
‘est’. The omission is not surprising if one considers that the term ‘esse’, when taken not
as a verb of the infinite mode but as the abstract counterpart of the concrete ‘ens’, does
not appear to signify that some subject is. The abstract ‘esse’ is used to refer to the res
significata of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ and to that by which something is denominated
‘ens’.70 In none of these cases its use suggests that its signification involves the
conception that something is. With so little information on ‘esse’, it seems nearly

See In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 271, lines 43-45: “Nam currere et esse
significantur in abstracto sicut et albedo; sed quod est, id est ens et currens, significantur sicut in
concreto, uelut album.”
70
See Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2; In IV Meta., lect. 2, n. 553; SCG I, c. 25.
69
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impossible for us to decide on the nature of the conception it signifies, or what Aquinas
might have taken it to be. However, although not much is said about ‘esse’ itself, plenty
of evidence as to its nature can be drawn from Aquinas’ account of the modus
significandi of abstract terms such as’albedo’ and ‘currere’.
For Aquinas, we might recall, the mode in which the res is signified by a term
follows upon the mode in which the res is conceived by the intellect.71 Accordingly, the
modus significandi of a term is an indication of the sort of conceptio the term signifies. In
the following pages, then, we shall examine the conception signified by the abstract term
‘esse’ based on what its modus significandi reveals about it. Our objective is to determine
whether the term ‘esse’, insofar as it signifies in the abstract mode, may be interpreted as
signifying a complex conception of esse. If the term ‘esse’ is to signify a complex
conception, it must signify composition. Specifically, it must signify the kind of
composition to which truth or falsity applies. In other words, the conception signified by
‘esse’ must consist in the composition of some subject and esse.
The first thing that characterizes an abstract term, in contrast to its concrete
counterpart, is that it signifies its res with precision. Aquinas explains that a concrete
term and its abstract counterpart signify the same res, but whereas the former potentially
includes in its signification the individuating principles of the res, as well as accidental
attributes, the latter explicitly excludes them. For that reason, Aquinas describes abstract
terms as signifying per modum partis whereas concrete terms signify per modum totius:

De pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 7, Marietti ed., p. 56: “[M]odus significandi in dictionibus quae a nobis
rebus imponuntur sequitur modum intelligendi; dictiones enim significant intellectuum
conceptiones, ut dicitur in principio Periher.” See, also, ST I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4,
p. 466: “[M]odus significandi sequitur modum intelligendi;” SCG I, c. 30, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p.
92, lines 31-32: “Nam nomine res exprimimus eo modo quo intellectu concipimus;” De pot., q. 7,
a. 5, ad 2; In VII Meta., lect. 1, n. 1253-1254.
71
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Nam humanitas significat principia
essentialia speciei, tam formalia quam
materialia, cum praecisione principiorum
individualium: dicitur enim humanitas
secundum quam aliquis est homo; homo
autem non est aliquis ex hoc quod habet
principia individualia, sed ex hoc solum
quod habet principia essentialia speciei.
Humanitas igitur significat sola principia
essentialia speciei. Unde significatur per
modum partis. Homo autem significat
quidem principia essentialia speciei, sed
non excludit principia individuantia a sui
significatione: nam homo dicitur qui habet
humanitatem, ex quo non excluditur quin
alia habere possit. Et propter hoc homo
significatur per modum totius: significat
enim principia speciei essentialia in actu,
individuantia vero in potentia.72

‘Humanity’ signifies the essential
principles of the species, both formal and
material, by prescinding from the
individuating principles. For, humanity is
that in accord with which something is a
human; but a human is not something
[human] because it has individuating
principles, but only because it has
principles essential to [its] species.
Therefore, humanity signifies only the
essential principles of the species. Hence it
is signified after the manner of a part (per
modum partis). ‘Human’ even signifies the
essential principles of the species, but
without excluding the individuating
principles from its signification. For,
‘human’ is said to be one who has
humanity, from whom the possibility of
having other things is not excluded. Thus,
‘human’ is signified after the manner of a
whole (per modum totius), for it signifies
the essential principles of the species
actually, but the individuating principles
potentially.

The conception signified by an abstract term, then, includes only that which belongs to
the res as such, excluding anything extraneous to it. Aquinas writes:
[C]onsiderandum est quod circa
quodcumque abstracte significatum hoc
habet ueritatem quod non habet in se
aliquid extraneum, quod scilicet sit preter
essentiam suam, sicut humanitas, albedo et
quecumque hoc modo dicuntur.73
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[A]s regards anything that is signified in
the abstract, one should notice that this
holds true: it does not have in itself
anything extraneous, that is, something that
is outside its essence, as [is the case with]
humanity, whiteness, and whatever is said
in this way.

SCG IV, c. 81, Leonine ed., vol. 15, p. 253, lines 15-31. See also, In I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 1; In
VII Meta., lect. 5, n. 1379, Marietti ed., p. 339: “[H]omo significat ut totum, humanitas significat
ut pars;” De ente, c. 2, lns. 292-304; Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1; Comp. Theol. I, c. 154; Super De
causis, prop. 22 (Saffrey ed., p. 116, lines 25-27): “[O]mne nomen a nobis impositum, vel
significat per modum completi participantis sicut nomina concreta, vel significat per modum
diminuti et partis formalis sicut nomina abstracta.”
73
In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 272, lines 117-21.
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Accordingly, Aquinas points out elsewhere that when a form such as whiteness is
considered in the abstract, its ratio contains no determination to something else but rather
is in itself infinite.74 The result is that an abstract term signifies a simple thing, or better
yet, it signifies its res as simple.75 Therefore, the conception signified by an abstract term
is, if anything, simpler than that of a concrete term insofar as it excludes composition
with other attributes.
When discussing the signification of ‘ens’76 we mentioned that the conception
signified by concrete terms includes composition on account of their mode of
signification, for a concrete term signifies its res without precision and hence as
composite. A sign of the consignification of composition by concrete terms is that some
subject is always contained in the conception they signify, either principaliter when the
res is conceived ‘as a subject (with attributes)’ (as in the case of ‘homo’) or ex
consequenti when the res is conceived ‘as in a subject’ (as in the case of ‘album’). The
conception signified by an abstract term, in contrast, prescinds from the notion of
individual subject. We have seen that when contrasting the signification of ‘album’ and
‘albedo’ Aquinas explains that whereas ‘album’ signifies some subject, albeit ex
consequenti, ‘albedo’ does not.
Hoc autem nomen album significat
subiectum ex consequenti, inquantum
significat albedinem per modum accidentis.
Unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat
in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis
esse est inesse. Albedo enim etsi significet
accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis,

This term ‘white’ signifies a subject ex
consequenti, inasmuch as it signifies
whiteness in the mode of accident.
Therefore, its ratio includes some subject
ex consequenti, for, ‘to be’ (esse) for an
accident is ‘to be in’ (inesse). The term
‘whiteness’ also signifies an accident, yet

See In I Sent., d. 43, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 1003: “Omnis enim forma in propria
ratione, si abstracte consideretur, infinitatem habet; sicut in albedine abstracte intellecta, ratio
albedinis non est finita ad aliquid.”
75
See SCG I, c. 30; ST I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 2.
76
See section 3.2.1
74
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sed per modum substantiae. Unde nullo
modo consignificat subiectum.77

not in the mode of accident, but in the
mode of substance. Thus, in no way does it
consignify a subject.

Elsewhere, Aquinas further explains that ‘albedo’, although it signifies quality, does not
signify its res “ut inherentem” in the way its counterpart ‘album’ does. He writes:
Albedo enim significat qualitatem, sed
significat eam per modum substantie, quia
non significat eam ut inherentem; set
album significat eam per modum qualis,
quia significat eam ut inherentem.78

‘Whiteness’ signifies quality but in the
mode of substance, for it does not signify
quality ut inherentem; but ‘white’ signifies
quality in the mode of quality, for it
signifies it ut inherentem.

The term ‘albedo’, then, prescinds in its signification from the notion of an invidual
subject, not including it even ex consequenti, for nothing but whiteness itself is conceived
and signified by the term ‘albedo’. Therefore, the conception signified by the term
‘albedo’, insofar as it has an abstract mode of signification, excludes composition.
Similar remarks on the signification of some subject regard the terms ‘ens’ and
‘esse’. After having identified ‘ens’ as signified in concreto and ‘esse’ as signified in
abstracto, Aquinas writes that ‘esse’ is not signified ‘as the subject of being’ (sicut
subiectum essendi), in the way ‘ens’ or ‘quod est’ is signified:
[I]psum esse non significatur sicut ipsum
subiectum essendi, sicut nec currere
significatur sicut subiectum cursus. Vnde,
sicut non possumus dicere quod ipsum
currere currat, ita non possumus dicere
quod ipsum esse sit; set id quod est
significatur sicut subiectum essendi, uelud
id quod currit significatur sicut subiectum
currendi.79
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[B]eing (esse) itself is not signified as the
subject of being (essendi), just as running
(currere) is not signified as the subject of a
run (cursus). Thus, just as we cannot say
that running (currere) itself runs, we
cannot say that being (esse) itself is. But
‘that which is’ is signified as the subject of
being, just as ‘that which runs’ is signified
as the subject of running.

In V Meta., lect. 5, n. 894, Marietti ed., p. 239. See also ST I-II, q. 53, a. 2, ad 3; De unione
verbi, a. 3, ad 5.
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De fallaciis, c. 9, Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 411, lines 55-58.
79
In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 271, lines 48-54.
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Therefore, whereas the term ‘ens’ signifies the subject of esse, the term ‘esse’ signifies
only esse or actus essendi.80 Nothing but the very actus essendi is conceived when the
reality of esse is understood in the abstract. The abstract conception of esse excludes
every individuating principle that determines it to something else. Thus, when considered
in the abstract, esse is conceived as simple. It follows, then, that the conception of esse
signified by the abstract ‘esse’ excludes composition.
Another characteristic of the abstract counterpart of a concrete term is that it
signifies its res ‘as that by which’ (ut quo est). Aquinas writes:
Unde intellectus noster, quidquid significat
ut subsistens, significat in concretione:
quod vero ut simplex, significat non ut
quod est, sed ut quo est.81

When our intellect signifies something as
subsistent, it signifies in the concrete; when
it signifies something as simple, it signifies
not as quod est, but as quo est.

[O]mnia nomina a nobis imposita ad
significandum aliquid completum
subsistens, significant in concretione, prout
competit compositis; quae autem
imponuntur ad significandas formas
simplices, significant aliquid non ut
subsistens, sed ut quo aliquid est.82

[A]ll words imposed by us to signify a
complete, subsistent thing signify in the
concrete, as befits composite things. Words
imposed to signify simple forms signify
something not as subsistent, but as that
whereby something is.

Aquinas identifies both ‘whiteness’ and ‘humanity’ as signifying ut quo est; ‘whiteness’
signifies that by which something is white, ‘humanity’ signifies that by which something
is a man.83 The reason abstract terms signify ut quo est is that they signify their res as

See also De ver., q. 1, a. 1, ad s.c. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 22/1-2, p. 7, lines 281-83: “Ad tertium
dicendum quod cum dicitur ‘diversum est esse et quod est’ distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui ille
actus convenit.”
81
SCG I, c. 30, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 92, lines 8-11.
82
ST I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 140. See, also, In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2,
Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 770: “[Q]uod significatur concretive, significatur ut per se existens, ut
homo vel album . . . quod significatur in abstracto, significatur per modum formae, cujus non est
operari vel subsistere in se, sed in alio.”
83
See In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 272, lines 122-23: “[H]umanitas significatur
ut quo aliquid est homo, et albedo quo aliquid est album;” ST I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol.
4, p. 140: “[A]lbedo significat ut quo aliquid est album.”
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simple, that is, with precision. The term ‘humanity’, for example, insofar as it signifies its
res with precision, signifies only that which pertains to the nature of humanity. Now,
humanity is that by which something is a man, for something is a man on account of
having the nature of humanity, not on account of its accidents. It follows, then, that the
abstract conception of humanity contains precisely what falls into the definition of a man,
that is, what makes a man a man. In this sense, ‘humanity’ signifies that by which
something is a man.84
Once again we find that the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ are analyzed in the same
manner as other pairs of concrete and abstract terms. Just as humanitas is that by which
something is a man, and albedo is that by which something is white, Aquinas writes that
esse or actus essendi is that by which something is a being (ens):
Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis in
quantum est ens, id est quo denominatur
aliquid ens actu in rerum natura.85

In another way, esse is said to be the act of
a being inasmuch as it is a being, that is,
that by which something is denominated ‘a
being’ in act in reality.

Similarly, Aquinas tells us that esse is that by which something is, just as currere or
cursus is that by which something runs.86 As the abstract counterpart of the concrete
‘ens’, then, the abstract term ‘esse’ signifies the intellect’s conception of esse not only as
See ST, I, q. 3, a. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 40: “[S]icut humanitas comprehendit in se ea quae
cadunt in definitione hominis: his enim homo est homo, et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scilicet
quo homo est homo;” De ente, c. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 373, lines 292-304: “Sed hoc nomen
humanitas significat eam [essentiam hominis] ut partem, quia non continet in significatione sua
nisi id quod est hominis in quantum est homo, et precidit omnem designationem.”
85
Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 25/1, p. 94,lines 41-43. Compare, SCG IV, c. 81,
Leonine ed., vol. 15, p. 253, lines 18-19: “[D]icitur enim humanitas secundum quam aliquis est
homo;” ST I-II, q. 53, a. 2, ad 3, Leonine ed., vol. 6, p. 338: “[A]lbedo dicitur qua aliquid est
album.”
86
See ST I, q. 50, a. 2, ad 3, Leonine ed, vol. 5, p. 6: “[I]psum autem esse est quo substantia est,
sicut cursus est quo currens currit;” Q. D. de anima, a. 6, Leonine ed., vol. 44/1, p. 51, lines 25455: “Nam ipsum esse est quo aliquid est, sicut cursus est quo aliquis currit;” and In De hebdom.,
lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 271, lines 55-59: “[S]icut possumus dicere de eo quod currit siue
de currente quod currat inquantum subicitur cursui et participat ipsum, ita possumus dicere quod
ens siue id quod est sit inquantum participat actum essendi.”
84
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simple but as ‘that by which’ (‘quo est’). That is why we can say that esse is that by
which something is denominated ‘ens’ in act.87 Regarding such as conception of esse,
consider also the following passage where Aquinas speaks of the possibility of
conceiving esse or actus essendi as ‘quo est’:
In compositis autem ex materia et forma
quo est potest dici tripliciter. Potest enim
dici quo est ipsa forma partis, quae dat esse
materiae. Potest etiam dici quo est ipse
actus essendi, scilicet esse, sicut quo
curritur, est actus currendi. Potest etiam
dici quo est ipsa natura quae relinquitur ex
conjunctione formae cum materia, ut
humanitas.88

In composites of matter and form, ‘that by
which it is’ can be said in three ways. For,
the forma partis, which gives being to
matter, can be called ‘that by which it is’.
Also, the act of being, that is, esse, can be
called ‘that by which it is’, just as that by
which something runs is the act of running.
Also, the very nature that results from the
conjunction of form and matter, such as
humanity, can also be said ‘that by which it
is’.

It is hard to see how a conception of esse in the abstract may be constructed as a
judgment or complex conception. In the first place, esse is conceived as simple. Thus, the
conception of esse in the abstract mode excludes composition. Second, esse is conceived
as ‘quo est’. Thus, nothing but that whereby something is, i.e., esse or actus essendi, is
contained in the abstract conception of esse, which prescinds from all other attributes. I
can find no reason to suppose that the conceptio signified by the abstract term ‘esse’
differs from the conceptio signified by any other abstract term except with regard to the
res intellecta, i.e., esse v. currere, e.g. By introducing the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ as an
example of a concrete term and its abstract counterpart, identifying ‘esse’ as signifying in
the same mode as ‘albedo’ and ‘currere’, Aquinas has shown us that it is possible for the
human intellect to conceive the reality of esse in a simple or non-composite way.
87

See Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2 quoted above; also, In IV Meta., lect. 2, n. 553, Marietti ed., p. 155:
“[H]oc vero nomen Ens, imponitur ab actu essendi;” SCG I, c. 25, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 77,
lines 13-14: “[N]omen autem rei a quidditate imponitur, sicut nomen entis ab esse;” and SCG II,
c. 54: (Leonine ed., vol, 13, ln. 31A, p. 392): “[I]psum esse est quo substantia denominatur ens.”
88
In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, Mandonett ed., vol. 1, p. 229.
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3.3

Aquinas on the Signification of the Verb ‘Est’
The term ‘est’ seems as likely to signify a complex conception as the term ‘ens’

does. They both signify in the concrete mode, thus they both signify composition insofar
as they signify the conception of esse without precision. Given their concrete mode of
signification, the conception that the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ signify includes not only esse
but also the subject of esse. As a result, it appears as if they signify that something is. In
fact, the case for ‘est’ as propositional is even clearer than in the case of ‘ens’. For, the
linguistic expression ‘est’ may stand for the proposition ‘aliquid est’. To the question,
“estne librum tuum?”, one may respond “est” (“it is”). When that is the case, the
expression ‘est’ is not a term but a proposition; as such, it signifies a complex conception,
the complex conception ‘something is’. But we are not concerned with the ‘est’ or
‘aliquid est’. Our interest lies in the signification of the term ‘est’, i.e., the verb ‘esse’ or
‘to be’, to the extent that, according to the theory of signification to which Aquinas
subscribes, it signifies a simple conception of esse.
In his commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias Aquinas discusses the
possibility of both ‘ens’ and ‘est’ signifying that something is. Given that all verbs imply
‘esse’ or ‘to be’, it might appear that they signify that something is. However, no verb
signifies the being or not being of a thing, that is, that a thing is or is not:
Nullum uerbum est signum esse rei uel non
esse, id est quod res sit uel non sit; quamuis
enim omne uerbum finitum implicet esse,
quia ‘currere’ est ‘currentem esse’, et omne
uerbum infinitum implicet non esse, quia
‘non currere’ est ‘non currentem esse’,

No verb signifies (est signum) the being or
not being of a thing, that is, that a thing is
or is not. For, although every finite verb
implies being, since ‘to run’ is ‘to be
running’, and every infinite verb implies
non-being, for ‘to non-run’ is ‘to be non-
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tamen nullum uerbum significat hoc totum,
rem esse uel non esse.89

running’, no verb signifies this whole, that
a thing is or is not.

Indeed, not even the verb ‘est’ and its participle ‘ens’, which more than any other term
appear to signify that something is, signify the being or not being of a thing. We have
already discussed Aquinas’ take on the signification of the participial noun ‘ens’. His
treatment of the verb ‘est’ is not much different from that of ‘ens’; the same arguments
and considerations we discussed regarding ‘ens’ apply to ‘est’ as well. Specifically, if the
verb ‘est’ is to signify the complex conception ‘something is’, then it must signify the
conception of the application of esse to some subject, that is, it must signify the sort of
composition to which truth or falsity applies.
At the outset, Aquinas points out that the verb ‘est’ appears to signify that
something is to the extent that ‘est’ signifies ‘esse’ (‘to be’) and remarks that ‘esse’
seems to signify the kind of composition to which truth or falsity applies.
[Q]uod enim nullum uerbum significet rem
esse vel non esse, probat per hoc uerbum
‘est’, quod secundum se dictum non
significat aliquid esse, licet significet esse.
Et, quia hoc ipsum ‘esse’ uidetur
compositio quedam, et ita hoc uerbum
‘est’, quod significat esse, potest uideri
significare compositionem in qua sit uerum
uel falsum, ad hoc excludendum subdit
quod ista compositio, quam significat hoc
uerbum ‘est’, non potest intelligi sine
componentibus, quia dependet eius
intellectus ex extremis, que si non
apponantur, non est perfectus intellectus
compositionis, ut possit in ea esse uerum
uel falsum.90
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That no verb signifies a thing to be or not
to be, he [Aristotle] proves through this
verb ‘est’, which said by itself does not
signify that something is, although it
signifies esse. And since this esse itself
appears to be a certain composition, and
thus this verb ‘est’, which signifies esse,
can appear to signify the composition in
which there is truth or falsity, to exclude
this [Aristotle] adds that the composition
which the verb ‘est’ signifies cannot be
understood without [its] components. For,
its [i.e., the composition’s] understanding
depends on the extremes, without whose
affirmation the understanding of the
composition is not complete such that truth
or falsity can be in it.

In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 29-30, lines 302-308. As Aquinas explains in the
same context, infinite verbs are not the same as negative verbs: the former are taken as one word,
the latter as two.
90
In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 378-91.
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Immediately following the paragraph quoted above Aquinas explains that the verb ‘est’
consignifies composition, or signifies composition ex consequenti, because it signifies in
the mode of a verb (per modum verbi).
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ consignificat
compositionem, quia non principaliter eam
significat, set ex consequenti: significat
enim id quod primo cadit in intellectu per
modum actualitatis absolute; nam ‘est’
simpliciter dictum significat esse actu et
ideo significat per modum uerbi.91

The verb ‘est’ consignifies composition
because it does not signify composition
principally, but as a consequence. For, it
signifies that which first falls into the
intellect in the mode of actuality
absolutely, for, ‘est’ simply said signifies
being in act, and thus it signifies in the
mode of a verb.

We have mentioned before that the distinction between nouns and verbs does not
correspond for Aquinas to a distinction in res significata, but rather to a distinction in
modus significandi. It is true that all verbs signify action (or act), but it is not true that
only verbs signify action. The same action may be signified by either a noun or a verb.
Thus, when Aquinas speaks of a modus verbi, he is referring to the mode of signification
that properly characterizes a verb. What the mode of signification of a verb entails we
already know from our discussion on the equivocation of terms that have the form of
verbs of the infinitive mode. The terms ‘esse’ and ‘currere’, for example, may be taken
as signifying both in the abstract (in which case they function as nouns) and in the
concrete (in which case they function as verbs). Now, Aquinas describes verbs as
signifying action according to the following mode: “as proceeding from a substance and
inhering in it as in a subject.”92 In other words, verbs signify their res, an action, ut
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In I Perher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 391-97.
See In I Perher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 26, lines 55-66: “[P]otest autem actio
significari tripliciter: uno modo, per se in abstracto, uelut quedam res, et sic significatur per
nomen, ut ‘actio’, ‘passio’, ‘ambulatio’, ‘cursus’, et similia; alio modo per modum actionis, ut
scilicet est egrediens a substantia et inherens ei ut subiecto, et sic significatur per uerba aliorum
modorum, que attribuuntur personis.” Also, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3, Mandonnet ed., vol.
1, p. 745: “[V]erbum significat actum ut egredientem ab agente.”
92
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inherentem. Therefore, verbs consignify composition, or signify composition ex
consequenti, insofar as they signify without precision and as proceeding from a
substance. Indeed, actions are not found in the world as existing per se, but as existing in
their subjects. The term ‘est’, then, insofar as it signifies in the mode of a verb, signifies
composition ex consequenti. This is why it appears to signify a composition principally.
Since verbs signify without precision, they signify in the concrete mode, but not
in the same manner a term such as ‘homo’ signifies, that is, ‘as a subject (with
attributes)’, in the mode of a noun. Rather, a verb signifies action ‘as in a subject’, that is,
in much the same manner as a term such as ‘album’ signifies, in the mode of an adjective.
A verb principally (principaliter) signifies action, but given that it signifies action ‘as in a
subject’, the notion of some subject is included in its signification as a consequence (ex
consequenti). Therefore, the sort of conception signified by verbs includes both
composition and the notion of some subject. More to the point, the conception signified
by verbs is the conception of an act ‘as inhering as in a subject’. That is why the term
‘est’, insofar as it signifies esse or actus essendi in the mode of a verb, appears to signify
that something is. Thus, the reason Aquinas holds that the ‘esse’ the verb ‘est’ signifies
appears to be some composition, specifically the composition to which truth or falsity
applies, is that the conception of esse signified by the verb ‘est’ is the conception of esse
as inhering as in a subject.
However, although inherence as in a subject is contained in the conception
signified by verbs, a verb does not signify that a certain action inheres in a subject, nor
does ‘inhering in a subject’ belong to the res significata of the verb. Rather, a verb
signifies action as inhering as in a subject in its mode of signifying. Accordingly,
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although the verb ‘est’ signifies esse as inhering as in a subject, it does not signify that
some subject is. I mentioned before that the linguistic expression ‘est’, when taken as a
proposition, signifies a complex conception. That is, when ‘est’ is taken to stand for the
proposition ‘aliquid est’, ‘est’ signifies that something is. However, when taken as a verb,
i.e., as a term, not as a composition, ‘est’ signifies a simple conception, the simple
conception of esse in the mode of a verb. Indeed, Aquinas, following Aristotle, observes
that since a verb has signification (est vox significatiua), it produces in the mind of the
one who listens (generet aliquem intellectum in animo audientis) an understanding which
is equivalent to the understanding produced by the utterance of a noun and not to the sort
of understanding produced by the utterance of a proposition. He writes:
Sed dicendum est quod duplex est operatio
intellectus, ut supra habitum est; ille qui
dicit nomen uel uerbum secundum se,
constituit intellectum quantum ad primam
operationem, que est conceptio alicuius . . .
non autem constituit intellectum quantum
ad secundam operationem, que est
intellectus componentis et diuidentis.93

It should be said that the operation of the
intellect is twofold, as was said above; and
he who speaks a noun or a verb by itself
brings about an understanding with respect
to the first operation, which is the
conception of something . . . but [the verb
or the noun said by itself] does not bring
about an understanding with respect to the
second operation, which belongs to the
intellect composing and dividing.

The intellect’s conceptio signified by a verb is as simple in nature as the conception
signified by a noun: thus, the verb said by itself brings about an understanding in the first,
incomplex operation of the intellect. And so, although the conceptio of esse signified by
the term ‘est’ implies inherence as in a subject, it is not itself a conceptio complexa, for it
lacks the extremes of the composition. The conceptio of esse signified by the verb ‘est’
might appear at first glance to be some composition, but on close examination it emerges
93

In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 30, lines 277-86. See, also, In I Periher., lect. 6,
Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 32, lines 20-23: “[S]ignificatio orationis differt a significatione nominis
uel uerbi, quia nomen uel uerbum significat simplicem intellectum, oratio autem significat
intellectum compositum.”

135
that, although inherence belongs to its mode, so that a subject is implied, there is in fact
no application of esse to some subject and thus no composition to which truth or falsity
applies. Therefore, the verb ‘est’ insofar as it is a term as opposed to a proposition does
not signify the complex conception ‘something is’.
Furthermore, so as to explain that the verb ‘est’ does not signify composition
principally (principaliter) but rather as a consequence (ex consequenti), Aquinas writes:
[S]ignificat enim id quod primo cadit in
intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute;
nam ‘est’ simpliciter dictum significat esse
actu. 94

For [‘est’] signifies that which first falls
into the intellect in the mode of actuality
absolutely, for ‘est’ simply said signifies
being in act.

Given that ‘to be’, simply speaking, is ‘to be in act’, the verb ‘est’ signifies not just ‘esse’
or ‘to be’ but ‘esse actu’ or ‘to be in act’. Thus, simply speaking, the verb ‘est’ signifies
‘esse actu’ or, as Aquinas writes, “that which first fall into the mind in the mode of
actuality.” Now, Aquinas further remarks that the verb ‘est’ signifies ‘esse actu’
absolutely (absolute). In other words, the verb ‘est’ signifies ‘esse actu’ principally
(principaliter). Given its concrete mode of signification, the conception signified by a
verb implies composition, but composition is not what a verb principally signifies. A verb
principally signifies action, and to the extent that it signifies action as inhering as in a
subject, it consignifies, or signifies only as a consequence, both the subject of that action
and the inherence of that action. Accordingly, the verb ‘est’ principally signifies ‘esse’
and ‘esse’ alone. That is to say, the term ‘est’ signifies ‘esse’ (in the mode of a verb)
absolutely or per se, according to its proper notion, and not according as it is realized in
this or that individual. In sum, the verb ‘est’ does not signify ‘something is in act’.
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In I Perher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 394-96.
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Aquinas has one more thing to say regarding the signification of the verb ‘est’.
The fact that the verb ‘est’ principally signifies ‘esse actu’ or ‘actualitas’ explains why
the verb ‘est’ is used as an intermediary between subject and predicate within a
proposition. Aquinas writes:
Quia uero actualitas, quam principaliter
significat hoc uerbum ‘est’, est communiter
actualitas omnis forme uel actus,
substancialis uel accidentalis, inde est
quod, cum uolumus significare
quamcunque formam uel actum actualiter
inesse alicui subiecto, significamus illud
per hoc uerbum ‘est’ . . . ; et ideo ex
consequenti hoc uerbum ‘est’ significat
compositionem.95

Since the actuality that is principally
signified by the verb ‘est’ is, in common,
the actuality of every form or act, whether
substantial or accidental, it follows that
when we wish to signify that some form or
act is actually in some subject, we signify
this by means of the verb ‘est’. . . . And, for
this reason this verb ‘est’ signifies
composition ex consequenti.

We have seen that ‘est’ can take on two different roles in a proposition, resulting in two
different kinds of propositions. When we want to signify that some subject actually is in
reality, ‘est’ is predicated per se as the principal predicate. That is the case of the
proposition ‘aliquid est’ which signifies that something is. When we want to signify that
some form is actually in some subject, as in ‘Sortes est homo’, ‘est’ is not predicated per
se but as adjacent to the principal predicate.96 The reason ‘est’ is used as adjacent to the
principal predicate is twofold. On the one hand, as Aquinas maintains, the actuality
signified by the verb ‘est’ is the actuality of all forms.97 On the other hand, from a purely
semantic perspective, there is the fact that the verb ‘est’ does not signify some
determinate subject, for it signifies esse principally (principaliter) and the subject of esse
only as a consequence (ex consequenti).
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In I Perher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 397-403.
See In II Periher., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 88, lines 35-48.
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See, also, ST I, q. 3, a. 4, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 42: “[Q]uia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel
naturae: non enim bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam esse.”
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We have previously compared the mode of signification of a verb to the mode of
signification of an adjective, to the extent that they both signify their res ‘as in a subject’.
Regarding the signification of ‘album’, Aquinas writes:
[I]n hoc nomine album intelligitur albedo,
et subiectum albedinis; sed albedo
determinate, subiectum autem albedinis
indeterminate. Nam cum dicimus album,
intelligimus aliquid albedine informatum;
non autem determinatur quid sit illud, sicut
determinatur forma.98

In this name ‘white’ both whiteness and the
subject of whiteness is understood; but,
whiteness determinately, the subject of
whiteness indeterminately. For when we
say ‘white’, we understand something
informed by whiteness; but what that is is
not determined, just as the form is
determined.

Similarly, then, the verb ‘est’ signifies both esse and the subject of esse, but the subject of
esse only indeterminately. Thus, since the verb ‘est’ signifies esse ‘as in a subject’
leaving the subject undetermined, and esse is in fact the act of every form or nature, when
we wish to signify that this or that form is actually in this or that subject, the verb ‘est’ is
used as adjacent to the principal predicate of the proposition in question. Generally
speaking, a proposition signifies the composition of esse and some subject. The term
‘est’, in contrast, principally signifies only ‘esse’.

Conclusion
In this chapter we reviewed Aquinas’ semantic analysis of the terms that have
esse as their res significata, namely, the nouns ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ as well as the verb ‘est’.
We concentrated on the modes of signification that Aquinas assigns to these terms, given
that, for Aquinas, the modes of signification of terms follow from our intellect’s modes of
understanding. Thus, by examining the modes of signification of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’,
and ‘est’, we were able to determine the manner in which the intellect conceives esse. We
98
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found that, for Aquinas, these terms signify, not a ‘judgment’ of esse, but a ‘concept’ of
esse; that is to say, they signify a ‘simple conception’ of their res, which is esse.
If any term appears to signify a judgment, it would be ‘ens’, since it signifies
‘quod est’ (‘what is’). But the term ‘ens’ does not signify the composition signified when
one says ‘aliquid est’ (‘something is’), i.e., the kind of composition to which truth or
falsity applies. Rather, the term ‘ens’, insofar as it signifies esse in the concrete mode,
“consignifies” composition; for, it signifies ‘a thing having esse’, that is to say, it
signifies ‘the subject of esse’, and so the compositeness of subject plus being (and hence
the term must, in this respect, be denied of God). Furthermore, as we have seen, the kind
of composition ‘ens’ consignifies is not the kind of composition the judgment ‘something
is’ signifies, wherein a comparison is made between a thing and esse. The nature of
propositions as involving such a comparison we shall explore further in Chapter IV.
In short, the term ‘ens’ signifies ‘quod est’, but unlike what is the case in the
judgment ‘aliquid est’ (‘something is’), the ‘est’ in ‘quod est’ is not a predicate. By
contrast, the abstract term ‘esse’ appears least to signify a judgment or ‘complex
conception’. For, it signifies its res as ‘that by which’ and as simple; thus, it excludes in
its signification all sorts of composition, from which it prescinds.
The case of the verb ‘est’ is parallel to that of ‘ens’. Taken in itself, that is, as a
verb and not as short-hand for the proposition ‘aliquid est’ (‘something is’), ‘est’
consignifies composition, for verbs signify their action as inherent in a subject. However,
since no an actual inherence is asserted, the conception signified has no truth value. Thus,
like the noun ‘ens’, the verb ‘est’ consignifies composition insofar as it includes in its
mode of signification the subject of esse. Nevertheless, neither the noun ‘ens’ nor the
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verb ‘est’ signify that some subject is or exists, that is to say, the fact that esse actually
inheres in some subject. Hence, neither term signifies a judgment.
Based on Aquinas’ analysis of the mode of signification of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’,
and ‘est’, all of which have esse as their res significata, we conclude that, for Aquinas, a
simple conception of esse is possible. As discussed in chapter I, Aquinas’ recognition of a
simple conception of esse, as signified by the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’, represents a
problem for the traditional interpretation of the commentaries on the Sentences and on the
De trinitate, namely, that Aquinas, by correlating the second operation of the intellect and
a thing’s esse, apparently denies the possibility of a simple conception of esse. As we saw
in Chapter I, Gilson’s answer to the difficulty is that Aquinas’ analysis of the terms ‘ens’
and ‘est’ as signifying a simple conception of esse belongs to the logic, not of Aquinas,
but of Aristotle. However, as we have shown in this chapter, Aquinas’ semantic analysis
of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ as signifying a simple conception of their res is consistent
with the general semantic theory to which Aquinas himself personally subscribes, a
theory we reviewed in Chapter II.
We saw in that chapter that, for Aquinas, a term immediately signifies a ‘concept’
or ‘conception’ in the mind, but it ultimately signifies the res that is the object of the
mental conception. Thus, the res significata (usually an extra mental reality) is signified
through the mediation of the intellect’s conception the term immediately signifies. Most
of our terms signify a form or nature, such as humanity; but, the res significata of a term
need not be an extra-mental form; it need not be something existing in reality. For
Aquinas, anything we are able to conceive, we are able to name.99 Regarding the
See ST I, q. 13, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 139: “[A]liquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest,
sic a nobis potest nominari.” A mental concept may or may not have a foundation in reality, but
99
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conception signified by terms, we saw that at different places throughout his works
Aquinas characterizes the conception signified by terms, nouns and verbs alike as simple
or non-composite (conceptio incomplexa); in contrast, the conception signified by
propositions is characterized by Aquinas as complex or composite (conceptio complexa).
We also saw that on more than one occasion Aquinas specifically links the kind of
conception that nouns and verbs signify with the first operation of the intellect, and the
kind of conception that propositions signify with the second operation of the intellect. 100
According to the two operations of the intellect, two different kinds of conceptions are
produced; each kind is signified by linguistic expressions of diverse nature. The
complexity of the conception signified by propositions is associated by Aquinas with
predication, and hence with its being the subject of truth value. Aquinas refers to the
conception signified by terms as simple or non-composite because its content lacks the
composition of a proposition. Thus, the conception signified by terms, insofar as it
contains no predication, has no truth value per se. This is not to say that a simple
conception lacks any sort of composition. As we saw in this chapter, terms signifying in
the concrete mode consignify composition, for they signify a conception wherein the res
is conceived ‘without precision’. The kind of conception concrete terms signify includes
some composition, but not the the kind of composition to which truth or falsity applies.
Such is the case, as we have seen in this chapter, of the concrete terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’,
which, even as they consignify composition, do not signify the kind of composition to
which truth or falsity applies.

in either case there surely is some identifiable res intellecta, i.e. the object of the mental concept
the term signifies and which is the res significata of the term.
100
For reference, see the discussion on Chapter II, section 2.2.1.
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Aquinas’ analysis of the signification of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’, as
discussed above, shows that he regards these terms as having the same semantic structure
as any other concrete or abstract term. Were this not the case, Aquinas would not have
been able, as he does, to parallel the signification of the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ with
the signification of terms such as the nouns ‘albus’ and ‘albedo’, and the verb and verbal
noun ‘currit’ and ‘currens’. The terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and ‘est’ signify a simple or noncomposite conception of their res, the sort of conception produced by the first operation
of the intellect. Aquinas identifies these terms as having esse (as contrasted with essence)
as their res significata. And, since, as we have said, corresponding to the simple, noncomposite content signified by these terms is a simple, non-composite conception,
produced by a simple act of the mind, we conclude that, for Aquinas, the intellect is able
to conceive esse as act in a simple conception through its first operation.
In the next and final chapter, I return to the problem of the human intellect’s
apprehension of esse in Aquinas. My answer to the difficulty consists on a
reinterpretation of Aquinas’ remarks in the commentaries on the Sentences and on the De
trinitate on the human intellect’s apprehension of a thing’s esse. According to my
interpretation of the texts, in setting up the correlation, Aquinas does not rule out the
possibility of a simple conception of esse.

CHAPTER IV

REREADING IN I SENT., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: EXPLAINING DIVINE
KNOWLEDGE WITH A DISTINCTIVE
PROPOSITION THEORY

In this final chapter, I return to the problem, laid out in Chapter I, of the apparent
inconsistency between, on the one hand, the semantic theory of the commentary on the
Peri hermeneias, where Aquinas recognizes a simple conception of esse, and, on the
other hand, Aquinas’ association of the second operation of the intellect with a thing’s
esse in the commentaries on the Sentences and on Boethius’ De trinitate. This association
appears to exclude the possibility of a simple conception of esse.
This chapter addresses the inconsistency created by the early texts on the
judgment of esse by offering a reinterpretation of the key text, In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3,
in light of the theory of propositions and their objects that serves as its background
(enuntiabile theory). In the process, I show that Aquinas’ association of the intellect’s
second operation with a thing’s esse is a consequence of his distinctive view on the
objects of propositions. Aquinas’ affirmations on the second operation of the intellect
cannot be understood independently of the medieval problem of divine knowledge of
enuntiabilia: can God with his simple understanding know propositions and their objects,
which are complex, and if so, how? After presenting the theoretical background of
Aquinas’ discussion, I show that Aquinas’s remarks on the second operation of the
intellect and ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ are not directed at the intellect’s
apprehension of esse as a simple, but rather at the intellect’s apprehension of the
composite unit that is ‘the esse of a subject’, which composite enuntiabilia signify. Thus,
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contrary to the standard reading of the passage, Aquinas’ correlation between the second
operation of the intellect and ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ does not rule out the
possibility of a simple conception of esse. The same association of the second operation
of the intellect with the apprehension of a complex ‘esse rei’ can be found in Aquinas’
other early texts, and he refers to the same solution to the problem of God’s knowledge of
enuntiabilia in the mature Summa theologiae.
Before I introduce my solution to the difficulty (in 4.2), though, in the first part of
the chapter, after restating the problem of the human intellect’s apprehension of esse in
Aquinas in light of our findings in Chapters II and III on Aquinas’ semantic theory and
the signification of the terms that signify esse (4.1.1), I examine two attempts to dissolve
the apparent inconsistency between texts. First (4.1.2), I consider Régis’ interpretation of
the texts from the Sentences and De trinitate commentaries as directed at the intellect’s
apprehension, not of esse as act (which the intellect conceives in ‘simple apprehension’),
but of esse as a mode of existing (which the intellect conceives in ‘judgment’). Such an
interpretation, however, cannot be made consistent with the texts, and it fails properly to
account for existential judgments. Second (4.1.3), I take up the possibility of a
developmental solution: does the late date of the commentary on the Peri hermeneias
allow for the possibility that Aquinas changed his mind on the subject of the intellect’s
apprehension of esse, and so eventually admitting the possibility of a simple conception
of esse? In response, the fourth section (4.1.4) shows that Aquinas recognizes a simple
conception of esse in the early works precisely while he maintains the view that the esse
of a thing is apprehended only through the second operation (as especially in In I Sent., d.
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38, q. 1, a. 3). So, although objections need to be considered (4.1.5), a solution other than
the developmental one will be required to explain this fact (4.1.6).

4.1

Eliminating Two Solutions

4.1.1

Restating the Problem: Two Conflicting Sets of Texts on the
Intellect’s Apprehension of Esse

In the preceding chapters we have seen that as part of his semantic theory Aquinas
recognizes a simple or non-composite conception of esse. Chapter II shows that Aquinas
subscribes to the standard semantic theory of the mid-thirteenth century Latin west,
terminist logic, according to which the signification of terms, nouns and verbs alike, is
constituted primarily by their “signing relation” with a simple or non-composite
(incomplexa) conception of some res. We saw that at different places throughout his
works Aquinas characterizes the conception signified by terms as simple (incomplexa),
and on more than one occasion he specifically links the kind of conception that nouns and
verbs signify to the first operation of the intellect.1 Under this semantic framework, the
noun ‘ens’ and the verb ‘est’, which have esse as their res significata, must signify a
simple conception of esse. Indeed, Chapter III shows that in his commentary on
Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias (c. 1270-71), Aquinas argues that, despite appearances to the
contrary, the conception the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ signify is not the sort of conception
produced by the second operation of the intellect, a complex conception, but rather the
sort of conception that belongs to the first operation, a simple conception.

1

See In III Sent., d. 23 q. 2 a. 2 qc. 1; De pot., q. 9, a. 5; De ver. q. 4, a. 2 and q. 14, a. 1; SCG I,
c. 59; Quodl. V, q. 5 a. 2; In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1223-1224; In I Periher., lect. 5, lines 277-86
and lect. 6, lines 20-23, 35-39. See also the discussion on Chapter II, section 2.2.1.
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A review of Aquinas’ theory of signification and his account of the signification
of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ reveals that, for Aquinas, the human intellect is able to form
a simple conception of esse. We are faced, however, with the following difficulty. While
in his commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias Aquinas recognizes a simple
conception of esse, elsewhere he appears to deny the very possibility of such a
conception. In his early Scriptum on the Sentences (c. 1251-52) Aquinas makes the
following remarks regarding the intellect’s apprehension of a thing’s essence and esse:
Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse
ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio
intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis
formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates
rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho, in III De
anima, dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia.
Alia autem comprehendit esse rei,
componendo affirmationem, quia etiam
esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a
qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in
quadam compositione formae ad materiam,
vel accidentis ad subjectum.2

Since there are two [components] in a
thing, the quiddity of the thing and its esse,
a twofold operation of the intellect
corresponds to these two. One is called
“formation” by philosophers, by which the
intellect apprehends the quiddities of
things, which is also called by the
Philosopher, in De anima III, the
“understanding of indivisibles.” But the
other comprehends the esse of a thing by
composing an affirmation, because also the
esse of a thing composed of matter and
form, from which the intellect receives
cognition, consists in a certain composition
of form with matter or of accident with
subject.

Later in the same article, in the response to the second objection, contrasting the divine
and the human intellect’s apprehension of a thing’s esse, Aquinas writes:
Sed intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a
rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent,
non apprehendit illud esse nisi
componendo et dividendo.3

But our intellect, whose cognition arises
from things that have composite esse,
apprehends this esse only by composing
and dividing.

According to the mainstream interpretation of these passages, in setting up a correlation
between the two operations of the intellect and the two principles in a thing, essence and
2
3

In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903.
In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 904.
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esse, Aquinas establishes a radical separation in the way the human intellect apprehends
each principle. Only of an essence is the human intellect able to form a simple
conception, for only essence is the object of the first operation of the intellect. Esse, on
the other hand, may be apprehended by the human intellect only through its second
operation, that is, in a complex conception. In other words, a simple conception of esse is
not possible.
If the mainstream reading of Aquinas’ correlation in the commentary on the
Sentences between the two operations of the intellect and a thing’s essence and esse is
accurate, then we are faced with two conflicting sets of texts on the subject of the human
intellect’s apprehension of esse. On the one hand, we have Aquinas’ discussion of the
signification of the term ‘ens’ and ‘est’ in his commentary on Aristotle’s Peri
hermeneias, where Aquinas, following on the semantic theory to which he subscribes,
recognizes a simple conception of esse as signified by these terms. On the other hand, we
have Aquinas’ early remarks on the human cognition of esse as contrasted with essence
in his commentary on the Sentences, which remarks suggest the impossibility of a simple
conception of esse.
Should Aquinas’ early remarks on the human cognition of esse in the commentary
on the Sentences be dismissed as inconsistent with his finished semantics of the Peri
hermeneias?
Before addressing the issue myself, in the following pages, I examine two
alternative ways to dissolve the apparent inconsistency between texts. The first one,
exposed by Louis-Marie Régis, interprets the expression “esse rei” in the commentaries
on the Sentences and De trinitate to refer, not to a thing’s act of existing, but to a thing’s
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mode of existing. 4 The second resolution argues that in between the writing of the
commentaries on the Sentences and on the Peri hermeneias, Aquinas changed his mind
on the subject of the intellect’s apprehension of esse, eventually allowing for the
possibility of a simple conception of esse. In short, do the texts on esse as grasped only in
judgment report an eccentric, early view? We shall see that neither alternative offers a
suitable solution to the difficulty.

4.1.2

Solution I: Judgment Regards Esse, not as Act of Existing, but
as Mode of Existing

According to Régis, the texts on the judgment of esse in the Sentences and De
trinitate commentaries speak of “esse rei” or “the esse of a thing” as the ultimate object
of judgment, not in the sense of a thing’s act of existing, but in the sense of a thing’s
mode of existing. Régis begins by arguing that the first object of judgment is not the
existence of things, but rather “the composition or synthesis of concepts with which
simple apprehension has already enriched the intellect.”5 Régis denies that esse as act
plays for judgment the role quiddity plays for simple apprehension. Esse is the first object
of judgment only when taken to signify the composition of the intellect, that is to say, the
synthesis of simple concepts in an enuntiation or proposition. This is not to say, Régis
cautions, that judgment has no contact with extra-mental reality. The first function of
judgment, he explains, is “to reassemble concepts so that they may more faithfully
reproduce the thing’s extra-mental mode of existing.”6 It is true that judgment regards the
esse of things, but it does not regard the act of existing of things, which is grasped instead

4

Louis-Marie Régis, Epistemology, trans. Imelda Byrne (New York: Macmillan, 1959), 322-31.
Régis, Epistemology, 323.
6
Ibid., 328.
5
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through simple apprehension. “Judgment,” Régis writes, “is modeled after the mode of
existing of things, and not after that act of existing perceived as the perfection of
quiddity.”7
In support of his interpretation of “esse rei” as apprehended in judgment, Régis
highlights the one remark by Aquinas at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, where the esse of a
thing is described as consisting in a certain composition of form with matter or of
accident with subject:
Alia autem [operatio] comprehendit esse
rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam
esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a
qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in
quadam compositione formae ad materiam,
vel accidentis ad subjectum.8

But the other [operation] comprehends the
esse of a thing by composing an
affirmation, because also the esse of a thing
composed of matter and form, from which
the intellect receives cognition, consists in
a certain composition of form with matter
or of accident with subject.

How can Aquinas say that esse consists in a certain composition of form with matter or of
accident with subject, if esse here is taken to stand for the act of existence? It must rather
be the case, Régis concludes, that “the esse in question is the whole being of the thing, its
essence and its existence, and not only the substantial but also the accidental mode of
existence.”9 Régis’ interpretation of “esse rei” finds further support in a parallel text from
the commentary on De trinitate, where a thing’s esse, which the intellect apprehends in
judgment, is said to result from the congregation of the principles of the thing:
Secunda uero operatio respicit ipsum esse
rei; quod quidem resultat ex congregatione
principiorum rei in compositis, uel ipsam
simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in
substantiis simplicibus.10

7

The second operation regards the esse itself
of a thing, which results from the
congregation of the principles of a thing in
composite substances, or accompanies the
simple nature of a thing, as in simple
substances.

Régis, Epistemology, 331.
In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903.
9
Régis, Epistemology, 330.
10
De trin., q. 5, a. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 147, lines 101-105.
8
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In following paragraphs, I raise three difficulties with Régis’ solution. Notice first
that the final part of this passage (“. . . uel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut
in substantiis simplicibus”) is translated by Régis as: “. . . or coincides with the simplicity
of nature in spiritual substances.”11 Régis’ rendering of ‘concomitatur’ as “coincides” is
misleading, though. A more adequate translation of ‘concomitatur’ is “accompanies”, for
it better conveys the literal sense of the Latin verb. The rendering of ‘concomitatur’ for
“accompanies” makes it evident that ‘esse’ here is taken to stand for something other than
the simple nature, and hence, as the act of existence.12 Furthermore, Régis’ appeal to
Aquinas’ characterization of a thing’s esse, in the texts from the commentaries on the
Sentences and De trinitate, as consisting in or resulting from the principles of the things,
is easily answered by appealing to other texts where Aquinas has esse in the sense of
actus essendi as resulting from the principles of a thing.13
The text from In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 also offers some difficulties for Régis’
interpretation of “esse rei” as standing exclusively for a thing’s mode of existing. There,
Aquinas introduces the claim of a correlation between the two operations of the intellect
and a thing’s essence and esse, by remarking on the real composition (and thus
distinction) between the essence or quiddity of a thing and its esse:
Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse
ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio
intellectus.14

11

Since there are two [components] in a
thing, the quiddity of the thing and its esse,
a twofold operation of the intellect
corresponds to these two.

Régis, Epistemology, 328; my italics.
See, John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to
Uncreated Being (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 29n23.
13
See In III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2; In IV Meta., lect. 2, n. 559.
14
In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903.
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Furthermore, immediately following the passage in question, Aquinas observes that one
may also consider in God his nature and his esse. God’s essence is cause and exemplar of
all nature, just as his esse is cause and exemplar of the esse of each thing; thus, knowing
his essence God knows every other thing, and knowing his esse God knows the esse of
each thing. But, Aquinas further observes, since God’s esse is not other than his esse, nor
is the result a composite, God knows the esse of each thing simply, without diversity or
composition.15 Thus, since Aquinas contrasts the nature and the esse of created things
with that of God, he must have in mind a thing’s esse in the sense of a thing’s act of
existing.16
A final problem for Régis’ reading of the texts is that it fails to provide a
sufficient account of existential judgments. According to Régis, the judgment ‘Socrates
is’ expresses, not the act of existing of a thing, but a substantial mode of existing, for ‘is’
is a substantial predicate expressing the ipsum esse of Socrates.17 In support of his
interpretation, Régis refers us to a passage from the commentary on the Metaphysics,
where Aquinas says that ‘is’ in ‘Socrates is’ is a substantial predicate (de praedicato
substantiali), if understood in its first sense, i.e., as signifying something existing in
rerum natura.18 When commenting earlier on this passage, Régis has acknowledged that
‘is’, when taken in its first sense, “expresses the act of the substance it perfects and from
See, In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903-904: “. Similiter etiam in ipso
Deo est considerare naturam ipsius, et esse ejus; et sicut natura sua est causa et exemplar omnis
naturae, ita etiam esse suum est causa et exemplar omnis esse. Unde sicut cognoscendo essentiam
suam, cognoscit omnem rem; ita cognoscendo esse suum, cognoscit esse cujuslibet rei; et sic
cognoscit omnia enuntiabilia, quibus esse significatur; non tamen diversa operatione nec
compositione, sed simpliciter; quia esse suum non est aliud ab essentia, nec est compositum
consequens.”
16
See, Wippel, Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 29-30.
17
Régis, Epistemology, 331: “. . . in the judgment ‘Socrates is,’ the is is a substantial predicate;
i.e., it expresses the ipsum esse of Socrates and therefore a substantial mode of existing.”
18
See In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 896.
15
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which it is distinguished.”19 But, he denies that the act of judgment regards a thing’s esse
in this sense. Rather, judgment regards a thing’s esse taken in its second sense, that is, as
signifying the composition of a proposition; such composition, Régis later adds, even in
the case of the existential proposition ‘Socrates is’, expresses, not the act of existing of a
thing, but its mode of existing. However, as Aquinas notes in the passage from the
commentary on the Metaphysics referred to by Régis, when taken as a substantial
predicate, the verb ‘is’ in the proposition ‘Socrates is’, is predicated of Socrates
according to the first sense of esse. As a result, as Aquinas observes elsewhere, ‘Socrates
is’ signifies that Socrates exists in rerum natura:
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ quandoque in
enunciatione predicatur secundum se, ut
cum dicitur: «Sortes est», per quod nichil
aliud intendimus significare quam quod
Sortes sit in rerum natura.20

The verb ‘is’ in a proposition is sometimes
predicated in itself, as when one says
‘Socrates is’, by which we intend to signify
nothing else than that Socrates exists in the
nature of things.

Thus, in the judgment ‘Socrates is’ (whenever the verb ‘is’ is taken to signify esse as act,
i.e., as the actus essendi by which something is or exists in rerum natura), the intellect
asserts the act of existing of Socrates.
In sum, Régis’ position fails to be compelling for two reasons: (i) it offers no
convincing alternative account of the early texts on judgment of esse; and (ii) the account
of these texts it offered focuses on a proposition as predicating form of a subject, ignoring
non-quidditative esse as act or reducing it to esse in the sense of the truth of a
proposition, or ‘propositional esse’.
In the next section, I examine an alternative approach to the apparent
inconsistency between, on the one hand, Aquinas’ correlation of the second operation of
19
20

Régis, Epistemology, 324.
In II Periher., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 88, lines 36-40.
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the intellect with a thing’s esse in the commentary on the Sentences and, on the other
hand, the semantics of the commentary on the Peri hermeneias. This alternative approach
seeks to preserve the traditional interpretation of In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, as ruling out a
simple conception of esse, while at the same time acknowledging a simple conception of
esse in the Peri hermeneias.

4.1.3

Solution II: Only in the Later Writings Does Aquinas Recognize
a Simple Conception of Esse

It may be argued, as a way to solve the apparent inconsistency between texts, that
Aquinas’ commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias is dated late enough (c. 1270-71) to
allow for the possibility that at some point during the years after his writing of the
commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas changed his mind on the subject of the human
intellect’s apprehension of esse. Such a scenario may find support in the fact that it is
only in his early writings, namely, the commentaries on the Sentences and on Boethius’
De trinitate (1257-59), that Aquinas correlates the two operations of the intellect with a
thing’s essence and esse.21 In later writings, the correlation has disappeared. Thus,
Aquinas’ remarks in his late commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias regarding the
signification of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘est’ as signifying a simple conception of esse would
attest only to the fact that in later years Aquinas reassessed his initial position on the
matter, eventually allowing for the possibility of a simple conception of esse. One might
even conjecture, with considerable plausibility, that all Aquinas had in mind in the early
21

Other than In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, there is another passage in the Sentences commentary
where the correlation is mentioned. See In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p.
489: “[P]rima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius.” In the commentary
on Boethius’ De trinitate the correlation is mentioned only once, see De trin., q. 5, a. 3, Leonine
ed., vol. 50, p. 147, lines 96-101: “Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam natura rei . . . Secunda
vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei.”
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works, in fact, is “being in the sense of what is signified by the truth of propositions,” as
Régis suggests; so, when Thomas comes to realize that he had confused this being with
being as actus essendi, that is, had confused propositional with ontological being, he
drops the correlation of judgment and esse as actus essendi in the mature works.
The main problem with the proposed solution to the difficulty is that Aquinas
recognizes a simple conception of esse precisely while maintaining that the esse of a
thing is apprehended only through the second operation of the intellect. Aquinas
considers the semantic structure of terms that signify esse at different times in his
commentary on the Sentences as well as in two other works dated around the same period
as his commentary on Boethius’ De trinitate, namely, in his De veritate and in his
commentary on Boethius’ De hebdomadibus (assuming it is an early work).22 As we are
about to see, Aquinas’ analysis of the signification of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ in these
early works remains in line with the tradition of terminist logic, giving no indication that,
for Aquinas, the semantic structure of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ differs from that of any
other term. Moreover, there is every indication that, for Aquinas, the terms ‘ens’ and
‘esse’ signify a simple conception of their res. In both the commentary on the Sentences

Aquinas’ Quaestiones disputatae De veritate is dated from 1256 to 1259. See Jean-Pierre
Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, DC:
Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 334. There is disagreement on the dating of
Aquinas’ commentary on Boethius’ De hebdomadibus. James Weisheipl dates it around the same
time as the commentary on the De trinitate (i.e. between 1256 and 1259). See, James Weisheipl,
Friar Thomas d’ Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work (Washington, DC: Catholic University of
America Press, 1983), 382. Torrell does not provide a specific date for the commentary on
Boethius’ De hebdomadibus, but he thinks it was composed at a later date than Weisheipl
suggests (Aquinas, 345). On the subject, see also Louis Bataillon and Carlo Grassi, preface to
Santi Thomae de Aquino, Expositio libri Boetii de ebdomadibus, Leonine ed., vol. 50 (Rome,
1992), 264. I follow Weisheipl here and assume that Aquinas worked on the commentary on the
De hebdomadibus around the same time he worked on the commentary on the De trinitate.
However, a later date for Aquinas’ commentary on Boethius’ De hebdomadibus does not affect
the conclusion of the present argumentation.
22
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and the De veritate, Aquinas explicitly associates the conception signified by ‘ens’ with
the first operation of the intellect and refers to such a conception as simple.
In the next section, then, I review Aquinas’ analysis of the signification of the
terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ in the commentary on the Sentences, the De veritate, and in the
commentary De hebdomadibus. As we shall see, Aquinas recognizes a simple conception
of esse precisely while (presumably) maintaining the view that esse is apprehended only
through the intellect’s second operation.

4.1.4

The Simple Conception of Esse in the Early Writings
A. Aquinas’ Early Account of the Semantic Structure of
‘Ens’ and ‘Esse’
In the Sentences commentary and in De veritate Aquinas associates the term ‘ens’

with esse as opposed to essence.23 In addition, as he contrasts the terms ‘ens’ and ‘res’ in
the same texts, Aquinas points out at different occasions that each term is imposed from
one of the two components in a thing: whereas ‘res’ is imposed from essence, ‘ens’ is
imposed from esse or actus essendi. This tells us that, for Aquinas, the res significata of
‘ens’ is esse, not essence.24 In the commentary on the Sentences, for instance, Aquinas
writes:

See, e.g., In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 223: “Ens autem non dicit
quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi;” De ver., q. 1, a. 1 ad s.c. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 22, 1/2, p. 7,
lines 282-85: “Ad tertium dicendum quod cum dicitur ‘diversum est esse et quod est’ distinguitur
actus essendi ab eo cui ille actus convenit; nomen autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo
cui convenit actus essendi.”
24
The res significata of a term is that from which, as from a “form” in a thing, a term is imposed
for the sake of signification. See e.g. In III Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 3, p. 232: “Et
nomen, proprie loquendo, dicitur significare formam sive qualitatem, a qua imponitur nomen.”
On this issue, see the discussion in Chapter II, section 2.2.1.
23
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[H]oc nomen «ens» et «res» differunt
secundum quod est duo considerare in re,
scilicet quidditatem et rationem ejus, et
esse ipsius; et a quidditate sumitur hoc
nomen «res». . . . Sed nomen entis sumitur
ab esse rei.25

The terms ‘ens’ and ‘res’ differ according
as two principles can be considered in a
thing, namely its ratio or quiddity and its
esse. And, the term ‘res’ is taken from
quiddity. . . . But the term ‘ens’ is taken
from the esse of the thing.

The parallel texts make explicit that Aquinas takes this Avicennian doctrine to involve
esse in the sense of act or the actus essendi.
[C]um in omni quod est sit considerare
quidditatem suam, per quam subsistit in
natura determinata, et esse suum, per quod
dicitur de eo quod est in actu, hoc nomen
«res» imponitur rei a quidditate sua,
secundum Avicennam, tract. II Metaph.,
cap. I, hoc nomen «qui est» vel «ens»
imponitur ab ipso actu essendi. Cum autem
ita sit quod in qualibet re creata essentia
sua differat a suo esse, res illa proprie
denominatur a quidditate sua, et non ab
actu essendi, sicut homo ab humanitate.26

Since in everything that is it is possible to
consider its quiddity, by which it subsists
in a determinate nature, and its esse, by
which it is said about it that it exists in act,
this term ‘res’ is imposed upon a thing
from its quiddity, according to Avicenna in
Metaph., 2.1, and this term ‘qui est’ or
‘ens’ is imposed [upon a thing] from its
actus essendi. Thus, since in each created
thing its essence differs from its esse, that
is properly denominated a ‘thing’ from its
quiddity, and not from its actus essendi,
just as a human [is denominated] from
humanity.

[E]ns sumitur ab actu essendi sed nomen
rei exprimit quiditatem vel essentiam
entis.27

‘Ens’ is taken from the actus essendi, but
the noun ‘res’ expresses the quiddity or
essence of a being (ens).

If at this time Aquinas presumably holds the view that esse is apprehended only through
the second operation of the intellect, one would expect some indication that, for Aquinas,
given that ‘ens’ signifies esse and ‘res’ signifies essence, the term ‘ens’ signifies a
complex conception whereas the term ‘res’ signifies a simple conception. Yet, in none of
the occasions in which ‘ens’ is contrasted with ‘res’ in the commentary on the Sentences
25

In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 611-12.
In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 195. See also In II Sent., d. 37 q. 1, a. 1.
27
De ver., q. 1, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 22, 1/2, p. 5, lines 137-39. For the same doctrine in later
texts, see In IV Meta., lect. 2, n. 553, Marietti ed., p. 155: “Sciendum est enim quod hoc nomen
Homo, imponitur a quidditate, sive a natura hominis; et hoc nomen Res imponitur a quidditate
tantum; hoc vero nomen Ens, imponitur ab actu essendi;” also SCG, I, c. 25, Leonine ed., vol. 13,
p. 77, lines 13-14: “[N]omen autem rei a quidditate imponitur, sicut nomen entis ab esse.”
26
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and De veritate does Aquinas provide any indication that he considers the terms ‘ens’ and
‘res’ to differ in anything other than their res significata.
In his commentary on Boethius’ De hebdomadibus, Aquinas addresses the mode
of signification of the terms ‘esse’ and ‘ens’. In a passage we have encountered before,
Aquinas identifies the terms ‘esse’ and ‘ens’ as signifying in the abstract and concrete
mode respectively, paralleling the modes of signification of the pair ‘esse’ and ‘ens’ to
that of the pair ‘albedo’ and ‘albus’ as well as the pair ‘currere’ and ‘currens’:
Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod
dicimus esse et aliud per id quod dicimus id
quod est, sicut et aliud significamus cum
dicimus currere et aliud per hoc quod
dicitur currens. Nam currere et esse
significantur in abstracto sicut et albedo;
sed quod est, id est ens et currens,
significantur sicut in concreto, uelut
album.28

We signify one thing by saying ‘esse’ and
another by saying ‘id quod est’, just as also
we signify one thing when we say ‘currere’
and another when ‘currens’ is said. For,
‘currere’ and ‘esse’ are signified in the
abstract, as is ‘whiteness’; but ‘quod est’,
namely ‘ens’, and ‘currens’ are signified in
the concrete, as is ‘white’.

There is nothing in Aquinas’ subsequent analysis of the modes of signification of the pair
‘esse’ and ‘ens’ and the pair ‘currere’ and ‘currens’ that would indicate that they differ
from one another in any other way than with respect to their res significata. Nothing
would indicate, in other words, that, unlike ‘currere’ and ‘currens’, the terms ‘ens’ and
‘esse’ signify a complex conception. Aquinas writes:
[I]psum esse non significatur sicut ipsum
subiectum essendi, sicut nec currere
significatur sicut subiectum cursus. Vnde,
sicut non possumus dicere quod ipsum
currere currat, ita non possumus dicere
quod ipsum esse sit; set id quod est
significatur sicut subiectum essendi, uelud
id quod currit significatur sicut subiectum
currendi; et ideo sicut possumus dicere de
eo quod currit siue de currente quod currat
in quantum subicitur cursui et participat
28

‘Esse’ itself is not signified as the subject
of being, just as ‘currere’ is not signified as
the subject of running. Thus, just as we
cannot say that running (currere) itself
runs, we cannot say that being (esse) itself
is. But ‘id quod est’ is signified as the
subject of being, just as ‘that which runs’ is
signified as the subject of running. Thus,
just as we can say of ‘that which runs’ or of
‘a runner’ that it runs inasmuch as it is the
subject of running and participates in it, we

In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 270-71, lines 39-45.

157
ipsum; ita possumus dicere quod ens siue
id quod est sit in quantum participat actum
essendi.29

can say that ‘ens’ or ‘id quod est’ is
inasmuch as it participates in the act of
being.

Undoubtedly, a discussion on the modes of signification of two terms that signify esse
would have been the perfect occasion for Aquinas to take note of the fact that if esse is
apprehended only through the second operation of the intellect, then the terms that have
esse as their res significata cannot signify the same sort of conception that other terms
signify; for, they would have to signify a complex conception of their res, i.e., of esse.
The fact, however, that Aquinas parallels the modes of signification of the terms ‘esse’
and ‘ens’ with those of the terms ‘currere’ and ‘currens’ implies that, for Aquinas, the
terms ‘esse’ and ‘ens’ signify a simple conception of their res, that is, of esse.
Aquinas’ handling of the signification of the terms that signify esse in his early
writings indicates the same simple conception of esse found in the mature works. That
this conception corresponds to a simple product of the mind (the concept or verbum) and
to a simple act of the intellect follows from the same reasoning that we saw at the end of
Chapter III: the content signified by simple terms is the same as the content of the noncomposite concept through which, as through a form, the simple act of intellection takes
place. In the following section, I build a further argument for the claim that the
conception of ‘ens’ is simple in nature, appealing to two major texts. If Aquinas had
meant literally that there is no apprehension of esse as the actus essendi prior to or
outside of the act of judgment, then the simple conception of ‘ens’ could not include in
any way esse as the actus essendi.

29

In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 271, lines 48-59.
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B. The Simple Conception of ‘Ens’ in the Commentary on the
Sentences and in the De veritate

Text 1: The Commentary on the Sentences
Addressing the issue of why ‘qui est’ or ‘ens’ is the most proper name of God,
Aquinas explains that the term ‘ens’ is prior to the terms ‘bonum’, ‘unum’, and ‘verum’.
The reason is the following:
[E]ns includitur in intellectu eorum, et non
e converso. Primum enim quod cadit in
imaginatione intellectus, est ens, sine quod
nihil potest apprehendi ab intellectu; sicut
primum quod cadit in credulitate
intellectus, sunt dignitates.30

Ens is included in the understanding of the
other [concepts], and not the opposite. For
that which first falls into the intellect’s
imaginatio is ens, without which nothing
can be apprehended by the intellect; just as
that which first falls into the intellect’s
credulitas are the first principles.

Since in the passage above Aquinas is speaking of that which first falls into the intellect,
“ens” must stand not for the linguistic expression (i.e., for the term ‘ens’), but for the
understanding or conception that the linguistic expression signifies (i.e. the conception
‘ens’).31 Given that in both the commentary on the Sentences and De veritate Aquinas
identifies esse, as opposed to essence, as the res significata of the term ‘ens’, we are
confident that, for Aquinas, the object of the conception ‘ens’ is esse.32 Thus, in the
passage quoted above Aquinas is speaking of a conception of esse. What is quite
remarkable about this passage is that Aquinas associates the intellect’s conception of esse
signified by the term ‘ens’ with what he calls in the intellect ‘imaginatio’, which is
30

In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 200.
Although he does not do so in the passage just quoted, elsewhere Aquinas refers to both the
first principles (dignitates) and the intellect’s primary notions (‘ens’, ‘unum’, etc.) as conceptions.
See, De ver., q. 11, a .1; De trin., q. 6, a. 4; and Quodl. VIII, q. 2, a. 2 (disputed probably during
the Advent of 1257).
32
The res significata of a term is the object of the conception signified by the term. See ST I, q.
13, a. 4, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 144: “Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus
de re significata per nomen.”
31
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another expression for Aristotle’s ‘understanding of indivisibles’, that is, for the first
operation of the intellect.
The use of ‘imaginatio’ to refer to the first operation of the intellect has its origins
on twelfth-century Latin translations of the logical works of Avicenna and Al-Ghazali
(especially by Gundissalinus), where the Arabic terms ‘tasawwur’ and ‘tasdiq’, used in
reference to the Aristotelian distinction in De Anima between ‘understanding of
indivisibles’ and ‘composition and division,’ are translated as ‘imaginatio’ and
‘credulitas’ respectively.33 The Latin translation of Averroes’ commentary on De Anima
adopts the terms ‘formatio’ and ‘fides’ for the Arabic expressions ‘tasawwur’ and
‘tasdiq’. In the commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas uses both sets of “Arabic” terms.34
A good example of such use is found in the following passage where, incidentally, the
correlation between the two operations of the intellect and a thing’s essence and esse is
mentioned:
[C]um sit duplex operatio intellectus: una
quarum dicitur a quibusdam imaginatio
intellectus, quam Philosophus, III De
anima, text. 21, nominat intelligentiam
indivisibilium, quae consistit in
apprehensione quidditatis simplicis, quae
alio etiam nomine formatio dicitur; alia est
quam dicunt fidem, quae consistit in
compositione vel divisione propositionis:

The intellect has two operations: one called
‘imaginatio intellectus’ by some, and
‘understanding of indivisibles’ by the
Philosopher in De anima III, which
consists in the apprehension of a simple
quiddity, and which is also called
‘formatio’ by another name; the other
operation is called ‘fides’, which consists in
the composition and division of

See Benoît Garceau, Judicium: vocabulaire, sources, doctrine de Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris:
Vrin, 1968), 104-12. On the terms ‘tasawwur’ and ‘tasdiq’ and their Latin equivalents, see also
Harry A. Wolfson, “The Terms tasawwur and tasdiq in Arabic Philosophy and their Greek, Latin
and Hebrew Equivalents,” The Moslem World 33 (1943). For the Arabic, and Greek, origins of
the terms ‘formatio’ and ‘imaginatio’, see also Joseph Owens, “Judgment and Truth in Aquinas,”
in St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, ed. John R.
Catan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 242n21.
34
See In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3; d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7; d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2,
qa 1; d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, qa 2.
33
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prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei;
secunda respicit esse ipsius.35

propositions. The first operation regards
the quiddity of a thing; the second regards
its esse.

If in this passage Aquinas means literally that quiddity alone, not esse, may be conceived
in “imaginatio intellectus,” then, contrary to what Aquinas explicitly says early in the
same commentary, the conception of ‘ens’ cannot be the first thing that falls into the
mind (whether this is a first in time or in nature): “primum quod cadit in imaginatione
intellectus.”36

Text 2: The De veritate

In addition to the passage from the Sentences commentary where Aquinas
associates the conception signified by the term ‘ens’ with the first operation of the
intellect, there is a passage from the De veritate where Aquinas refers to the sort of
conception signified by the term ‘ens’ as simple. Aquinas writes:
[P]raeexistunt in nobis quaedam
scientiarum semina, scilicet primae
conceptiones intellectus quae statim lumine
intellectus agentis cognoscuntur per species
a sensibilibus abstractas, sive sint
complexa sicut dignitates, sive incomplexa
sicut ratio entis et unius, et huiusmodi quae
statim intellectus apprehendit.37

There pre-exist in us certain seeds of the
‘sciences’, namely the first conceptions of
the intellect, which are known immediately
by the light of the agent intellect through
the species abstracted from sensible things,
and these [first conceptions] are either
complex as are axioms, or simple as are the
notions of ‘ens’, ‘unum’, and the like,
which the intellect apprehends
immediately.

In this passage, speaking again of the primary conceptions of the intellect, Aquinas
distinguishes between those conceptions that are complex (complexa), like the principle
35

In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 489. See also De ver., q. 14, a. 1,
Leonine ed., vol. 22, 2/2, p. 430, lines 78-82: “[U]nde etiam et apud Arabes prima intellectus
operatio vocatur imaginatio intellectus, secunda autem vocatur fides, ut patet ex verbis
Commentatoris in III De anima.”
36
See text from note 30.
37
De ver., q. 11, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 22, 2/1, p. 350, lines 264-72.
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of non-contradiction, and those conceptions that are simple or non-composite
(incomplexa), like the conceptions of ‘ens’ and ‘unum’. We have, then, in this passage an
explicit reference on the part of Aquinas to the intellect’s conception of ‘ens’ as simple
(incomplexa), which should be in no way surprising given Aquinas’ association in the
commentary on the Sentences of the conception signified by the term ‘ens’ with the first
operation of the intellect.

4.1.5

Response to an Objection to a Simple Conception of ‘Ens’ in the
Early Writings

Against the evidence presented above for Aquinas’ early recognition of the simple
conception of esse, it might be argued that the conception of ‘ens’ Aquinas refers to in
the passages from the commentary on the Sentences and from the De veritate quoted
above is not a conception of esse but a conception of essence. After all, for Aquinas, the
term ‘ens’ also signifies essence:
[E]sse dicitur dupliciter: uno modo
secundum quod ens significat essentiam
rerum prout dividitur per decem genera;
alio modo secundum quod esse significat
compositionem quam anima facit; et istud
ens Philosophus [. . .] appellat verum.38

Esse is said in two ways. In one way
according as ens signifies the essence of
things as divided by the ten genera. In
another way according as esse signifies the
composition formed by the soul; and this
ens the Philosopher calls the true.

I answer that ‘ens’ is said to signify essence inasmuch as it signifies esse. The term ‘ens’
signifies its res significata, i.e., esse, in the concrete mode; as such, it signifies the
conception ‘what has esse’ or ‘the subject of esse’ (subiectum essendi). Thus, inasmuch

38

In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 488 [the ellipses are for the reference
to Aristotle, added by the editors]. Aquinas somewhat obscurely refers here to “being” in the
sense of the truth of a proposition, Aristotle’s third sense in Metaphysics 5.7. See also In II Sent.,
d. 37, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; SCG II, c. 8; De pot., q. 7, a. 2 ad 1.
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as ‘the subject of esse’ is essence, ‘ens’ signifies essence.39 As Aquinas notes in the
following parallel text, the conception of ‘ens’ is first and foremost that of “something
existing in nature” (aliquid in natura existens):
[E]ns multipliciter dicitur. Uno enim modo
dicitur ens quod per decem genera
dividitur: et sic ens significat aliquid in
natura existens; sive sit substantia, ut
homo; sive accidens, ut color. Alio modo
dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem
propositionis; prout dicitur quod affirmatio
est vera, quando significat esse de eo quod
est; et negatio, quando significat non esse
de eo quod non est; et hoc ens
compositionem significat, quam intellectus
componens et dividens adinvenit.
Quaecumque ergo dicuntur entia quantum
ad primum modum, sunt entia quantum ad
secundum modum: quia omne quod habet
naturale esse in rebus, potest significari per
propositionem affirmativam esse, ut cum
dicitur: color est vel homo est.40

Ens is said in many ways. For in one way
ens is said as it is divided by the ten genera.
And in this way ens signifies something
existing in nature, whether it is a substance,
like a man, or an accident, like a color. Ens
is said in another way [to be] what signifies
the truth of a proposition; as when it is said
that an affirmation is true when it signifies
‘to be’ of what is, and a negation [is true]
when it signifies ‘not to be’ of what is not;
and this ens signifies the composition that
the intellect forms when it composes and
divides. Thus, whatever is said to be ‘a
being’ (ens) according to the first way, is
also ‘a being’ in the second way because
everything that has ‘physical’ being (esse)
in things can be signified to be by an
affirmative proposition, as when we say ‘a
color is’ or ‘a man is’.

When Aquinas says that ‘ens’ signifies essence, he does not mean that essence is the res
significata of ‘ens’. The res significata of ‘ens’ is esse, not essence. ‘Ens’ signifies
essence because it signifies esse in the concrete mode and thus it signifies the conception
‘what has esse’ or ‘habens esse’. Since essence is ‘what has esse’, Aquinas says that ‘ens’
signifies essence. Therefore, the conception of ‘ens’ Aquinas associates in the Sentences
with the first operation of the intellect or imaginatio and later in De veritate describes as
simple or incomplexa is indeed a conception of esse as actus essendi.

See, e.g., Quodl. II, q. 1, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 25/2, p. 214: “Set uerum est quod hoc nomen
ens, secundum quod importat rem cui competit huiusmodi esse, sic significat essenciam rei, et
diuiditur per decem genera.”
40
In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 872. ‘Physical’ being here means, not
corporeal, but extra-mental, unlike privations.
39
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4.1.6

Two Corollaries

From the discussion above we conclude that Aquinas recognizes the simple
conception of esse even when he maintains a correlation between the two operations of
the intellect and the two principles of reality, essence and the esse of a thing. Two things
may be deduced from this finding.
First, the apparent inconsistency between Aquinas’ commentary on the Sentences
and his commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias on the possibility of a simple
conception of esse may not be resolved by attending to the dating of the texts in question.
The fact that in the Sentences commentary and in De veritate Aquinas recognizes that the
term ‘ens’ signifies a simple conception of esse rules out the possibility that in between
the writing of his commentaries on the Sentences and on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias,
Aquinas changed his mind on the subject of the human intellect’s apprehension of esse.
Aquinas’ remarks of the signification of the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ in the Peri hermeneias
do not represent a new doctrine, they are in fact consistent with Aquinas’ early remarks
on the matter.
We are back where we started, then, with a set of conflicting texts on the subject
of the human intellect’s apprehension of esse. On the one hand, we have Aquinas’
correlation between the two operations of the intellect and a thing’s essence and esse in
the commentaries on the Sentences and on the De trinitate, which suggests the
impossibility of a simple conception of esse. On the other hand, we have Aquinas’
remarks on the intellect’s conception of esse signified by the term ‘ens’ in the Sentences
commentary and the De veritate, which reveal that Aquinas acknowledges a simple
conception of esse.
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Second, the fact that Aquinas recognizes a simple conception of esse while
maintaining a correlation between the two operations of the intellect and a thing’s
essence and esse opens up the possibility that in setting up the correlation Aquinas did
not intend to restrict the apprehension of each principle, i.e., of essence and esse, to one
operation alone.
With the latter idea in mind, and in order to address the apparent inconsistency
between texts, in the next part of the chapter I propose an alternative interpretation to In I
Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, one that leaves open the possibility of a simple conception of
esse.41 The alternative reading explains Aquinas’ correlation between the second
operation of the intellect and a thing’s esse in light of the immediate textual and
theoretical context of the passage. In the following pages, it will be shown that despite
the affirmation in the commentary on the Sentences of a real distinction between a thing’s
esse and its essence, together with different ways the human intellect apprehends each, it
does not follow that the human intellect cannot conceive esse, just as it conceives
essences, in a simple conception.

4.2

In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: Utrum scientia Dei sit enuntiabilium

We begin by identifying and examining the theoretical context of the discussion at
In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: the propositional theory that supplies the topic of the article.

41

I have elected to concentrate on the text from In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 since this is where, to
my estimation, Aquinas works out the correlation to the greatest extent. This is not to say,
however, that we will not consider as well the other two texts where the correlation is mentioned,
namely, In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7; and De trin., q. 5, a. 3.
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4.2.1

Theoretical Context: Enuntiabile Theory

The issue Aquinas addresses at I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 is whether God knows
enuntiabilia (Utrum scientia Dei sit enuntiabilium). Now, the term ‘enuntiabile’ is a
technical term used from the mid-twelfth century forward to designate the propositional
complex that is the immediate object of the intellect’s act of composition and division.42
The theory of the enuntiabile developed originally as a theory of signification for
propositions, but as is often the case in medieval semantics, we find that the logical
notion of the enuntiabile carried important implications in the areas of epistemology and
ontology.43
In treatises of logic from the mid-twelfth to mid-thirteenth century the term
‘enuntiabile’ is used to designate that which is signified by a propositio or enuntiatio. It
should be noted that in this particular context, the terms ‘enuntiatio’ and ‘propositio’
stand only derivatively for the written or spoken proposition and primarily for their
mental counterpart, that is, for the “mental proposition” which the written or spoken

42

For the theory of the enuntiabile I rely especially on Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the
Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity (Amsterdam:
North-Holland, 1973), 165-94. Also, Gabriel Nuchelmans, “The Semantics of Propositions,” in
The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny,
and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 195-203; Yukio Iwakuma,
“Enuntiabilia in Twelfth-Century Logic and Theology,” in Vestigia, Imagines, Verba: Semiotics
and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts, ed. Constantino Marmo et al. (Belgium: Brepols,
1997); and Norman Kretzmann, “Medieval Logicians on the Meaning of the Propositio,” Journal
of Philosophy 67 (1970).
43
The introduction of the term ‘enuntiabilie’ in the context of discussions regarding the
signification of propositions is attributed to Adam of Balsham, in his Ars Disserendi, a logical
tract written around 1132. See Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 169; Iwakuma,
“Enuntiabilia,” 19. Treatises of logic dating from the end of the twelfth century (1180-1200)
contain a full-fledged theory of enuntiabilia. Logicians of the thirteenth century uphold the
theory, but added very little to it. It was to be the theologians who in the thirteenth century
continued the theoretical discussion of enuntiabilia, particularly in connection to questions
regarding God’s knowledge and the object of faith. See Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition,
177; Kretzmann, “Meaning of the Propositio,” 782-83.
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proposition signifies.44 The enuntiabile, then, is that which is immediately signified by a
mental proposition. Now, although medieval logicians were aware of a distinction
between the acts of mere predication and assertion, for many purposes the term
‘enuntiatio’, in all its senses, was used in such a way that it holds both predicative value
and assertoric force.45 Thus, a mental proposition consists not only of an act of combining
the predicate with the subject in an affirmative or negative way, but also of an act of
judging that what is thereby conceived is so in reality.46 The term ‘enuntiabile’, then,
designates the significate of a mental proposition in the sense of that which is asserted or
judged to be the case by a mental proposition. But, there is one more precision to make.
The term ‘enuntiabile’, by its very form, contains a nuance of potentiality which was not
lost on medieval logicians. In accordance with its form, then, the term ‘enuntiabile’
designates not only what is in fact asserted, but what is capable of being asserted.47 Thus,
the enuntiabile is that which is asserted or judged to be the case by a mental proposition
in the sense of that which “can be” asserted or judged to be the case by a mental
proposition.
Setting aside the semantic terminology, we may identify the enuntiabile with the
immediate object of the intellect’s act of composition and division, that is to say, with the
propositional complex or complexum effected in and by the intellect when it composes an
affirmation or negation. On the other hand, given that the intellect’s act of composition
and division is understood as carrying not only predicative value but also assertoric force,

Nuchelmans, “Semantics of Propositions,” 198.
Ibid., 197-98. For Aquinas’ distinction between predication and assertion, see In I Sent., d. 19,
q. 5, a. 3, ad 5 and d. 41, q. 1, a. 5; De ver., q. 1, a. 6, a. 2; q. 10, a. 10, ad 8; and q. 10, a. 12, ad 7;
also ST I, q. 16, a. 8, ad 3.
46
Nuchelmans, “Semantics of Propositions,” 199.
47
Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 169.
44
45
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perhaps a better characterization of the enuntiabile would be that of the immediate object
of our individual judgments, wherein the term ‘judgment’ denotes an act of both
predication and assertion.
In order to differentiate the enuntiatio (judgment or mental proposition) from its
object, the enuntiabile, logicians often phrased enuntiabilia using accusative-plusinfinitive constructions in Latin (‘that-clauses’ in English); for instance, the enuntiatio
‘Socrates currit’ is said to assert the enuntiabile ‘Socratem currere’ (‘that Socrates
runs’).48 But, the distinction between the enuntiatio and the enuntiabile was not always as
straightforward as that. In the first place, given that the enuntiabile is a propositional
complex, consisting of the composition of subject and predicate, it has predicative value.
To that extent, the enuntiabile is itself also an enuntiatio (although it lacks assertoric
force). To further complicate matters, the enuntiabile is a significant expression, for it
signs or signifies a state of affairs in reality. The perceived similarities between the
enuntiabile and the enuntiatio led to a tendency among scholars, including Aquinas, to
use the term ‘enuntiatio’ for the term ‘enuntiabile’.49 Under such circumstances, it would
not be difficult for contemporary readers unfamiliar with the theory to mistake the
enuntiabile with the mental act of which it is an object. The observation is of particular
importance in the face of some interpretations regarding what the issue under discussion
is at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3. The subject under discussion is not, as it has been

48

Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 174-76.
On this issue, see Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 188. Nuchelmans refers to
Bonaventure, Albert, and Aquinas for instances of the practice. Robert Schmidt has noted that in
Aquinas whenever the term ‘enuntiatio’ is used for the term ‘enuntiabile’ the objective meaning
of ‘enuntiatio’ is emphasized. See, Robert Schmidt, The Domain of Logic According to Saint
Thomas Aquinas (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966), 223n84.
49
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suggested, “whether God knows our individual judgments,”50 but rather whether God
knows enuntiabilia, that is, whether God knows that which the human intellect knows in
judgment. Aquinas’ remarks at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 regarding the second operation
of the intellect and its object are thus directly framed by the theory of the enuntiabile, a
fact that has not infrequently been overlooked by contemporary commentators.
There are several other things we need to know about enuntiabilia before we are
ready to approach the discussion at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: (A) the ontological status
of enuntiabilia; (B) the doctrine of enuntiabilia as bearers of truth value; and (C) the role
of enuntiabilia as immediate objects of knowledge and belief.

A. The Ontological Status of Enuntiabilia

Logicians thought of enuntiabilia as having their own category of being, one that
is set apart from the ten categories distinguished by Aristotle.51 Not much, however, is
said positively about their particular ontological status. For the most part, enuntiabilia are
described more in terms of what they are not than in terms of what they are. A passage
from the anonymous Ars Meliduna, a logical tract written around 1180, lists and rejects
three basic opinions on the nature of enuntiabilia: (i) they are acts of human thought and
as such properties or accidents of the intellect; (ii) they are compositions or divisions of
things outside the mind; and (iii) they are nothing properly speaking, just manners of
speaking.52 Among the positive characterizations of enuntiabilia found in the Ars

50

John F. Wippel, Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 29.
Nuchelmans, “The Semantics of Propositions,” 201.
52
For a close study on this section of the Ars Meliduna, see Nuchelmans, Theories of the
Proposition, 170-72; and Iwakuma, “Enuntiabilia,” 19-22. On the dating of the Ars Meliduna, see
De Rijk, Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic (Assen:
Van Gordum, 1967) 2:280-81.
51
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Meliduna and similar logical tracts, we may include the idea that enuntiabilia are
something in between the acts of the intellect and the outside world, accessible only to
the intellect and not to the senses.53 Gyula Klima is on the right track, I believe, when he
identifies the mode of being of enuntiabilia as described by logicians with Aquinas’
conception of entia rationis. According to Klima, enuntiabilia should be understood as
objects of thought formed in and by the activity of the intellect although having a
foundation in reality; as such, enuntiabilia exist objectively in the intellect as a sort of
complex ens rationis or mental entity.54
Given the conception of enuntiabilia as entities having their own category of
being, logicians further identified the enuntiabile as the ‘thing’ (‘res’) referred to by
Aristotle in his formula: ‘it is because the thing is or is not that a proposition is said to be
true or false’ (Categories 4b8, 14b21). Accordingly, enuntiabilia are taken to be the
primary bearers of truth values.55 The anonymous author of the Ars Burana, dated to
around 1200, summarizes the doctrine as follows:
Note that whether we speak about the dictum of a proposition or of the significate
of a proposition or of an enuntiabile it is the same. For an enuntiabile is what is
signified by a proposition. For example: ‘a man is an animal’, this proposition is
true, because what it signifies is true; and that true thing that you in this way
understand is the enuntiabile, whatever it is. Similarly, when I say: ‘Socrates is an
ass’, this proposition is false, because what it signifies is false, and the false thing
that you conceive in this way is the enuntiabile. And this cannot be seen, nor
heard or sensed, but it is only perceivable by the intellect. If you ask in which
category of things it belongs, whether it is a substance or an accident, of the
enuntiabile we have to say that it is neither a substance nor an accident nor does it
belong to any of the categories. For it has its own peculiar mode of existence. And
it is said to be extrapredicamental, not because it does not belong to any category,
but because it does not belong to any of the categories distinguished by Aristotle.
Nuchelmans, “The Semantics of Propositions,” 201.
Gyula Klima, “The Changing Role of Entia Rationis in Mediaeval Semantics and Ontology: A
Comparative Study with a Reconstruction,” Synthese 96 no.1 (1993): 31-34.
55
See Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 172-173 and “The Semantics of Propositions,”
199. Also, Klima, “Entia Rationis,” 34.
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Therefore it belongs to some category that can be called the category of
enuntiabilia.56

B. Enuntiabilia as Bearers of Truth Value

The doctrine of enuntiabilia as bearers of truth values is vast and complex, and far
exceeds our present concerns. This much, however, is important for us to understand in
view of our subsequent discussion: A judgment or mental proposition has truth value
only in a derivative sense; it has truth value insofar as it is a sign of truth, that is, insofar
as it asserts the truth of an enuntiabile.57 Now, the truth value of an enuntiabile in the
case of extra-mental objects depends on whether the state of affairs it signifies actually
obtains in reality. In this case, according to the inherence theory of predication upheld
among others also by Aquinas, an enuntiabile would obtain in reality if and only if the
property signified by the predicate actually inheres (or not) in the thing denoted by the
subject.58 Thus, the truth value of a judgment or mental proposition depends immediately
on the truth value of the enuntiabile it signifies, but ultimately also on the way real things
are.

Quoted in the above English translation in Klima, “Entia Rationis,” 31. On the origin and
dating of the Ars Burana, see De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, 2:397-98.
57
The doctrine is expressed in the formula: “Truth and falsity are in the enuntiabile as in their
subject and in the propositio as in a sign.” See Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 172.
Aquinas need not propose a new category of being for the enuntiabilia, since they fall under one
of the analogous senses of being, being in the sense of the truth of a proposition; all such beings
are entia rationis.
58
In other words: ‘that a man is white’ is verified if and only if whiteness (the property signified
by the predicate-term) actually inheres in the individual man who is denoted by the subject-term.
On the inherence theory of predication, see De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, 1:37-38; also John
Malcolm, “A Reconsideration of the Identity and Inherence Theories of the Copula,” Journal of
the History of Philosophy 17 (1979). For Aquinas, see Herman Weidemann, “The Logic of Being
in Thomas Aquinas,” in The Logic of Being, ed. Simo Knuuttila and Jaakko Hintikka (Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1986).
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According to Klima, the above would be the sense of the definition of truth as
consisting in what Aquinas calls adaequatio intellectus et rei.59 The point is important for
our purposes. The doctrine of enuntiabilia as primary bearers of truth values is an integral
part of the theoretical background on which Aquinas’ conception of truth rests.
According to Aquinas, the notion of truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei requires, not
that the act of judging be equated to the thing known, but that what the intellect says or
knows in judgment be equated to the thing.60 Hence, the primary bearer of truth value is
the immediate object of the intellect’s act of judging or asserting, that is to say, an
enuntiabile. Truth is found primarily in the enuntiabile or propositional composition
effected by the intellect, for this alone conforms immediately to reality.61 But, truth is
found also in a derivative sense in the act of judging, for a judgment or mental
proposition says or asserts truth – i.e., the truth of its immediate object, the enuntiabile.62
This is what Aquinas has in mind when he distinguishes between “being true” and
“saying or knowing truth.”63 Hence, when Aquinas says that the intellect judges when it
says ‘to be’ of the thing that ‘is’ or ‘not to be’ of the thing that ‘is not’, the thing that is or
Klima, “Entia Rationis,” 35-36.
See SCG I, c. 59, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 167: “Cum enim veritas intellectus sit adaequatio
intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est vel non esse quod non est, ad illud
in intellectu veritas pertinet quod intellectus dicit, non ad operationem qua illud dicit. Non enim
ad veritatem intellectus exigitur ut ipsum intelligere rei aequetur, cum res interdum sit materialis,
intelligere vero immateriale: sed illud quod intellectus intelligendo dicit et cognoscit, oportet esse
rei aequatum, ut scilicet ita sit in re sicut intellectus dicit.”
61
How this is so will become clearer once we discuss in more detail Aquinas’ inherence theory of
predication later in this section.
62
Truth is found in the external thing as well in so far as it is the cause of truth in the intellect.
See, In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 486: “[V]erum per prius dicitur de
veritate intellectus, et de enuntiatione dicitur inquantum est signum illus veritatis: de re autem
dicitur, inquantum est causa;” and In I Periher., lect. 7, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 36, lines:
“Dicitur autem in enunciatione esse uerum uel falsum sicut in signo intellectus ueri uel falsi; set
sicut in subiecto est uerum uel falsum in mente . . . in re autem sicut in causa.”
63
In I Periher., lect. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 15, lines 99-102: “[U]eritas in aliquo inuenitur
dupliciter: uno modo sicut in eo quod est uerum; alio modo sicut in dicente uel cognoscente
uerum;” also In I Periher., lect. 3, lines 149-80; ST I, q. 16, a. 2; and De ver., q. 1, a. 9.
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is not is not a real thing but an enuntiabile and the sense of ‘to be’ or ‘is’ is not that of
real being but of truth.64
We should also notice that although the enuntiabile is what immediately conforms
to reality and what is true in a primary sense, the notion or ratio of truth as adaequatio
intellectus et rei is fully realized not in the enuntiabile as such but in the act of judging,
that is, in judgment (the judgment that ‘that x is’ is true). The reason is that equation
implies comparison of two items and it is only when the intellect says or knows its
conformity to reality that the equation between intellect and thing is completed.65 Perhaps
the best way to make sense of these last remarks is to remember that the intellect’s act of
judging is both an act of predication and assertion. It is through one and the same act that
the enuntiabile is effected in and asserted to be the case by the intellect. Thus, through
one and the same act of composition and assertion (i.e. through judgment) the intellect

See, In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 872: “Alio modo dicitur ens, quod
significat veritatem propositionis; prout dicitur quod affirmatio est vera, quando significat esse de
eo quod est; et negatio, quando significat non esse de eo quod non est; et hoc ens compositionem
significat, quam intellectus componens et dividens adinvenit;” and In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 895,
Marietti ed., p. 239: “Ponit [Aristotle] alium modum entis, secundum quod esse et est, significant
compositionem propositionis, quam facit intellectus componens et dividens. Unde dicit, quod esse
significat veritatem rei. Velut sicut alia translatio melius habet «quod esse significat» quia aliquod
dictum est verum. Unde veritas propositionis potest dici veritas rei per causam. Nam ex eo quod
res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est. Cum enim dicimus aliquid esse, significamus
propositionem esse veram. Et cum dicimus non esse, significamus non esse veram.” Notice that
this doctrine could give rise to the objection that all that Aquinas ever means by ‘esse rei’ in his
theory of the proposition is “propositional being”, as Régis suggests; see also the texts at notes
38, 40 and 90. The inadequacy of this (initially compelling) objection will emerge in Aquinas’
texts throughout the rest of this chapter.
65
At different places, Aquinas notes that under the definition of truth in terms of conformity to
reality, truth is present in both sense perception and the first operation of the intellect, for there is
a likeness to reality in both the sense and the intellect in its first operation. But neither sense nor
the intellect in its first operation knows its conformity to reality. The latter is possible only in
judgment; it is something that belongs only to the second operation of the intellect and its act. See
De ver. q. 1, a. 2 and a. 9; ST I, q. 16, a. 2; and In I Periher., lect. 3, lines 149-80.
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both brings about and knows its own conformity to reality in the completed judgment of
truth.66

C. Enuntiabilia as Objects of Knowledge and Belief

The last thing we need to know about the theory of the enuntiabile concerns the
role of enuntiabilia as immediate objects of knowledge and belief. It was generally
recognized in medieval logic and grammar that epistemic verbs, such as ‘to know’ (scire)
and ‘to believe’ (credere), could not have as their immediate objects single terms but
require an oratio infinitiva (i.e. a ‘that-clause’ in English) as their complement. The
reason behind such requirement was thought to be the fact that acts of knowing and
believing are accompanied by assent. We know and believe something to be true or false.
To that extent, acts of knowing and believing were identified as acts of judgment. From
there it was only a small step to identify the immediate object of acts of believing and
knowing, i.e. what is known or believed (the creditum or the scitum), with an
enuntiabile.67
Throughout the twelfth and thirteenth century, theologians made ample use of the
notion of enuntiabilia (also referred to as complexa) as objects of acts of believing and
knowing, particularly in the context of certain difficulties regarding God’s knowledge

See, In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1236, Marietti ed., p. 311: “[I]n hac sola secunda operatione
intellectus est veritas et falsitas, secundum quam non solum intellectus habet similitudinem rei
intellectae, sed etiam super ipsam similitudinem reflectitur, cognoscendo et diiudicando ipsam.”
That only one act is involved is suggested also in the following text, In I Periher., lect. 3, Leonine
ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 17, lines 170-72: “[I]ntellectus non cognoscit ueritatem nisi componendo uel
diuidendo per suum iudicium.”
67
See Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 179, 184. Also, Kretzmann, “Meaning of the
Propositio,” 779-80.
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and the articles of faith.68 Aquinas, for example, when dealing with the specific issue of
the identity or unity of the object faith in the third book of the commentary on the
Sentences, identifies the object of faith with an enuntiabile or complexum.69 Following on
Augustine’s definition of faith as thinking with assent (credere est cum assensione
cognitare), Aquinas concludes that the object of faith is a verum complexum.70 He
remarks that such is the case is further evidenced by the fact that “some philosophers”
called the act of the intellect by which it composes and divides ‘fides’.71 As we
mentioned before, in Latin translations of Avicenna and Averroes, the terms ‘credulitas’
and ‘fides’ were used to translate the Arabic ‘tasdiq’, which was the term used by Arabic
philosophers to refer to the intellect’s act of composition and division as distinguished by
Aristotle in De Anima. Aquinas’ association between enuntiabilia and ‘fides’ provides
evidence that Aquinas adheres to the standard notion of enuntiabilia as immediate objects
68

For a summary of the difficulties and a survey of the main positions held by twelfth and
thirteenth-century theologians on the issues, see Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 17789.
69
See the discussion at In III Sent., d. 24, a. 1, qc. 1 and qc. 2. The issue Aquinas addresses here
relates to the problem of how to maintain the identity of the object of faith in the face of the
different ways in which the same event (e.g. the nativity of Christ) is linguistically expressed by
believers through the passing of time. Abraham, who believed ‘that Christ will be born’, and later
Christians who believe ‘that Christ was born’ do not appear to share the same object of faith.
Aquinas’ answer to the difficulty in the Sentence is that although Abraham and later Christians
believe diverse enuntiabilia, they nonetheless share the same object of faith for they believe the
same truth. The proper object of faith, Aquinas argues, concerns not the “matter” of the
enuntiabile but the “form” of the enuntiabile which is truth (In III Sent., d. 24, a. 1, qc. 1, sol. and
ad 3).
70
See In III Sent., d. 24, a. 1, qc. 2, sol., Mandonnet ed., vol. 3, p. 763: “[S]icut Augustinus dicit,
(De Praedest. Sanctor., c. 2, n. 5; L. 44, 963) credere est cum assentione cognitare. Assentire
autem non potest aliquid nisi ei quod verum est. Veritas autem non consistit nisi in complexione
vel intellectuum vel vocum. Et ideo fidei objectum oportet quod sit verum complexum;” also the
ad 3 (Mandonnet ed., vol. 3, p. 764): “Objectum autem fidei est verum, quod completur per
operationem anime. Et quia compositio et divisio quae est in enuntiabilibus, non est nisi per
animam; ideo complexum est objectum fidei.” For the twelfth-century background, see William
Courtenay, Ockham and Ockhamism: Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought
(Brill, 2008) 24-26, 39-80.
71
See In III Sent., d. 24, a. 1, qc. 2, sol., Mandonnet ed., vol. 3, p. 763: “Et hoc patet per hoc quod
quidam philosophi illam operationem intellectum qua componit et dividi, appellaverunt fidem.”
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of the intellect’s act of composition and division, that is, as immediate objects of
judgments. In addition, we should observe that Aquinas refers to the enuntiabile as
‘complexum’ and as ‘verum complexum’, a practice that is consistent with the traditional
interpretation of enuntiabilia.
We are ready now to turn our attention to the discussion at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a.
3. As we indicated earlier, the issue Aquinas addresses here is whether God knows
enuntiabilia, or, better yet, whether enuntiabilia are objects of God’s knowledge. I begin
by reviewing Aquinas’ answer to the question of the article, that is, God’s knowledge of
enuntiabilia. Next, I consider what the discussion at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 tells us
about human being’s knowledge of enuntiabilia.

4.2.2

God’s Knowledge of Enuntiabilia: An Exegesis of In I Sent., d. 38,
q. 1, a. 3

The problem with making enuntiabilia objects of God’s knowledge rests on the
fact that the notion of enuntiabilia seems to entail a manner of cognition that does not
belong to God. Enuntiabilia are the complex objects of the human intellect’s act of
composition and division; as such, they entail a manner of cognition that is essentially
complex. Unlike the human intellect, the divine intellect is ontologically simple and does
not admit any sort of extra-mental composition. It would appear, then, that enuntiabilia
cannot be objects of God’s knowledge. Yet, as Aquinas notes in the sed contra, one
cannot deny God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia without admitting to an impossible
deficiency in God’s knowledge with respect to ours: God would not know what we know.
The challenge, then, is how to maintain God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia without at the
same time compromising God’s simple manner of cognition.
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Let’s see, then, how Aquinas answers the challenge of explaining how it is
possible for God to know enuntiabilia in a simple understanding. In the corpus of the
article, Aquinas writes:
Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse
ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio
intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis
formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates
rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho, in III De
anima, dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia.
Alia autem comprehendit esse rei,
componendo affirmationem, quia etiam
esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a
qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in
quadam compositione formae ad materiam,
vel accidentis ad subjectum. Similiter etiam
in ipso Deo est considerare naturam ipsius,
et esse ejus; et sicut natura sua est causa et
exemplar omnis naturae, ita etiam esse
suum est causa et exemplar omnis esse.
Unde sicut cognoscendo essentiam suam,
cognoscit omnem rem; ita cognoscendo
esse suum, cognoscit esse cujuslibet rei; et
sic cognoscit omnia enuntiabilia, quibus
esse significatur; non tamen diversa
operatione nec compositione, sed
simpliciter; quia esse suum non est aliud ab
essentia, nec est compositum consequens.72

Since there are two [components] in a
thing, the quiddity of the thing and its esse,
a twofold operation of the intellect
corresponds to these two. One is called
“formation” by philosophers, by which the
intellect apprehends the quiddities of
things, which is also called by the
Philosopher, in De anima III, the
“understanding of indivisibles.” But the
other comprehends the esse of a thing by
composing an affirmation, because also the
esse of a thing composed of matter and
form, from which the intellect receives
cognition, subsists (consistit)73 in a certain
composition of form with matter or of
accident with subject. Similarly, in God
himself it is possible to consider his nature
and his esse; and just as his nature is cause
and exemplar of every nature, so also his
esse is cause and exemplar of every esse.
Thus, just as by knowing his own essence
God knows each thing (res), so also by
knowing his own esse, he knows the esse
of each thing; and thus he knows all
enuntiabilia by which esse is signified;
although without diversity of operation or
composition, but simply, because his esse
is not other than his essence, nor is it the
result a composite.

As we examine this passage, I want to call attention to the theme of simplicity and
complexity running through it.
72

In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903-904.
In presenting Régis, I translated ‘consistit’ as ‘consists’, as fits his position, and as is frequently
a suitable translation, including in the Sentences commentary (see at notes 35 and 84).
Nevertheless, as Lewis and Short amply attests, ‘consistit’ commonly is synonymous with
‘subsists’, which I prefer to ‘stands together in’. That this must be the case here is clear if esse
signifies, as it does, the actus essendi. We shall find confirmation for this in parallel texts
throughout Section 4.2.
73
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Aquinas begins by appealing to the ontological composition of essence and esse
within a thing.74 He then observes that a twofold operation of the intellect corresponds to
these two components. In a first operation, which Aquinas observes is called by Aristotle
in De Anima III “understanding of indivisibles” (indivisibilium intelligentia), the intellect
“apprehends (apprehendit) the quiddities of things (quidditates rerum).” The first
operation of the intellect, then, regards something “indivisible,” that is, something simple
or non-composite, as the quiddities of things are. Now, in a second operation, the intellect
“comprehends (comprehendit) the esse of a thing (esse rei, not the indivisible term ‘esse’)
by composing an affirmation.” There are two things to observe here. First, the use of
“comprehendit” for the second operation of the intellect, in contrast to the use of
“apprehendit” for the first operation, conveys the complexity of understanding of the
second operation, which is not to be found in the first operation. Second, the complexity
of the second operation is propositional: the intellect comprehends the esse of a thing
(esse rei) by composing an affirmation. In the subsequent lines, Aquinas remarks on the
composite character of the object of the second operation of the intellect. He observes
that the thing whose esse the intellect comprehends by composing an affirmation is
“composed of matter and form” (ex materia et forma compositae), and that the esse itself
of the composite thing “subsists (consistit) in a certain composition of form with matter
or of accident with subject.” Again, the verbs with the ‘con-’ prefix highlight
composition, which is found ontologically in creatures, epistemologically in humans’
composite comprehension of creature, and semantically in the composite expression of
truth.
74

2.

For an earlier affirmation of the essence-esse composition, see In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 1 and a.
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The above remarks on human cognition are preparatory for Aquinas’ final answer
to the question of the article: whether enuntiabilia are objects of God’s knowledge.
Aquinas begins by remarking that in God, too, one may consider his nature and
his esse. He observes that, God’s nature is “cause and exemplar” of every nature; thus,
knowing his essence, God knows each thing or res (just as we know essences in our
simple ‘understanding of indivisibles’). Likewise, God’s esse is “cause and exemplar” of
every esse; thus, knowing his esse, God knows “the esse of each thing” (esse cujuslibet
rei). In this manner, then, Aquinas concludes, God knows “all enuntiabilia by which esse
is signified” although not by means of composition, but simply, because God’s esse,
which is not other than his essence, is simple. Notice that the implication here is that
enuntiabilia signify “esse cujuslibet rei,” and that earlier in the text Aquinas has
identified “esse rei” as that which the human intellect apprehends in its second operation
by means of composition, i.e., by composing an affirmation. Hence, whereas God knows
“esse rei” simply, the human intellect knows “esse rei” by means of composition.
The response to the second objection, which explicitly remarks on the composite
understanding implied in the conception of enuntiabilia,75 contains a condensed version
of the argument in the corpus. Aquinas writes:
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ipsum esse
divinum quod est simplex, est exemplar
omnis esse compositi quod in creatura est;
et ideo per esse suum simplex cognoscit
sine compositione intellectuum vel
divisione omne esse vel non esse quod rei
convenit. Sed intellectus noster, cujus
cognitio a rebus oritur, quae esse

[T]he divine esse itself, which is simple, is
the exemplar of every composite esse that
is in the creature; and for this reason
through his own simple esse [God] knows
without composition or division of
intellections every esse or non esse that
belongs to a thing. But our intellect, whose
cognition arises from things that have

See In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, arg. 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 902: “Praeterea ut dicitur in III
De anima, text. 21, quando intellectus intelligit affirmationem et negationem, fit quaedam
compositio intellectuum. Sed in divino intellectus nulla est compositio. Ergo enuntiabilia non
cognoscit.”
75
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compositum habent, non apprehendit illud
esse nisi componendo et dividendo.76

composite esse, apprehends this esse only
by composing and dividing.

Once again, I call attention to the recurrent theme of simplicity and complexity.
God’s esse is simple (simplex), and since God’s esse is exemplar of “all composite esse
(omnis esse compositi) that is in the creature,” it follows that knowing his simple esse,
God knows without composition or division “every esse or non esse that belongs to a
thing.”77 As we may see, up to now Aquinas used esse rei to refer to the object of
affirmative enunciations (compositions) known by God. But now, in case we had any
doubt, he includes as well enunciations about non-esse (negations or ‘divisions’). God, no
less than humans through an ontologically complex judgment (the second act of the
intellect), knows also negative complexa or enuntiabilia, through God’s esse as their
exemplar cause.78
Finally, Aquinas ends the response with some remarks on the human cognition,
which are a reminiscent of what he said in the corpus of the article. He observes that,
unlike what is the case in God, who is simple, our cognition arises from things that have
“composite esse” (esse compositum), and thus we can only apprehend such composite
esse by composing and dividing. Notice the theme: our composite mode of knowing
76

In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 904.
Here, “esse” and “non esse” is not real being and non-being. Aquinas has in mind either
composition and division, or truth and falsity. See In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol.
2, p. 873: “Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis; prout dicitur, quod
affirmatio est vera, quando significat esse de eo quod est; et negatio, quando significat non esse
de eo quod non est; et hoc ens compositionem significat, quam intellectus componens et dividens
adinvenit.” Given the context of the discussion, though, I would argue that Aquinas has in mind,
not truth, but the propositional composition of the intellect, hence, enuntiabilia in general. Thus,
when Aquinas says that God knows “every esse or non esse that belongs to a thing,” he means
that God knows “every enuntiabilia.” Negative enuntiabilia are verified through affirmative, and
hence through esse rei.
78
Note that the use of non esse might make one think that Aquinas has in mind esse rei as a being
of reason or as signifying the ‘truth of a proposition’; but ‘esse’ both in creatures and God refers
to the actus essendi as opposed to their essence.
77
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composite esse rei corresponds to the composite, creaturely mode of being, whereas
God’s simple mode of knowing composite esse rei corresponds to his simple mode of
being. Modes of signifying or predicating composites correspond to modes of knowing
and being, which latter modes are diverse in God and creatures. Aquinas’ answer to the
question of the possibility of God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia in the two passages quoted
above may be summarized as follows: God’s esse, which is simple, is cause and exemplar
of all composite esse. Therefore, knowing his own simple esse, God knows without
composition or division, but simply, “the esse of each thing;” thus, God knows “all
enuntiabilia by which esse is signified” in a simple understanding.79 God knows
enuntiabilia, and that which enuntiabilia signify (esse rei), in a simple act, by knowing
his simple esse that is their cause. For a full understanding of the doctrine, we would have
to recall that just as all creaturely essences are limited participations in God’s essence, so
the complex enuntiabilia (and the complex esse rei) that concern those essences are
effects and likenesses of the divine esse.80 Notice, however, that although the divine
essence accounts for God’s knowledge of simple essence, Aquinas does not regard the
divine essence as sufficient to account for the God’s knowledge of complexes. To
account for the latter, he appeals to the divine esse (although it is identical in reality to,
even if conceptually distinct from, the divine essence). The esse Dei, as the (conceptually
distinct) act by which the divine essence exists, is the exemplar cause of the esse rei, the
object of enuntiabilia. This account would not be necessary if esse were taken as simple
(versus the composite esse rei) and therefore as explained in the same way as God knows
See In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903: “[. . .] cognoscendo esse suum,
cognoscit esse cujuslibet rei; et sic cognoscit omnia enuntiabilia, quibus esse significatur.”
80
On divine ideas, see, for example, Vivian Boland, Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas
Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis (Leiden: Brill, 1996); Gregory Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine
Ideas as Exemplar Causes (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008).
79
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all simples, through his simple essence. And, the account of complex enuntiabilia would
not succeed were Aquinas affirming that only simple esse is known in judgment, not esse
rei.
In sum, we can draw some initial conclusions for how to read In I Sent., d. 38, q.
1, a. 3, given Aquinas’ theory of enuntiabilia. Whatever “esse rei” means in the crucial
text, it cannot be the simple esse or actus essendi, as if that by itself is only grasped in the
second operation of the intellect. It must mean something at least as complex as a
proposition and its immediate object, the enuntiabile, is complex. Notice, however, that
we cannot yet rule out the possibility that what Aquinas has in mind, though he
misexpresses himself (and so, later drops the doctrine), is merely propositional being, as
Régis suggests. Let us explore what positively Aquinas may mean by examining human
knowledge of enuntiabilia.

4.2.3

Human Knowledge of Enuntiabilia

As we indicated earlier, Aquinas identifies that which enuntiabilia signify as the
esse of each thing or esse rei. This is consistent with Aquinas’ correlation in the
commentary on the Sentences between esse rei and the second operation of the intellect.81
Now, we have seen that enuntiabilia are identified as the immediate objects of the
intellect’s act of composition and division.82 Since, according to Aquinas, enuntiabilia
signify the esse of a thing, it follows that by means of enuntiabilia the human intellect

See In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903: “Alia [i.e. operatio secunda]
autem comprehendit esse rei, componendo affirmationem;” In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, Mandonnet
ed., vol. 1, p. 486: “[E]t in ipsa operatione intellectus accipientis esse rei sicut est per quamdam
similationem ad ipsum;” and the ad 7 (Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 489): “[P]rima operatio respicit
quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius.”
82
See the discussion in section 4.2.1 above.
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knows in its second operation the esse of a thing or esse rei. We should also notice that
later in the commentary on the Sentences Aquinas identifies the esse of a thing or esse rei
as the cause of truth of enuntiabilia: “[V]eritas enuntiabilis causetur ab esse rei.”83
Furthermore, twice in the Sentences commentary Aquinas identifies esse rei as the
foundation and cause of truth in the intellect:
Cum autem in re sit quidditas ejus et suum
esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis
quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab
esse imponitur; et in ipsa operatione
intellectus accipientis esse rei sicut est per
quamdam similationem ad ipsum,
completur relatio adaequationis, in qua
consistit ratio veritatis. Unde dico, quod
ipsum esse rei est causa veritatis, secundum
quod est in cognitione intellectus.84

Since in a thing there is its essence and its
esse, truth is founded on the esse of a thing
more than on its essence, just as the term
‘ens’ is imposed from esse [more than
essence]. And in the operation of the
intellect that receives the esse of a thing
just as it is through a certain likeness to
itself, the relation of adequation is
completed, in which relation the notion of
truth consists. Thus I say that the esse of a
thing is the cause of truth according as it is
in the cognition of the intellect.

Alio modo dicitur esse ipse actus essentiae;
sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus, est
animae actus; non actus secundus, qui est
operatio, sed actus primus. Tertio modo
dicitur esse quod significat veritatem
compositionis in propositionibus,
secundum quod «est» dicitur copula: et
secundum hoc est in intellectu componente
et dividente quantum ad sui
complementum; sed fundatur in esse rei,
quod est actus essentiae, sicut supra de
veritate dictum est.85

In another way, esse is said to be the very
act of an essence; as ‘to live’, which is ‘to
be alive’, is the act of the soul, not its
second act or operation, but its first act. In
a third way, esse is said to signify the truth
of the composition in propositions,
according to which ‘est’ is said the copula.
And in this sense, [esse] is in the intellect
composing and dividing as its complement,
but it is founded in the esse of a thing,
which is the act of an essence, just as truth
was said to be earlier.

How are we to understand the expression “esse rei” as Aquinas uses it in this context?
What does the expression “esse rei” stand for in reality when used to designate that
which enuntiabilia signify?
83

In I Sent., d. 41, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 976.
In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 486.
85
In I Sent., d. 33, q.1, a.1 ad 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 766.
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The Standard Interpretation. The mainstream interpretation of the expression
“esse rei” focuses on esse alone. The reference to a thing (“rei”) would be incidental: in
reality all esse is found as received and limited by the essence it actualizes and, in this
sense, as pertaining to ‘a thing’. But the real composition of esse and essence within a
thing would not be what Aquinas has in mind as the ultimate object of the second
operation. That which we know in a composite understanding by means of enuntiabilia is
esse taken by itself and, as it were, as “abstracted” or “separated” from the essence it
actualizes and with which it enters into composition. Aquinas’ reference to the real
distinction between essence and esse within creatures coupled with the subsequent
correlation of essence with the first operation of the intellect, arguably give credit to the
claim in the standard interpretation that the expression “esse rei” as signified by
enuntiabilia stands for esse taken apart from any composition in reality, notably, apart
from the composition with essence. In other words, according to the standard
interpretation of “esse rei” in In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, nothing but esse is grasped in the
second operation of the intellect. Since esse considered in itself constitutes one absolute
object, it follows that that which enuntiabilia signify in reality is a simple or noncomposite object, i.e. an incomplexum.
Response to the Standard Interpretation. The problem with the interpretation of
the expression “esse rei” as referring to esse considered in itself is that it disregards the
relevant theoretical context of the discussion, namely, the theory of enuntiabilia. As we
are about to see, although that which the human intellect knows in its second operation by
means of enuntiabilia constitutes one single object, such single object is by no means
simple (unum simplex). For, how could something which is intrinsically composed, i.e.,
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an enuntiabile, be ‘equated to’ something which lacks composition, the simple actus
essendi? Enuntiabilia, we might recall, are the primary bearers of truth values. If
Aquinas’ conception of truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei is to be legitimate, that
which corresponds ex parte rei to the composition of enuntiabilia must be something
equally complex or composed (unum complexum). Thus, if “esse rei” is that which
enuntiabilia signify in reality, then the expression “esse rei” cannot stand for simple or
non-composite esse by itself, that is, esse considered apart from any subject in reality, of
which it is affirmed in a way that yields a truth value. What is it, then, that enuntiabilia
signify in reality? What does the human intellect know by means of enuntiabilia in its
second operation?
An Alternative Interpretation. Notice that Régis raises for us an alternative to
what has become the standard interpretation: ‘esse rei’ signifies propositional being,
being in the sense of the truth of the proposition. But in the texts I have translated
immediately above,86 one can already see the inadequacy of this alternative
interpretation: there, propositional being is clearly said to be other than and founded on
esse rei. Still, this is a puzzling doctrine: are all propositions about the existence of
things, that is to say, are all propositions existential? Existential propositions, if anything,
seem to be less paradigmatic than propositions that affirm accident of subject, or form of
matter, which latter are mentioned in In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 itself and in other
parallels in the early works and throughout the corpus. What, then, can Aquinas mean by
this doctrine of esse rei and what, if any, is its justification?
The answer to these questions rests on Aquinas’ theory of predication. Before we
can determine what the expression “esse rei” stands for when used to designate that
86

See at note 95 below, in addition to at notes 84-85 above.
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which enuntiabilia signify, we need to determine first what it is that, for Aquinas, the
intellect conceives in the composition of enuntiabilia, that is to say, in the composition of
subject and predicate. In the following sections, then, I review the main tenants of
Aquinas’ theory of predication. Next, I answer the question, what does “esse rei” as
signified by enuntiabilia stand for in reality? Finally, I return to In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3
and address the apparent inconsistency between, on the one hand, the semantics of the
commentary on the Peri hermeneias, where Aquinas explicitly recognizes a simple
conception of esse, and, on the other hand, the correlation in the commentaries on the
Sentences and on Boethius’ De trinitate between the second operation of the intellect and
‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’, which correlation has traditionally suggested the
impossibility of a simple conception of esse.

4.2.4

The Inherence Theory of Predication in Aquinas

A. Copulative Propositions
According to the inherence theory of predication upheld by Aquinas,87 the
composition of subject and predicate produced in and by the intellect is a sign of the
See In III Sent., d. 5, q. 3, a. 3 expositio, Mandonnet ed., vol. 3, p. 210: “Et dicendum, quod
differentia est inter nomina substantiva et adjectiva. Substantiva enim significant non tantum
formam, sed etiam suppositum formae, unde possunt praedicari ratione utriusque. Et quando
praedicantur ratione suppositi, dicitur praedicatio per identitatem. Quando autem ratione formae,
dicitur per denominationem, sive informationem. Et haec est magis propria praedicatio, quia
termini in praedicato tenentur formaliter. Adjectiva autem tantum significant formam. Et ideo non
possunt praedicari, nisi per informationem;” and ST I, q. 13, a. 12, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 164:
“[I]n qualibet propositione affirmativa vera, oportet quod praedicatum et subiectum significent
idem secundum rem aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. Et hoc patet tam in
propositionibus quae sunt de praedicato accidentali, quam in illis quae sunt de praedicato
substantiali. Manifestum est enim quod homo et albus sunt idem subiecto, et differunt ratione,
alia enim est ratio hominis, et alia ratio albi. Et similiter cum dico homo est animal, illud enim
ipsum quod est homo, vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura sensibilis, a qua
dicitur animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur homo. Unde hic etiam praedicatum et subiectum sunt
87
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inherence (inesse) of the predicate in the subject.88 More precisely, at least in the
paradigm case,89 an enuntiabile signifies or is a sign of the inherence in reality of the
“form” signified by the predicate-term in the “thing” denoted by the subject-term.90 As
Aquinas writes:
[I]n omni propositione [intellectus noster]
aliquam formam significatam per
praedicatum, vel applicat [intellectus]
alicui rei significatae per subiectum, vel
removet ab ea.91

[I]n every proposition [our intellect] either
applies a form signified by the predicate to
a thing signified by the subject, or it
removes it from it.

idem supposito, sed diversa ratione. Sed et in propositionibus in quibus idem praedicatur de
seipso, hoc aliquo modo invenitur; inquantum intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti, trahit ad
partem suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati, trahit ad naturam formae in supposito
existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod praedicata tenentur formaliter, et subiecta materialiter.
Huic vero diversitati quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluralitas praedicati et subiecti,
identitatem vero rei significat intellectus per ipsam compositionem.”
88
See e.g. In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1223, Marietti ed., p. 309: “Dicitur autem hic affirmatio
compositio, quia significat praedicatum inesse subiecto;” and In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed.,
vol. 1*/1, p. 27, lines 108-13): [Q]uia subiectum enunciationis significatur ut cui inheret aliquid,
cum uerbum significet actionem per modum actionis, de cuius ratione est ut inhereat, semper
ponitur ex parte predicati, nunquam autem ex parte subiecti, nisi sumatur in ui nominis.”
89
Medieval scholars make use of “paradigm cases” to convey a general doctrine; secondary cases
do not fit the paradigm perfectly, but may be understood in light of it. One does not find in logical
treatises, for instance, a set of “semantic rules” that apply absolutely and unequivocally to all
cases, as in Carnap, although such rules can be formulated. See Gyula Klima, “The Semantic
Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’ Metaphysics of Being,” Medieval Philosophy and
Theology 5 (1996): 87-88.
90
Since for Aquinas “negatio reducitur ad genus affirmationis” (In I Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 3; ST I,
q. 33, a. 4, ad 3), in the following pages I will concentrate on Aquinas’ analysis of affirmative
propositions. Negations or affirmations of privation can be understood mutatis mutandis against
affirmative paradigm cases. See also, in addition to the text at note 40, In II Sent., d. 37, q.1, a. 2,
ad 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 947: “[D]icendum, quod, ut supra dictum est, ens dicitur
dupliciter. Uno modo quod significat essentiam rei extra animam existentis; et hoc modo non
potest dici ens deformitas peccati, quae privatio quaedam est: privationes enim essentiam non
habent in rerum natura. Alio modo secundum quod significat veritatem propositionis; et sic
deformitas dicitur esse, non propter hoc quod in re esse habeat, sed quia intellectus componit
privationem cum subjecto, sicut formam quamdam. Unde sicut ex compositione formae ad
subjectum vel ad materiam, relinquitur quoddam esse substantiale vel accidentale; ita etiam
intellectus compositionem privationis cum subjecto per quoddam esse significat. Sed hoc esse
non est nisi esse rationis, cum in re potius sit non esse; et secundum hoc quod in ratione esse
habet, constat quod a Deo est.” Notice that according to this text, God, as cause of all esse, is also
the cause of esse rationis of privations.
91
ST I, q. 16, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 208. See also SCG II, c. 96, Leonine ed., vol. 13, p. 572,
lines 31-37B), where Aquinas writes of the intellect: “Intelligit enim quod quid est abstrahendo
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For Aquinas, the logical composition of subject and predicate does not consist of the
synthesis of two concepts, as if the proposition ‘a man is white’ were to be equal to the
phrase ‘a white man’.92 The intellect’s composition of subject and predicate must be
interpreted instead as consisting of the application or attribution of a “concept” to an
individual thing, that is to say, of the attribution of the intelligible content signified by the
predicate-term to the thing denoted by the subject-term. Accordingly, under the
framework of the inherence theory of predication, the subject and predicate terms have
very different roles. A term placed in the subject position represents what it “stands for,”
that is, the subject it supposits for. Properly speaking, then, the subject-term does not
signify (significat) but supposits (supposit). A term placed in the predicate position, on
the other hand, represents what it signifies, that is, a form or act as conceived by the
intellect in a concept or simple conception.93 This is what Aquinas has in mind when he
states that, in a proposition, the subject-term is taken “materially” whereas the predicateterm is taken “formally.”94
From above, it follows that in the composition of enuntiabilia the intellect
conceives and asserts to be the case the inherence (inesse) of some form or act in a
subject or supposit. Now, the inherence of a form or act in a subject or supposit is nothing

intelligibilia a sensibilium . . . Componit autem aut dividit applicando intelligibilia prius abstracta
ad res.”
92
For an example of an interpretation of the immediate object of judgment as a composition or
synthesis of concepts, see Louis-Marie Régis, Epistemology, 312-313, 322-331.
93
See e.g. ST III, q. 16, a. 9, ad 3, Leonine ed., vol. 11, p. 213: “[N]omen . . . secundum quod
ponitur in subiecto, tenetur pro supposito, secundum autem quod ponitur in praedicato refertur ad
naturam.” On the role of the subject and predicate terms in Aquinas, see Ambrose McNicholl,
“On Judging Existence,” The Thomist 43 (1979): 530-42. For a more general discussion, see Peter
Geach, Reference and Generality (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), 22-44.
94
See In I Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 2; In III Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 5, ad 5; d. 6, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3 and q. 2, a. 1,
ad 7; d. 11, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; ST I, q. 13, a. 12; q. 31, a. 3, ad 2; ST III, q. 16, a. 7, ad 4; q. 16, a. 9
co. and ad 3, q. 17, a. 1, ad 3; In IX Meta., lect. 11, n. 1898.
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but the actuality or actual existence of that form or act in the subject. This is why Aquinas
remarks that when we wish to signify the inherence of some form or act, whether
substantial or accidental, in a subject, we do so by means of the verb ‘is’ which signifies
‘being in act’ (esse actu):
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ . . . significat enim id
quod primo cadit in intellectu per modum
actualitatis absolute; nam ‘est’ simpliciter
dictum significat esse actu, et ideo
significat per modum uerbi. Quia uero
actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc
uerbum ‘est’, est communiter actualitas
omnis forme uel actus, substancialis uel
accidentalis, inde est quod, cum uolumus
significare quamcumque formam uel actum
actualiter inesse alicui subiecto,
significamus illud per hoc uerbum ‘est’.95

[T]he verb ‘is’ . . . signifies that which first
falls into the intellect in the mode of
actuality absolutely; for ‘is’ simply said
signifies being in act, and thus it signifies
in the mode of a verb. But because the
actuality that is principally signified by the
verb ‘is’ is, in common, the actuality of
every form or act, whether substantial or
accidental, it follows that when we wish to
signify that some form or act is actually in
some subject, we signify this by means of
the verb ‘is’.

For Aquinas, then, the role of the verb ‘is’ as copula is not merely that of joining together
the subject and predicate terms. The verbal copula is adjacent to the predicate-term, so
that it is in fact part of the predicate.96 The copulative role of the verb ‘is’ as adjacent to
the predicate-term is to signify the actuality of the form or act signified by the predicateterm, so that by means of the verb ‘is’ the form or act signified by the predicate-term is
attributed to the subject as inherent. This is why, properly speaking, in a proposition such
as ‘a man is white’, what is attributed on the side of the predicate to the individual man
the subject-term ‘a man’ supposits for is not whiteness as such, i.e. the form signified by
the predicate-term ‘white’, but ‘the actuality of whiteness’, ‘the inherence of whiteness’

95

In I Periher., lect. 5, lns. 391-403, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31. See also ST I, q. 3, a. 4,
Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 42: “Secundo, quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae: non enim
bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam esse;” De pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad
9, Pession ed., p. 192: “Qualibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod
esse ponitur . . . Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc
est perfectio omnium perfectionum.”
96
See In II Periher., lect. 2, lines 36-52.
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or, simply said, ‘being white’. Therefore, that which the intellect conceives and asserts to
be the case in the enuntiabile ‘that a man is white’ is the actuality (or inherence) of the
accidental form whiteness in an individual man. In other words, the enuntiabile ‘that a
man is white’ signifies ‘the being white of a man’. Aquinas writes:
[O]mne esse a forma aliqua inhaerente est,
sicut esse album ab albedine . . . . [N]on
potest intelligi quod paries sit albus sine
albedine inhaerente.97

[A]ll esse comes from some inhering form,
as being white comes from whiteness . . . .
It cannot be understood that a wall is white
without the inherence of whiteness.

“[. . .] ut esse album attribuitur Sorti cum
dicimus: Sortes est albus.98

[. . .] as being white is attributed to
Socrates when we say: Socrates is white.

Likewise, we would say that the enuntiabile ‘that Socrates is a man’ signifies ‘the being
human of Socrates’, for that which is attributed to Socrates on the side of the predicate in
the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’ is ‘being human’, that is to say, ‘the actuality of
humanity’ or ‘the inherence of humanity’. Hence, that which the intellect conceives and
asserts to be the case in the enuntiabile ‘that Socrates is a man’ is the actuality (or
inherence) of the essence humanity in Socrates or, better yet, as we shall see later, the
actuality of the essence humanity in the individual matter by which Socrates is this man.
One of the consequences of the theory of predication depicted above (at least for
the type of propositions we have been discussing thus far where the verb ‘is’ functions as
copula) is that neither the existence of the thing denoted by the subject-term nor its
97

In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 393.
Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 25/1, p. 95, lines 65-66. Note in the last two texts the use
of the term ‘white’ (albus) not ‘whiteness’ (albedo) in the predicate position. We do not say ‘a
man is whiteness’ (ST I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3); only a concrete term (noun or verb) may be placed in
the predicate position (see e.g. In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; and In I Periher., lect. 5, lines
108-13). The reason is that the conception signified by a concrete term does not abstract or
prescind from the quality’s inherence in a subject, which is signified therefore by the term in the
predicate position: ‘white’ signifies the form of whiteness as in a subject; ‘runs’ signifies the act
of running as in a subject. On the signification of concrete terms see De ente, c. 2; In I Sent., d.
23, q. 1, a. 1; Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 2 in contr.; Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1; SCG IV, c. 81; ST I, q. 3, a.
3; q. 13, a. 1, ad 2; In De hebdom., lect. 2; In VII Meta., lect. 5, n. 1378-1380.
98
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identity with the thing denoted by the predicate-term matters for verification, for none of
the above is asserted to be the case by the intellect in this type of judgment.99
Accordingly, explaining Aristotle’s formula ‘it is because the thing is or is not that a
proposition is said to be true or false’, Aquinas remarks that the thing that is or is not (i.e.
the enuntiabile) should not be understood as referring
[. . .] ad solam existenciam vel non
existenciam subiecti, set ad hoc quod res
significata per predicatum insit vel non
insit rei significate per subiectum.100

[. . .] to the existence or not existence of the
subject alone, but to the fact that the thing
signified by the predicate does or does not
inhere in the thing signified by the subject.

What truly matters for verification, that which must obtain in reality for a judgment to be
true, is the actuality (or inherence) of the form or act signified by the predicate-term in
the individual subject or supposit denoted by the subject-term.
On the issue of verification we mentioned earlier that Aquinas’ conception of
truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei requires that that which correspond ex parte rei to
the composition of enuntiabilia, as both the foundation and cause of truth, must be
something equally complex or composed. On the matter, Aquinas writes:
Oportet enim veritatem et falsitatem quae
est in oratione vel opinione, reduci ad
dispositionem rei sicut ad causam. Cum
autem intellectus compositionem format,
accipit duo, quorum unum se habet ut
99

Truth and falsity that is in speech or
opinion must be reduced to the disposition
of the thing as to their cause. When the
intellect forms a composition, it regards
two [components], one of which stands as

The actual existence of the thing denoted by the subject-term as well as its identity with the
thing denoted by the predicate-term is implied but not asserted. The identity of reference implied
in affirmative predication is what Aquinas has in mind when he states that the predicate and
subject terms signify the same in reality, or that they are the same in supposit, but differ
conceptually (See ST I, q. 13, a. 12; q. 85, a. 5, ad 3; In VI Meta., lect. 4, n. 1241). Indeed, if
whiteness actually inheres in an individual man, then the term ‘a man’ and the term ‘white’ in the
proposition ‘a man is white’ must denote the same thing. Weidemann, “The Logic of Being,”
188, 196n16.
100
In I Periher., lect. 9, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 47, lines 63-70. See also In II Periher., lect. 2,
Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 88, lines 43-46: “[C]um dicitur: «Sortes est albus»: non enim est
intentio loquentis ut asserat Sortem esse in rerum natura, set ut attribuat ei albedinem mediante
hoc uerbo ‘est’.”
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formale respectu alterius: unde accipit id ut
in alio existens, propter quod praedicata
tenentur formaliter. Et ideo, si talis operatio
intellectus ad rem debeat reduci sicut ad
causam, oportet quod in compositis
substantiis ipsa compositio formae ad
materiam, aut eius quod se habet per
modum formae et materiae, vel etiam
compositio accidentis ad subiectum,
respondeat quasi fundamentum et causa
veritatis, compositioni, quam intellectus
interius format et exprimit voce. Sicut cum
dico, Socrates est homo, veritas huius
enunciationis causatur ex compositione
formae humanae ad materiam
individualem, per quam Socrates est hic
homo: et cum dico, homo est albus, causa
veritatis est compositio albedinis ad
subiectum: et similiter est in aliis. Et idem
patet in divisione.101

formal in relation to the other; hence [the
intellect] takes it as existent in the other,
because predicates are taken formally.
Therefore, if such an operation of the
intellect must be reduced to a thing as to its
cause, then in composite substances the
very composition of form with matter, or of
what is related in the way of form and
matter, and also the composition of
accident with subject, must correspond, as
the quasi-foundation and cause of truth, to
the composition which the intellect forms
interiorly and expresses in words. For
example, when I say, ‘Socrates is a man’,
the truth of this enunciation is caused by
the composition of the form humanity with
the individual matter by which Socrates is
this man; and when I say, ‘a man is white’,
the cause of truth is the composition of
whiteness with a subject; and similarly in
other cases. And the same is clear in
division [i.e., negation].

According to Aquinas in the passage above, the real composition found within composite
substances is “quasi fundamentum et causa veritatis” of the logical composition effected
by the intellect in its second operation. This means that, in the paradigm case, what
corresponds in reality to the logical composition of enuntiabilia, that is to say, what
verifies an enuntiabile, is the real composition of composite substances.102
101

In IX Meta., lect. 11, n. 1898, Marietti ed., p. 456. See also ST I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3, Leonine ed.,
vol. 5, p. 341: “Unde compositioni et divisioni intellectus respondet quidem aliquid ex parte rei . .
. Invenitur autem duplex compositio in re materiali. Prima quidem, formae ad materiam, et huic
respondet compositio intellectus qua totum universale de sua parte praedicatur; nam genus
sumitur a materia communi, differentia vero completiva speciei a forma, particulare vero a
materia individuali. Secunda vero compositio est accidentis ad subiectum, et huic reali
compositioni respondet compositio intellectus secundum quam praedicatur accidens de subiecto,
ut cum dicitur, homo est albus.”
102
In the passage we just quoted, Aquinas speaks of a third composition apart from the one of
form with matter and of accident with subject, namely the composition “of what is related in the
way of form and matter.” There are different opinions concerning what Aquinas has in mind here.
Ludger Oeing-Hanhoff suggests the composition of esse and essence. Joseph Owens identifies it
as the composition of genus and species. See Ludger Oeing-Hanhoff, “Die Methoden der
Metaphysik im Mittelalter,” in Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter: ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung,
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How does the inherence theory of predication relate to Aquinas’ correlation
between logical and real composition above? Let us consider the two paradigm cases we
have been studying. According to the inherence theory of predication, what needs to
obtain in reality paradigmatically for the proposition ‘a man is white’ to be true is the
actuality (or inherence) of whiteness in a man. It is not difficult to see how the real
composition of the accidental form whiteness and an individual man accounts for the
actuality of the accidental form whiteness in the latter; so that the real composition of the
accidental form whiteness and an individual man is identified as the cause of truth of the
enuntiabile ‘that a man is white’ which is signified by the proposition ‘a man is white’.
The case of the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’, which according to Aquinas has as the
cause of its truth the composition of the essence humanity and the individual matter by
which Socrates is this man, is perhaps not as obvious. What we need to keep in mind,
though, is that in the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’, the intellect conceives and asserts
the actuality (or inherence) of humanity in an individual subject (a subject that happens to
be named ‘Socrates’). What is at stake is the inherence of humanity in this rather than
that individual subject. Now, in the case of a material entity, whose essence is composed
of common matter and form, its essence accounts for the fact that it belongs to a given
species, but it is the composition of its essence and the individual matter by which the
material entity is this individual rather than another that accounts for the fact that this
individual entity enjoys the mode of being proper to the species. The reason is that

ed. Paul Wilpert (Berlin: Gruyter, 1963), 87; and Joseph Owens, “Judgment and Truth in
Aquinas,” 45. I am inclined to agree with Oeing-Hanhoff, for Aquinas is speaking of the
composition found in composite substances and the composition of genus and species is regarded
by Aquinas as a logical composition – although certainly dependent on the real composition of
form with matter. See De ente, c. 2; In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; De ver., q. 3, a. 2, ad 3; and
ST I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3.
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individual matter limits the essence it receives to an individual subject.103 Hence, what
accounts for the actuality of humanity in an individual subject is the real composition
within the subject of the essence humanity and the individual matter by which the subject
is this individual human rather than another.

B. Existential Propositions

Up to this point, we have considered only one type of proposition, the type where
the verb ‘is’ functions as copula. But Aquinas recognizes another type of proposition, one
where the verb ‘is’ is predicated not as adjacent to some term but in itself. Aquinas
writes:
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ quandoque in
enunciatione predicatur secundum se, ut
cum dicitur: «Sortes est», per quod nichil
aliud intendimus significare quam quod
Sortes sit in rerum natura; quandoque uero
non predicatur per se, quasi principale
predicatum, set quasi coniunctum principali
predicato ad connectendum ipsum subiecto,
sicut cum dicitur : «Sortes est albus» : non
enim est intentio loquentis ut asserat
Sortem esse in rerum natura, set ut attribuat
ei albedinem mediante hoc uerbo ‘est’; et
ideo in talibus ‘est’ predicatur ut adiacens
principali predicato, et dicitur esse tercium
non quia sit tercium predicatum, set quia
est tercia dictio posita in enunciatione, que
simul cum nomine predicato facit unum
predicatum, ut sic enunciatio diuidatur in
duas partes, non in tres.104

The verb ‘is’ is sometimes predicated in a
proposition in itself, as when one says
‘Socrates is’, by which we do not intend to
signify anything other than that Socrates
exists in reality. But sometimes the verb
‘is’ is not predicated in itself, as if [it were]
the principal predicate, but, as it were,
conjoined to the principal predicate in order
to connect it to the subject, as when one
says ‘Socrates is white’. For, it is not the
intention of the speaker to assert that
Socrates exists in reality, but to attribute to
him whiteness by means of the verb ‘is’;
and for this reason, ‘is’ in such cases is
predicated as adjacent to the principal
predicate, and it is said to be ‘third’, not
because it is a third predicate, but because
it is a third expression placed in the
proposition, which together with the noun
predicated makes one predicate, and thus
the proposition has two parts, not three.

See De spirt. creat., a. 1, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 24/2, p. 14, lines 431-33: “[F]orma speciei
limitatur ad indiuiduum: et talis limitatio forme est per materiam;” also In De hebdom., lect. 2,
lines 77-80.
104
In II Periher., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 88, lines 36-52.
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One thing to take note regarding the two types of propositions Aquinas mentions above is
that the structure of a proposition of the form ‘Socrates is’ does not differ greatly from
the structure of a proposition of the form ‘Socrates is white’. They both contain two
components, namely, a subject and a predicate. The difference between them is that in the
proposition ‘Socrates is white’, the predicate is composed of the verb ‘is’ and the term
‘white’, whereas in the proposition ‘Socrates is’ the verb ‘is’ alone constitutes the
predicate. Aquinas’ distinction between the two types of propositions is thus based on the
content of the predicate. Such a discerning principle is consistent with Aquinas’ view of
the predicate as the principal part of a proposition.105
Let us now turn our attention to Aquinas’ analysis of those propositions where the
verb ‘is’ alone constitutes the predicate. What is it that the intellect conceives and asserts
to be the case when it judges, for instance, ‘Socrates is’? As we indicated above, in the
case of the proposition ‘Socrates is’ the verb ‘is’ is predicated in itself and not as adjacent
to some term signifying a form or act. Now, the verb ‘is’, when taken in itself, signifies
actuality (actualitas) or being (esse) in the mode of a verb, that is, it signifies ‘being in
act’ (esse actu).106 In the words of Aquinas:
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ . . . significat enim id
quod primo cadit in intellectu per modum
actualitatis absolute; nam ‘est’ simpliciter
dictum significat esse actu, et ideo
significat per modum uerbi.107

[The] verb ‘is’ . . . signifies that which first
falls into the intellect in the mode of
actuality absolutely; for, ‘is’ simply said
signifies being in act, and thus it signifies
in the mode of a verb.

See In I Periher., lect. 8, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 41, lines 108-13): “[P]redicatum autem est
principalior pars enunciationis, eo quod est pars formalis et completiua ipsius.”
106
Aquinas often associates esse with actuality. See e.g. ST I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3, Leonine ed., vol. 4,
p. 50: “Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est;” ST I, q. 54, a. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 5, p.
39: “[E]sse est actualitas substantiae vel essentiae;” De spirt. creat., a. 11, Leonine ed., vol. 24/2,
p. 118, lines 205-206): “Sicut autem ipsum esse est actualitas quedam essentie;” and De pot., q. 7,
a. 2, ad 9, Pession ed., p. 192: “Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium
actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum.”
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In I Periher., lect. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 31, lines 391-97.
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Accordingly, that which is attributed to Socrates in the proposition ‘Socrates is’ is ‘being
in act’ or ‘to be in act’ (esse actu). Now, elsewhere, Aquinas states that the proposition
‘Socrates is’ signifies that Socrates is or exists in the nature of things:
[H]oc uerbum ‘est’ quandoque in
enunciatione predicatur secundum se, ut
cum dicitur: «Sortes est», per quod nichil
aliud intendimus significare quam quod
Sortes sit in rerum natura.108

The verb ‘is’ in a proposition is sometimes
predicated in itself, as when one says
‘Socrates is’, by which we intend to signify
nothing else than that Socrates exists in the
nature of things.

Aquinas often explains that a thing (res) or a being (ens) is or exists because it has esse, it
is in act, or it participates in the act of being (actus essendi).109 Thus, what is attributed to
Socrates in the proposition ‘Socrates is’ is esse as signifying existence or the act of being,
that is, esse taken in its primary sense.
According to Aquinas, when taken in its primary sense, esse may be attributed to
anything which is or exists in the nature of things, whether a substance or an accident, so
that we may say both ‘a man is’ and ‘a color is’.110 However, in its primary sense, esse is
attributed most properly and truly only to that which subsists in itself, that is to say, only
to a substance:
Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis in
quantum est ens, idest quo denominatur
aliquid ens actu in rerum natura; et sic esse
non attribuitur nisi rebus ipsis quae in
decem generibus continentur, unde ens a
tali esse dictum per decem genera dividitur.
108

In another way, esse is said to be the act of
a being insofar as it is a being, that is, that
by which something is denominated ‘a
being’ in act in the nature of things; and in
this sense esse is attributed only to those
things that are counted in the ten genera, so

In II Periher., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 1*/1, p. 88, lines 36-40.
See e.g. In De hebdom., lect. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 271, lines 57-59: “[. . .] ita possumus
dicere quod ens, sive id quod est, sit, inquantum participat actum essendi;” SCG I, c. 22, Leonine
ed., vol. 13, p. 68, lines 29-31B and 48-49B: “Esse actum quendam nominat: non enim dicitur
esse aliquid ex hoc quod est in potentia, sed ex eo quod est in actu [. . . ] Amplius. Omnis res est
per hoc quod habet esse;” and ST I-II, q. 26, a. 4, Leonine ed., vol. 6, p. 190: “[E]ns simpliciter
est quod habet esse.”
110
See In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 872: “[O]mne quod habet naturale
esse in rebus potest significari per propositionem affirmativam esse, ut cum dicitur: color est vel
homo est.”
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Sed hoc esse attribuitur alicui rei dupliciter.
Uno modo, sicut ei quod proprie et vere
habet esse vel est; et sic attribuitur soli
substantiae per se subsistenti.111

that ‘a being’ said from this esse is divided
by the ten genera. But this esse is attributed
to a thing in two ways. In one way, as to
that which properly and truly has esse or is;
and in this way esse is attributed only to a
substance that subsists per se.

Thus, only a substance may properly and truly be said ‘to be in act’ in an affirmative
proposition, as when we say ‘Socrates is’, by which we signify that the substance for
which the subject-term ‘Socrates’ supposits is or exists in the nature of things.
Given that what is attributed to Socrates in the proposition ‘Socrates is’ is esse as
signifying existence or the act of being (actus essendi), it follows that that which the
intellect conceives and asserts to be the case in the enuntiabile ‘that Socrates is’ is ‘the
existence of Socrates’ or ‘the act of being of Socrates’. Now, for a substance to exist, its
essence must be actualized by its corresponding esse. This means that the real
composition of essence and esse within a substance accounts for the existence of the
substance. Accordingly, that which verifies the paradigmatic enuntiabile ‘that Socrates is’
is the real composition of esse and supposit within Socrates. Therefore, that which ex
parte rei corresponds to the logical composition effected in and by the intellect when it
composes an affirmation such as ‘Socrates is’ is the real composition of esse and
supposit.

4.2.5

The Esse of Things as Signified by Enuntiabilia

We are ready to offer an answer to our previous question regarding enuntiabilia
and the esse of a thing. We wanted to know what the expression “esse rei,” when used to
designate that which enuntiabilia signify, stands for in reality. As the preceding
111

Quodl. IX, q. 2 a. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 25/1, p. 94, lines 41-50.
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discussion has shown, both existential and copulative propositions involve the
predication of esse, that is to say, the attribution to a subject of esse taken either in the
sense of existence or in the sense of a particular mode of being (as in ‘being white’ or
‘esse album’).112 In fact, even in those cases where the verb ‘is’ is not explicitly
contained in the predicate, as in the proposition ‘Socrates runs’, esse is attributed to some
subject, for every verb can be restated with ‘is’.113 Therefore, enuntiabilia are said by
Aquinas to signify “the esse of a thing” or “esse rei” because enuntiabilia involve the
conception of ‘the esse of a subject’. But enuntiabilia signify ‘the esse of a subject’ in
two ways. An enuntiabile may signify ‘the existence of a subject’, as in the enuntiabile
‘that Socrates is’, or it may signify ‘the being-so-and-so of a subject’, as in the
enuntiabile ‘that Socrates is human’ or ‘that Socrates is white’ or ‘that human is risible’.
We conclude, then, that the expression “esse rei,” when used by Aquinas to indicate that
which enuntiabilia signify, stands for the composed unit in the nature of things that is, as
is especially clear in the paradigm case, a subject or supposit and its esse. In other words,
that which the human intellect knows by means of enuntiabilia in its second operation is,
paradigmatically, esse taken as “inherent” in a subject or supposit. This means that the
ultimate object of the intellect’s act of composition and division is not esse considered in
itself apart from any composition in reality, but rather ‘the esse of a thing’, that is, the
esse which belongs to an individual subject.
The interpretation of the expression “esse rei” as signified by enuntiabilia in
terms of the notion of esse as “inherent” in a subject is consistent with Aquinas’
On this latter sense, see e.g. In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 393: “[O]mne
esse a forma aliqua inhaerente est, sicut esse album ab albedine ... Sicut igitur non potest intelligi
quod paries sit albus sine albedine inhaerente.”
113
See In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 893, Marietti ed., p. 239: “Verbum enim quodlibet resolvitur in hoc
verbum Est, et participium;” also In I Periher., lect. 5, lines 304-307.
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conception of truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei. As we indicated earlier, enuntiabilia
are the primary bearers of truth value. Thus, given the complex or composed character of
enuntiabilia, that which ex parte rei corresponds to the composition of enuntiabilia must
be something equally complex or composed (unum complexum). In other words, if
Aquinas conception of truth is to be valid, that which enuntiabilia signify cannot be
something simple.114 It is true that enuntiabilia signify one thing, that is to say, it is true
that only one thing is understood in the conception of an enuntiabile. But, enuntiabilia
signify one thing by means of composition, the composition of subject and predicate.
Hence, that which enuntiabilia signify in reality, and which serves as the cause and
foundation of its truth, is a composed unit wherein some form or act inheres in a subject.
Again, notice that esse rei, which all enuntiabilia can be said to signify, cannot be
something simple, such as the simple actus essendi. ‘That actus essendi’ or ‘that actually
exists’ are not enuntiabilia: they are too simple. At the same time, although in the
paradigm case, ‘that Socrates exists’, the esse rei is composite, not only notionally, but
also in reality, not all enuntiabilia signify an esse rei that is ontologically composite, as is
clear in the enuntiabile ‘that God exists’.
The reference to inherence in relation to esse might seem problematic from an
ontological standpoint, since the notion of inherence brings to mind the inherence of an
accident, and esse is not an accident of the subject it actualizes and perfects. It would thus
be a mistake to consider it as such. However, the notion of esse as inherent in a subject in
the paradigm case should be understood in the same way Aquinas concedes that esse,
Even the enuntiabile ‘that God exists’ is complex, although the esse Dei is, of course, in God
simple. And so, this enuntiabile must be understood mutatis mutandis against the paradigm case
‘that Socrates exists’. ‘That God has simple esse’ is a complex, and even God understands the
notional complexity in this enuntiabile (through his simple esse, not through his simple essence
alone, according to the teaching of In I Sent., d. 38).
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insofar as it is the actuality of some substance, is a quasi-accident.115 Hence, taken as the
actuality of a substance, or as the actuality of some form or act, we may speak of esse as
“inherent” in order to convey the understanding of esse as it belongs to a subject.
Accordingly, Aquinas himself speaks of the human intellect’s understanding of esse in
this way:
Intellectus autem noster hoc modo intelligit
esse quo modo invenitur in rebus
inferioribus a quibus scientiam capit, in
quibus esse non est subsistens, sed
inhaerens.116

Our intellect understands esse in the way it
is found in things herebelow, from which it
receives knowledge, in which esse is not
subsistent but inherent.

Thus, since esse is found in things as inherent, if the intellect is to comprehend ‘the esse
of a thing’ with truth, it must do so by means of the composition of subject and predicate,
that is, by means of enuntiabilia.
In the next and final section of the chapter, I examine, in light of our findings on
enuntiabilia and the esse of things, Aquinas’ correlation at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3
between the second operation of the intellect and ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’. I show
that, in setting up the correlation, Aquinas does not restrict the apprehension of esse to
the second operation of the intellect; thus, all remaining appearence of inconsistency
between the commentaries on the Sentences and the Peri hermeneias on the subject of the
human intellect’s apprehension of esse is removed.

See Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2, Leonine ed., vol. 25/2, p. 215, lines 88-90: “[E]sse est accidens,
non quasi per accidens se habens, sed quasi actualitas cuiuslibet substantiae.”
116
De pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 7, Pession ed., p. 192.
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4.2.6

Returning to In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: Esse Rei as the Correlate
of Human Judgment

At In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Aquinas observes that, in an operation other than the
one in which it apprehends “the quiddities of things,” the human intellect comprehends
“the esse of a thing” or “esse rei” by composing an affirmation:
Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse
ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio
intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis
formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates
rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho, in III De
anima, dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia.
Alia autem comprehendit esse rei,
componendo affirmationem, quia etiam
esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a
qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in
quadam compositione formae ad materiam,
vel accidentis ad subjectum.117

Since there are two [components] in a
thing, the quiddity of the thing and its esse,
a twofold operation of the intellect
corresponds to these two. One is called
“formation” by philosophers, by which the
intellect apprehends the quiddities of
things, which is also called by the
Philosopher, in De anima III, the
“understanding of indivisibles.” But the
other comprehends the esse of a thing by
composing an affirmation, because also the
esse of a thing composed of matter and
form, from which the intellect receives
cognition, subsists (consistit) in a certain
composition of form with matter or of
accident with subject.

Given that Aquinas’ remarks on the second operation of the intellect and ‘the esse of a
thing’ or ‘esse rei’ are preparatory to his final answer to the question of the article, i.e.,
whether enuntiabilia are objects of God’s knowledge, they cannot be understood
independently of the theory of enuntiabilia.
We have seen that enuntiabilia are the direct objects of the intellect’s act of
composition and division, that which the intellect conceives when it composes and
divides. We also saw that, according to the theory of propositions to which Aquinas
subscribes, in the composition of subject and predicate, the intellect attributes esse to
some subject. In the composition of enuntiabilia, then, the intellect comprehends ‘the
117

In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903.
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esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’. This is why Aquinas affirms at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3
that the human intellect comprehends ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ by composing an
affirmation. For instance, in the proposition ‘Socrates is’, the intellect comprehends ‘the
existence (esse or actus essendi) of Socrates’; and, in the proposition ‘Socrates is white’,
the intellect comprehends ‘the being-white (esse album) of Socrates’.
We also saw that Aquinas identifies ‘esse rei’ or ‘the esse of a thing’ as that
which enuntiabilia signify, that is to say, as that which the intellect knows by means of
enuntiabilia. Now, the expression ‘esse rei’, as signified by enuntiabilia, stands for, not
something simple, but for something composite. Indeed, as we have seen, the expression
‘esse rei’ stands for, in the paradigm case, the composed unit in the nature of things that
is a subject or supposit and its esse. In the composition of enuntiabilia, the intellect
comprehends, not ‘esse’ as a simple, but ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’. At In I Sent., d.
38, q. 1, a. 3, Aquinas consistently characterizes ‘esse rei’ in terms of composition. In the
corpus of the article, Aquinas observes that the thing in question is a matter-form
composite, and that its esse subsists (consistit) in a certain composition of form with
matter or of accident with subject:
Alia [operatio] autem comprehendit esse
rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam
esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a
qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in
quadam compositione formae ad materiam,
vel accidentis ad subjectum.118

But the other [operation] comprehends the
esse of a thing by composing an
affirmation, because also the esse of a thing
composed of matter and form, from which
the intellect receives cognition, subsists
(consistit) in a certain composition of form
with matter or of accident with subject.

Later, in the response to the second objection, Aquinas further refers to the esse of a
thing, which the intellect apprehends in its second operation, as composite:
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In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903.
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Sed intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a
rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent,
non apprehendit illud esse nisi
componendo et dividendo.119

But our intellect, whose cognition arises
from things that have composite esse,
apprehends this esse only by composing
and dividing.

Aquinas’ characterization of the esse of a thing, not only as composite, but also as
subsisting (consistit) in a certain composition of form with matter or of accident with
subject might appear rather puzzling at first glance. How is it possible that a thing’s esse,
as contrasted with essence, be described in terms of the composition of form with matter
and accident with subject? A similar characterization of esse rei, as apprehended by the
second operation of the intellect, is made by Aquinas in his commentary on Boethius’ De
trinitate:
Secunda uero operatio respicit ipsum esse
rei; quod quidem resultat ex congregatione
principiorum rei in compositis, uel ipsam
simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in
substantiis simplicibus.120

The second operation regards the esse itself
of a thing, which results from the
congregation of the principles of a thing in
composite substances, or accompanies the
simple nature of a thing, as in simple
substances.

Here, Aquinas describes the esse of a composite substance, i.e., of a thing composed of
matter and form, as resulting from the congregation or composition of the principles of
the thing. In addition, there are two other occasions where Aquinas refers to the esse of a
thing or esse rei, as contrasted with its essence, as resulting from the essential principles
of the thing:
Alio modo dicitur esse, quod pertinet ad
naturam rei, secundum quod dividitur
secundum decem genera; et hoc quidem
esse est in re, et est actus entis resultans ex
principiis rei, sicut lucere est actus
lucentis.121
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In another way, esse is said to be that
which pertains to the nature of a thing,
according to which it is divided by the ten
genera; and this esse is in a thing, and it is
the act of a being resulting from the
principles of the thing, as to shine is the act
of a shining thing.

In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 904.
De trin., q. 5, a. 3, Leonine ed., vol. 50, p. 147, lines 101-105.
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In III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 3, p. 238.
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Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius
essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod
sit aliquod superadditum ad modum
accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per
principia essentiae.122

Although the esse of a thing is different
from its essence, it should not be
understood to be something added in the
mode of an accident, but rather as quasiconstituted by the principles of the essence.

Such remarks by Aquinas are often explained by appealing to a characteristic of
the relation between essence and esse within things to which we made allusion earlier,
namely, the fact that the esse or actus essendi by which something is or exists in the
nature of things is limited and specified by the very essence it actualizes and enters into
composition with. Thus, considered as limited and specified by its essence, the esse or
actus essendi of a thing may be said to subsist (consistit) in, or to result from, the
congregation of the essential principles of a thing, that is, from the union or composition
of form and matter.123
This does not explain, however, Aquinas’ characterization at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1,
a. 3 of a thing’s esse in terms of the composition of accident with subject. Especially
when considered as specified by its essence, that is to say, as resulting from the
composition of matter and form, the esse or actus essendi of a thing is identified by
Aquinas as the thing’s substantial esse. Such esse is in turn distinguished by Aquinas as
really distinct from a thing’s accidental esse, which results from the composition of
accident with subject.124 Now, the composition of accident with subject does not result in
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In IV Meta., lect. 2, n. 559, Marietti ed., p. 155.
See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 30-31; also Joseph Owens, “Aquinas
on Knowing Existence,” in St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: Collected Papers of
Joseph Owens, ed. John R. Catan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 28.
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See In II Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 947: “[E]x compositione formae
ad subjectum vel ad materiam, relinquitur quoddam esse substantiale vel accidentale;”De ente, c.
6, Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 380, lines 10-13: “[S]icut ex forma et materia relinquitur esse
substantiale quando componuntur, ita ex accidente et subiecto relinquitur esse accidentale quando
accidens subiecto aduenit;” De principiis naturae, c. 1, Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 39, lines 4-8):
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any way in the existence of the latter, for the subject of an accident already pre-exists in
act.125 How is it possible, then, that a thing’s esse be described by Aquinas as ‘consisting’
in a certain composition of accident with subject?
We can make sense of Aquinas’ remarks by considering them in their proper
theoretical context, namely, the enuntiabile theory. Let us examine the passage in
question in more detail. Aquinas writes:
Alia [operatio] autem comprehendit esse
rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam
esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a
qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in
quadam compositione formae ad materiam,
vel accidentis ad subjectum.126

But the other [operation] comprehends the
esse of a thing by composing an
affirmation, because also the esse of a thing
composed of matter and form, from which
the intellect receives cognition, subsists
(consistit) in a certain composition of form
with matter or of accident with subject.

Clearly, Aquinas is offering an explanation, but its purpose is not as clear as it might
seem. The ‘etiam’ after ‘quia’ indicates that something new will be added to that which
has already been said. Unfortunately, it is easily missed or, alternatively, misinterpreted
so that Aquinas’ remarks on the esse of a thing composed of matter and form as
subsisting (consistit) in the composition of form with matter or of accident with subject
are taken as an explanation, or as an additional explanation, for why the intellect

“Sed duplex est esse, scilicet esse essentiale rei sive substantiale, ut hominem esse, et hoc est esse
simpliciter; est autem aliud esse accidentale, ut hominem esse album, et hoc est esse aliquid.”
125
See ST I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 56:”Nam cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in
actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur
ens, secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse
substantiale rei uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens
simpliciter. Per actus autem superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid, sicut esse album
significat esse secundum quid: non enim esse album aufert esse in potentia simpliciter, cum
adveniat rei iam praeexistenti in actu.” Also, De ver., q. 21, a. 5, Leonine ed., vol. 22, 3/1, p. 605,
lines 87-89: “[A]liquid dicitur esse ens absolute propter suum esse substantiale, sed propter esse
accidentale non dicitur esse absolute;” and ST I, q. 77, a. 6, Leonine ed., vol. 5, p. 246: “Forma
autem accidentalis non facit esse simpliciter; sed esse tale, aut tantum, aut aliquo modo se habens:
subiectum enim eius est ens in actu.”
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In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 903.
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comprehends the esse or existence of a thing by composing an affirmation. However, as
we shall see next, they are intended to explain something slightly different.
When discussing the interpretation of the expression “esse rei” as signified by
enuntiabilia, we saw that the intellect composes an affirmation to comprehend ‘the esse
of a thing’ in more than one sense. Although every proposition signifies ‘the esse of a
thing’, not every proposition signifies or asserts the existence of the thing denoted by its
subject-term. Such is the case of the propositions ‘Socrates is a man’ and ‘Socrates is
white’, by which the intellect comprehends, not ‘the existence of Socrates’, but ‘the being
human of Socrates’ and ‘the being white of Socrates’ respectively. Given that, for
Aquinas, the truth of the intellect arises from its conformity to reality, in order to
comprehend truthfully ‘the esse of a thing’, taken in the sense of ‘the being so-and-so of a
thing’, the intellect composes an affirmation, because a thing’s esse, taken in this sense,
involves some composition or, as Aquinas has written earlier in the Sentences, is from the
inherence of some form in a subject:
[O]mne esse a forma aliqua inhaerente est,
sicut esse album ab albedine. . . . [N]on
potest intelligi quod paries sit albus sine
albedine inhaerente.127

All being (esse) is from some inhering
form, as being white is from whiteness. . . .
It cannot be understood that a wall is white
without an inhering whiteness.

Hence, in keeping with the current paradigmatic examples, in order to comprehend ‘the
being white of Socrates’, the intellect composes the affirmation ‘Socrates is white’, in
which whiteness is attributed to ‘Socrates’ as inherent, because ‘the being white of
Socrates’ results from (relinquitur; cf. note 124) or subsists (consistit) in (to use the
language of In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3) the real composition of the accidental form
whiteness with the subject ‘Socrates’, that is to say, results from the inherence of
127
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whiteness in Socrates. Likewise, in order to comprehend ‘the being human of Socrates’,
the intellect composes the affirmation ‘Socrates is a man’, because ‘the being human of
Socrates’ results from (or subsists in) the real composition of the essence humanity with
the individual matter by which ‘Socrates’ is this man, that is to say, from the inherence of
humanity in Socrates.
Aquinas’ remarks at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 on ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’
as subsisting (consistit) in the composition of form with matter and of accident with
subject are thus not an explanation for why the intellect composes an affirmation to
comprehend ‘the esse of a thing’ in the sense of ‘the existence of a thing’. Rather, they
are an explanation for why the intellect composes an affirmation to comprehend ‘the esse
of a thing’ in the sense of ‘the being-so-and-so of a thing’. In sum, when Aquinas
characterizes the esse of a thing or esse rei in terms of the composition of form with
matter or of accident with subject, the expression “esse rei” should not be taken in the
sense of ‘the existence of a thing’, but rather in the sense of ‘the being-so-and-so of a
thing’. Notice, however, that Aquinas’ reference at In I Sent. d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 to ‘the esse
of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ as the ultimate object of the second operation of the intellect
encompasses all of the senses in which the expression ‘esse rei’ may be taken under the
paradigmatic case of the ‘existential enuntiabile’ ‘that Socrates exists’. Aquinas has
introduced the discussion by remarking on the real distinction (and hence composition) of
essence and esse within things. Thus, when Aquinas writes that the human intellect, in its
second operation, comprehends ‘the esse of a thing’ by composing an affirmation, he has
in mind first and foremost ‘the existence of a thing’ (which, too, may be said to subsist
(consistit) in a certain composition, the composition of essence and esse within the thing).
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On the other hand, once again, ‘esse rei’ cannot signify the act of being in ‘existential
enuntiabilia’ alone; otherwise, such enuntiabilia would exclude compositions of “form
and matter” and “subject and accident” in which “being-so-and-so” is predicated, and the
corpus of In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 would defend only the claim that God knows
‘existential enuntiabilia’.
For Aquinas to use ‘esse rei’ to capture the object of propositions that are both
existential and predicamental fits his theory of truth as a reflection of the composite
human mode of knowing creaturely composites according to their mode of being. As
Aquinas writes in the response to the second objection In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, our
cognition arises from things that have a “composite esse” (esse compositum):
Sed intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a
rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent,
non apprehendit illud esse nisi
componendo et dividendo.128

But our intellect, whose cognition arises
from things that have composite esse,
apprehends this esse only by composing
and dividing.

Given the composite character of creatures (which are the proper object of our cognition),
the human intellect cannot apprehended ‘the esse of a thing’ unless by means of
composition; for, truth in the intellect arises from the intellect’s conformity to reality in
seeing and affirming that form or esse belongs to some subject. This doctrine is reflected
in Aquinas’ remarks earlier in the Sentences on ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ as the
cause of truth in the intellect:
Cum autem in re sit quidditas ejus et suum
esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis
quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab
esse imponitur; et in ipsa operatione
intellectus accipientis esse rei sicut est per
quamdam similationem ad ipsum,
completur relatio adaequationis, in qua
consistit ratio veritatis. Unde dico, quod
128

Since in a thing there is its essence and its
esse, truth is founded on the esse of a thing
more than on its essence, just as the term
‘ens’ is imposed from esse [more than from
essence]. And the relation of adequation, in
which [relation] the notion of truth
consists, is completed in the operation of
the intellect that, through a certain likeness

In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 904.
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ipsum esse rei est causa veritatis, secundum to [the esse of a thing] takes the esse of a
quod est in cognitione intellectus.129
thing just as it is. Hence, I say that the esse
of a thing is the cause of truth according as
it is in the cognition of the [human]
intellect.
The text fits Aquinas’ doctrine in the later Summa theologiae I, q. 16, a. 2 that knowing
truth involves seeing the form (or esse) in some subject (res), and in predicating that
“likeness” of the thing to which it belongs. Thus, the conception of truth as adaequatio
intellectus et rei matchesAquinas’ distinctive theory of the proposition and its object
according to which the intellect comprehends ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ only
through its second operation, by composing an affirmation in which truth is known.
Before we continue, let us summarize the discussion up to this point. I have
argued that, given the theoretical context of the discussion, Aquinas’ correlation at In I
Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 between the second operation of the intellect and ‘the esse of a
thing’ or ‘esse rei’ should be understood as addressing, not the intellect’s apprehension of
esse as a simple (actus essendi by itself), but rather the intellect’s apprehension of esse as
it belongs to a subject or supposit. The reason the intellect comprehends ‘the esse of a
thing’ or ‘esse rei’ in its second operation by composing an affirmation (i.e., by means of
enuntiabilia) is that ‘the esse of a thing’ is a composed unit subsisting (consistit) in, most
notably, the composition of essence and esse, but also in the composition of form with
matter and of accident with subject.
The notion that enuntiabilia signify in reality a composite object is a central
element of Aquinas’ answer to the question of the article, namely, whether enuntiabilia
are objects of God’s knowledge. God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia is problematic not only
because of the composite character of enuntiabilia, but also because of the composite
129
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character of that which the human intellect knows by means of enuntiabilia. For Aquinas,
God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia is not guaranteed merely by claiming that God knows
that which enuntiabilia signify, i.e., ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’, rather than
enuntiabilia themselves. Instead, Aquinas adds two other steps to the argument,
declaring that God knows ‘the esse of each thing’ (esse cujuslibet rei), and therefore,
enuntiabilia, by knowing his own esse, which is simple and not other than his essence:
Similiter etiam in ipso Deo est considerare
naturam ipsius, et esse ejus; et sicut natura
sua est causa et exemplar omnis naturae, ita
etiam esse suum est causa et exemplar
omnis esse. Unde sicut cognoscendo
essentiam suam, cognoscit omnem rem; ita
cognoscendo esse suum, cognoscit esse
cujuslibet rei; et sic cognoscit omnia
enuntiabilia, quibus esse significatur; non
tamen diversa operatione nec
compositione, sed simpliciter; quia esse
suum non est aliud ab essentia, nec est
compositum consequens.130

Similarly, in God himself it is possible to
consider his nature and his esse; and just as
his nature is cause and exemplar of every
nature, so also his esse is cause and
exemplar of every esse. Thus, just as by
knowing his own essence God knows each
thing (res), so also by knowing his own
esse, he knows the esse of each thing; and
thus he knows all enuntiabilia by which
esse is signified; although without diversity
of operation or composition, but simply,
because his esse is not other than his
essence, nor it is the result a composite.

The same argument is found in the response to the second objection, where once again
Aquinas remarks on the composite character of ‘the esse of a thing’:
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ipsum esse
divinum quod est simplex, est exemplar
omnis esse compositi quod in creatura est;
et ideo per esse suum simplex cognoscit
sine compositione intellectuum vel
divisione omne esse vel non esse quod rei
convenit.131

[T]he divine esse itself, which is simple, is
the exemplar of every composite esse that
is in the creature; and for this reason
through his own simple esse [God] knows
without composition or division of
concepts every esse or non esse that
belongs to a thing.

God’s esse, which is simple, is cause and exemplar of “every composite esse that is in the
creature.” Thus, knowing his esse, God knows the esse of all things (esse rei), and
therefore what signifies it. But this knowledge introduces no ontological composition or
130
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division in God, whether in God’s act of intellection, as if in a judgment, or in a complex
verbum produced within God; for, all esse rei is a reflection of God’s esse, which is
conceptually distinct from, though really identical to his simple essence, of which it is the
act (esse Dei). The human intellect, on the other hand, comprehends the esse of things by
means of composition in act of understanding (judgment) and in verbum (the complex
verbum in the mind that affirms ‘esse’ as true of a ‘res’). In answering the question of
God’s simple knowledge of the composite enuntiabilia, then, Aquinas develops a
distinctive theory of propositions and their objects which allows him to capture the
“complexity” of all propositions under the unity of the esse Dei, not of the divine
essence, as their exemplar. The paradigm case for propositions is that of the predication
of esse or actuality or form of a supposit or subject. Thus, Aquinas reinterprets the
paradigm in the standard “inherence theory” of the proposition in terminist logic: the
predication of a form of matter or of some subject. Existential propositions such as
‘Socrates is’ can also be taken as predicating a form. But rather than reducing being to
form, Aquinas moves in the opposite direction: all propositions can be related to
existential propositions as the primary instance, so that all propositions can be seen as
predicating the act of being of a thing; hence, all propositions signify esse rei, the act of
existence of a thing. And, since propositions are the object of the second act of the mind,
this esse rei is comprehended only in the act that targets propositions.
In later writings, the second operation of the intellect is no longer associated with
esse rei. Aquinas rather associates the composition of the intellect, paradigmatically, with
real composition, most notably, the composition of form with matter and accident with
subject. The logical composition of subject and predicate is said to be rooted in the real
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composition of form with matter or accident with subject. It is real composition, not esse
rei, that Aquinas identifies as the foundation and cause of truth in the intellect. 132 By now
we have seen how such association is perfectly compatible with Aquinas’ understanding
of propositions as signifying esse rei, that is, as signifying the inherence of esse in a
subject.133 Nevertheless, it must be observed, although in later writing Aquinas no longer
associates the second operation of the intellect with esse rei, he continues to associate
enuntiabilia with esse rei in the context of the discussion of divine knowledge.
In the Summa contra Gentiles (1261-63), for example, having previously showed
that God does not know by composing and dividing, Aquinas remarks:
Non autem propter hoc oportet nos dicere
quod enuntiabilia ignorat. Nam essentia
sua, cum sit una et simplex, exemplar est
omnium multiplicium et compositorum. Et
sic per ipsam Deus omnem multitudinem et
compositionem tam naturae quam rationis
cognoscit.134

But we must not for this reason say that
God does not know enuntiabilia. For his
essence, since it is one and simple, is
exemplar of all multiple and composite
things. Thus, through it [his essence], God
knows every multiplicity and composition
both of nature and of reason.

Notice especially in this passage the reference to multiplicity and composition, both of
reason and of nature, in relation to enuntiabilia. As we have seen, enuntiabilia are
complexa, and they signify something multiple and composite. Still, this passage invites
the familiar objection: if we were right to say that In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 explains
God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia by appealing, not to the divine essence (alone), but to
the divine esse, then it could again appear that Aquinas has changed his mind. If we had
no further evidence, it might be hard to accept the obvious resolution of the apparently
contradictory answers between 1251 and 1259: the ‘esse Dei’, which is identical to
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deitas, is invoked precisely to explain how God through the exemplarity of his simple
essence can know composite esse rei. But we do have further evidence.
In the Summa theologiae (1265-73), Aquinas addresses once again the question of
God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia. His answer to the question is as follows:
[C]um formare enuntiabilia sit in potestate
intellectus nostri; Deus autem scit quidquid
est in potentia sua vel creaturae, ut supra
dictum est; necesse est quod Deus sciat
omnia enuntiabilia quae formari possunt.
Sed, sicut scit materialia immaterialiter, et
composita simpliciter, ita scit enuntiabilia
non per modum enuntiabilium, quasi
scilicet in intellectu eius sit compositio vel
divisio enuntiabilium; sed unumquodque
cognoscit per simplicem intelligentiam,
intelligendo essentiam uniuscuiusque. Sicut
si nos in hoc ipso quod intelligimus quid
est homo, intelligeremus omnia quae de
homine praedicari possunt.135

[S]ince to form enuntiabilia is in the power
of our intellect, and God knows whatever is
in his own power or in [the power] of a
creature, as was said above, it is necessary
that God knows all enuntiabilia that can be
formed. But, just as God knows material
things immaterially, and composite things
simply, so he knows enuntiabilia, not in the
manner of enuntiabilia, namely, as if in his
intellect there were composition or division
of enuntiabilia. Rather, God knows each
thing through a simple understanding
(intelligentiam) by understanding the
essence of each. It is as if we, by
understanding what man is, were to
understand all that can be predicated of
man.

The response is intriguing because it sounds some notes that resemble the solutions of
both 1251 and 1259. As in the SCG I, c. 59, God is said to know enuntiabilia through a
simple understanding (there through his essence, here as if in the simple notion ‘human’).
Nonetheless, as in In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Aquinas emphasizes that God knows the
complex that we know in our propositional knowledge. In fact, he adds three points not
found earlier: God knows all the enuntiabilia that we know in our propositions, and, in
fact, knows all propositions that can possibly be made (because he knows all potencies,
including our own). Later in the same article, in response to the second objection (which
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runs along the same lines as the second objection in In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3),136
Aquinas makes a reference to that which is signified by enuntiabilia, identifying it, as in
the Sentences commentary, as ‘esse rei’ or the esse of a thing:
[C]ompositio enuntiabilis significat aliquod
esse rei, et sic Deus per suum esse, quod
est eius essentia, est similitudo omnium
eorum quae per enuntiabilia
significantur.137

The enuntiable composition signifies some
esse of a thing, and in this way God,
through his own esse, which is his essence,
is a likeness of all those things that are
signified through enuntiabilia.

Aquinas’ general description of enuntiabilia in the Summa theologiae is one with which
we are familiar. Enunciations are characteristic of a human mode of cognition. They are
formed by the intellect’s act of composing and dividing, and are thus identified with the
sort of composition formed by predication (putting together the predicate with the
subject). Furthermore, Aquinas speaks of the “composition” of an enuntiabile, which is a
sign of ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’, which enuntiabilia themselves are said to
signify.
There is certainly some development on Aquinas’ treatment of the question of
God’s knowledge of enuntiabilia in the mature writings; Aquinas does not do things the
same way. But one can see that there is an essential unity in the doctrine.

ST I, q. 14, a. 14, arg. 2, Leonine ed., vol. 4, p. 194: “[O]mnis cognitio fit per aliquam
similitudinem. Sed in Deo nulla est similitudo enuntiabilium, cum sit omnino simplex. Ergo Deus
non cognoscit enuntiabilia.” Cf. In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, arg. 2, Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 902:
“Praeterea ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 21, quando intellectus intelligit affirmationem et
negationem, fit quaedam compositio intellectuum. Sed in divino intellectus nulla est compositio.
Ergo enuntiabilia non cognoscit.”
137
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136

214
Concluding Remarks on the Intellect’s Apprehension of Esse Rei
at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3

From our examination of In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, it is evident that in setting up
the correlation between the second operation of the intellect and esse rei, Aquinas does
not have in mind as the ultimate object of the second operation of the intellect esse
considered in itself as a simple, the actus essendi, as for the standard interpretation, but
rather esse or actus essendi as part of a complex, as predicated and known of things,
belonging to them as its subject or supposit. Is this the only manner in which the intellect
may apprehend a thing’s esse? It is true that the intellect cannot apprehend ‘the esse of a
thing’ except by composing an affirmation (as some adherents of the standard
interpretation may agree). But this composite apprehension is only possible if the human
intellect already conceives the esse as an act or ‘form’ to be predicated of a subject or res:
esse + rei. The argument of In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 presupposes ‘est’ or ‘est ens’ or
‘habet esse’ or ‘est homo’ or ‘est album’ as ‘forms’ that may be combined in an
enuntiation about a subject. From Aquinas’ correlation between the two operations of the
intellect and a thing’s essence and esse, it does not follow that the intellect cannot
conceive esse just as essence as a simple non-composite content. Quite the opposite:
without the simple term, the enunciation is impossible. And if Aquinas means the
judgment concerns esse as simple and non-composite, he fails to address the question of
how God knows composite enuntiabilia (what is a simple enuntiabile?) Aquinas’ aim at
In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 is to contrast a proposional or complex apprehension of ‘the
esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ in humans that in God is not really distinct from his
apprehension of his esse, which is his essence. Nothing in this project rules out a simple
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conception of esse. The text of Distinction 38 takes no position on the matter (nor,
admittedly, does it make all of the distinctions necessary to address it). The question of a
simple conception of esse is resolved by examining other texts in light of Aquinas’
semantic theory, which shows us that esse can, indeed, must be conceived in a simple
conception.

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation I present evidence for the following two thesis statements:
First, Aquinas recognizes as part of his semantic theory a simple or non-composite
conception of esse. Second, the traditional reading of Aquinas’ remarks in the
commentaries on the Sentences and on Boethius’ De trinitate on the intellect’s
apprehension of a thing’s esse as ruling out the possibility of a simple conception of esse
cannot be made consistent with the text.
Chapters II and III provide support for the first statement. In Chapter II, I show
that Aquinas subscribes to a version of the standard semantic theory of the mid-thirteenth
century Latin west according to which the signification of terms, nouns and verbs alike, is
constituted primarily by their “signing relation” with a simple or non-composite
conception of some res. For Aquinas, a term immediately signifies a concept or
conception in the mind, but it ultimately signifies the res that is the object of that
conception. Thus, the res significata (in the paradigm case an extra mental reality) is
signified through the mediation of the intellect’s conception the term immediately
signifies. Most of our terms signify a form or nature, such as humanity; but, the res
significata of a term is semantically, not necessarily ontologicaly a form. For Aquinas,
anything we are able to conceive, we are able to name, including privations. Regarding
the conception signified by terms, we have seen that at different places throughout his
works Aquinas characterizes it as simple or non-composite (incomplexa), whereas the
conception signified by propositions is characterized as complex or composite
(complexa). Also on more than one occasion Aquinas specifically links the kind of
conception that nouns and verbs signify to the first operation of the intellect, and the kind
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of conception that propositions signify, to the second operation of the intellect.
Accordingly, the complexity of the conception signified by propositions is associated by
Aquinas with predication, and hence with its being the subject of truth value. Aquinas
refers to the conception signified by terms as simple or non-composite because it lacks
the composition of a proposition. Thus, the conception signified by terms, insofar as it
contains no predication, is not subject to truth or falsity per se.
Under this semantic framework, the nouns ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ as well as the verb
‘est’, all of which have esse as their res significata, must signify a simple conception of
esse. Accordingly, as Chapter III shows, these terms, for Aquinas, signify, not a
‘judgment’ of esse, but a ‘concept’ of esse; that is to say, they signify a ‘simple
conception’ of their res, which is esse. In order to ascertain the sort of conception these
terms signify, I examine in Chapter III, the modes of signification that Aquinas assigns to
these terms. As shown in Chapter II, following the practice of pre-modist logicians,
Aquinas relates the notion of modi significandi with that of modi intelligendi. Given that
the res significata of a term is signified through the mediation of the intellect’s
conception, which conception term immediately signify, the mode or manner in which a
term signifies its res signifcata is a reflection of the mode or manner in which the same
res is conceived by the intellect. More precisely, the modes of signification of terms form
part of the content of the conception signified by terms, the significatum. Hence, by
examining the mode of signification that Aquinas assigns to the terms ‘ens’, ‘esse’, and
‘est’, we are able to determine the sort of conception these terms signify.
In particular, what such an examination discloses is that Aquinas identifies the
pair ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ as an example of a concrete term and its abstract counterpart.
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Furthermore, Aquinas parallels their signification with that of the pairs ‘albus’ - ‘albedo’
and ‘currens’ - ‘currere’. All of these pairs have in common that they signify the same
res significata under different modes of signification: ‘ens’, ‘albus’, and ‘currens’ signify
in the concrete mode (i.e., without precision) whereas ‘esse’, ‘albedo’, and ‘currere’
signify in the abstract mode (i.e., with precision). The parallel set up by Aquinas between
these terms shows that, forhim, the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ signify the same sort of
conception that the other terms signify. Otherwise, the parallel would be impossible.
Thus, despite possible appearances to the contrary, the terms ‘ens’ and ‘esse’ must
signify a simple conception of their res, which is esse.
The abstract term ‘esse’ appears the least to signify a judgment or complex
conception. For, it signifies its res as ‘that by which’ and as simple; thus, it excludes in its
signification all sorts of composition, from which it prescinds. By contrast, the term ‘ens’
appears the most to signify a judgment, for it signifies ‘quod est’ (‘what is’). Parmenides
exploited the paradoxes that ensues if ens entails an existential judgment. But, explains
Aquinas, the term ‘ens’ does not signify the composition signified when one says ‘aliquid
est’ (‘something is’). Rather, the term ‘ens’, insofar as it signifies esse in the concrete
mode, “consignifies” composition; for, it signifies ‘a thing having esse’; that is to say, it
signifies ‘the subject of esse’. Furthermore, the kind of composition ‘ens’ consignifies is
not the kind of composition the judgment ‘something is’ signifies, wherein a comparison
is made between a thing and esse, based on which a truth value may be assigned. The
term ‘ens’ signifies ‘quod est’, but unlike what is the case in the judgment ‘aliquid est’
(‘something is’), the ‘est’ in ‘quod est’ is not a predicate, but signifies the res significata
of the term.
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The case of the verb ‘est’ is parallel to that of ‘ens’. Taken in itself, that is, as a
verb and not as short-hand for the proposition ‘aliquid est’ (‘something is’), ‘est’
consignifies composition, for verbs signify their action as inherent in a subject. However,
since no an actual inherence is asserted, the conception signified has no truth value. Thus,
like the noun ‘ens’, the verb ‘est’ consignifies composition insofar as it includes in its
mode of signification the subject of esse. Nevertheless, neither the noun ‘ens’ nor the
verb ‘est’ signify that some subject is or exists, that is to say, the fact that esse actually
inheres in some subject. Hence, neither term signifies a judgment.
Chapter IV provides evidence for the second thesis statement: the traditional
reading of Aquinas’ remarks in the commentaries on the Sentences and on Boethius’ De
trinitate on the intellect’s apprehension of a thing’s esse as ruling out the possibility of a
simple conception of esse cannot be made consistent with the text. In this chapter, I offer
an exegesis of the key text, In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, where Aquinas refers twice to the
intellect’s apprehension of a thing’s esse in its second operation. My reading of the text is
guided by the theoretical context of the discussion. The question Aquinas addresses here
is a standard one for thirteenth-century theologians: can God with his simple
understanding know enuntiabilia, which are complex, and if so, how? In reviewing the
theory of enuntiabilia, we may see that in both logical and theological contexts, the term
‘enuntiabilia’ is used to identify the immediate objects of the intellect’s act of
composition and division. Enuntiabilia are the mental products of the second operation of
the intellect, that which the intellect produces and properly understands when it composes
and divides. Now, enuntiabilia signify something in reality, which at In I Sent., d. 38, q.
1, a. 3 Aquinas identifies as ‘esse rei’ or ‘the esse of a thing’. It follows, then, that by
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means of enuntiabilia, the intellect comprehends in its second operation ‘the esse of a
thing’ or ‘esse rei’. Hence, as Aquinas observes in the text from the Sentences
commentary, the human intellect comprehends ‘esse rei’ by composing an affirmation.
The expression “esse rei” as signified by enuntiabilia stands, not for something
simple, but for something composite. Evidence for this claim is found in Aquinas’
presentation of the inherence theory of predication. In that presentation, the intellect’s
composition of subject and predicate involves the predication of esse, that is to say, the
attribution to a subject of esse taken either in the sense of existence or in the sense of a
particular mode of being (as in ‘being white’ or ‘esse album’). In fact, even in those cases
where the verb ‘is’ is not explicitly contained in the predicate, as in the proposition
‘Socrates runs’, esse is attributed to some subject; for every verb can be restated with ‘is’.
It follows that in the composition of enuntiabilia, that is to say, in the composition
signified by subject and predicate, the intellect conceives ‘the esse of a subject’, either in
the sense of ‘the existence of a subject’, as in the enuntiabile ‘that Socrates is’, or in the
sense of ‘the being-so-and-so of a subject’, as in the enuntiabile ‘that Socrates is human’
or ‘that Socrates is white’.
Now, enuntiabilia are the primary bearers of truth value. Although that which the
human intellect knows in its second operation by means of enuntiabilia constitutes one
single object, such single object is by no means simple (unum simplex). For, how could
something which is intrinsically composed, i.e., an enuntiabile, be ‘equated to’ something
which lacks composition, the simple actus essendi? If Aquinas’ conception of truth as
adaequatio intellectus et rei is to be legitimate, that which corresponds ex parte rei to the
composition of enuntiabilia will be something equally complex or composed (unum
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complexum), at least in the paradigm case. Thus, if “esse rei” is that which all
enuntiabilia signify in reality, then the expression “esse rei” cannot stand for simple or
non-composite esse by itself, that is, esse considered apart from any subject in reality, of
which it is affirmed in a way that yields a truth value. We conclude, then, that the
expression “esse rei,” when used by Aquinas to indicate that which enuntiabilia signify,
stands paradigmatically for the composed unit in the nature of things that is a subject or
supposit and its esse. In other words, that which the human intellect knows by means of
enuntiabilia in its second operation is esse, not as simple, but as “inherent” in and
predicated of a subject or supposit.
Aquinas’ aim at In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 is to identify a propositional
apprehension of ‘esse rei’ or ‘the esse of a thing’ in humans that in God is not really
distinct from his apprehension of his essence, which is esse. It is precisely in the context
of explaining divine simple knowledge of enuntiabilia that Aquinas develops a
distinctive theory of propositions and their objects, where all propositions are related to
existential propositions as the primary instance, so that all propositions can be seen as in
some way predicating esse (the act of being) of a thing, and hence as signifying ‘the esse
of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’: esse + rei. Aquinas’ association of the intellect’s second
operation with ‘the esse of a thing’ or ‘esse rei’ is thus a consequence of his distinctive
view of the object of propositions. By establishing ‘esse rei’ as that which the human
intellect’s knows by means of enuntiabilia, Aquinas is able to explain how God knows
enuntiabilia in a simple understanding. For, inasmuch as God’s esse, which is simple, is
cause and exemplar of all composite esse in creatures, in knowing his own esse, God
knows that which enuntiabilia signify, although not through composition or division, but
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simply. Nothing in this project rules out a simple conception of esse. The Distinction 38
of the Book I of the Sentences commentary takes no position on the matter (nor,
admittedly, does it make the distinctions necessary to address it). The question of a
simple conception of esse is resolved by examining other texts in light of Aquinas’
semantic theory, which shows us that esse can, indeed, must be conceived in a simple
conception. If esse as a simple actus essendi is said to be what is known only in
judgment, then Aquinas fails to account for the divine knowledge of composites. The
standard reading in Aquinas scholarship on the apprehension of esse as act, and the only
serious alternative reading, that propositional being is meant, appear unwarranted once
one examines the distinctive semantic theory of terms and propositions that Aquinas
employs to explain God’s knowledge.
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